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7Foreword
This volume collects the proceedings of an international conference on the 
historical work of Christopher Bayly, held in Naples on 10 March 2016 by the 
joint initiative of the Departments of Political Sciences and Humanities of the 
Federico II University (“From the History of the Empire to World History: The 
Historiographical Itinerary of C.A. Bayly”).1 At less than one year from his un-
timely death, the convenors intended to promote a first survey of the rich and 
complex scientific legacy of the English historian, calling on a group of specialists 
in the several disciplinary areas in which Bayly distinguished himself to collabo-
rate on this challenging and necessarily multifarious task. The conference did not 
pretend to cover the whole of Bayly’s many-sided work, but, more realistically, 
it aimed to offer a general outline of his intellectual achievement by focusing on 
his foremost contributions to the different scholarly fields in which he pioneered 
innovative approaches throughout his academic career.2 The resulting map is far 
from exhaustive, but the papers published in this volume provide an almost com-
plete account (the most relevant exceptions being Forgotten Armies and Forgotten 
Wars, the diptych on the collapse of the English domination in Asia written 
by Bayly with Tim Harper, and the posthumous Remaking the Modern World, 
1900-2015, that appeared in 2018) of the extraordinary sequence of great books 
by which he made repeated breakthroughs, over a period of five decades, on 
some of the most advanced research fronts of international historiography: the 
1 A shortened Italian version was published in Passato e presente. Rivista di storia contemporanea, 
35 (2017), no. 100: 97-130.
2 For a brief overview of Bayly’s intellectual biography see C.A. Bayly, “Historiographical and 
Autobiographical Note”, in idem, Origins of Nationality in South Asia. Patriotism and Ethi-
cal Government in the Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
307-322, and C. Clark, S. Bayly, “Christopher Bayly and the Making of World History,” in 
C.A. Bayly, Remaking the Modern World, 1900-2015: Global Connections and Comparisons (Ho-
boken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), xiii-xviii, which are now complemented by the bibliography 
annexed to the present volume (below, 149-160).
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local roots of the Indian nationalist movement, the transition from pre-colo-
nial to colonial India and the role of indigenous society in the establishment 
of European domination in the subcontinent, the nature and limits of colonial 
power, the rise of the Second British Empire, the history of globalization and the 
nineteenth-century turn towards planetary modernity, the transregional devel-
opment of nationalism and liberalism.
The contributors do not give an univocal reading of the texts they analyze, 
but diverge at times also with respect to Bayly’s interpretation of central historical 
issues (i.e. the forms and ways of European expansion in Asia, the coexistence be-
tween Hindus and Muslims in the Mughal and in the colonial ages, the essential 
character and periodization of modern and contemporary world history). Such 
differences not only enrich the discussion, but confirm the multifacetedness and 
fecundity of his work. The common aim of the participants in the Neapolitan 
meeting, however, was to highlight the stages of the path through which Bayly 
emerged, by virtue of the success achieved with The Birth of the Modern World, 
1780-1914, as a key figure in the contemporary revival of world history.3 As 
already pointed out by previous authors,4 the most immediate intellectual prem-
ise of Bayly’s approach to the long nineteenth century has to be identified in a 
proposal of conceptualization of the history of globalization he had advanced in 
the early 2000s. On the other hand, the categorical apparatus adopted by Bayly, 
who was inclined to define the ‘global’ as a specific geohistorical space generated 
by the dynamic interaction between large regional societies, besides testifying 
to his substantial agreement with coeval developments in the North American 
New World History movement, reflected changes that had been affecting for a 
long time his original area of  specialization —British colonial history—, whose 
post-decolonization practitioners have shown a marked propensity to consider 
the Empire as a particular network of interregional connections.5
3 In 2016, in recognition of his outstanding services to global history, Bayly was posthumously 
awarded the Toynbee Prize conferred by the Foundation of the same name affiliated to the 
American Historical Association since 2010 (http://toynbeeprize.org/toynbee-prize/sir-christo-
pher-bayly-named-2016-toynbee-prize-winner/).
4 B. Bongiovanni, T. Detti, and P. Ginsborg, “L’alba di una globalizzazione imperfetta,” edited 
by B. Bongiovanni, Passato e presente, 27 (2009), no. 1: 11-29. 
5 T. Tagliaferri, “L’espansione europea nella prospettiva della nuova storia globale,” Il mestiere 
di storico, 11 (2019), no. 1: 5-26.
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The following pages show, first of all, through which thematic, conceptual 
and documentary options Bayly contributed to the reorientation of the imperi-
al and ‘European expansion’ studies. The historiographical path that emerges 
appears to be characterized by a growing complexity of the object investigated, 
by a progressive enlargement of its spatial and chronological boundaries. In this 
way, Bayly developed the conviction that only world history offered an analytical 
context suitable for the reconstruction of the vicissitudes of an expanded, com-
posite imperial system as ubiquitous as the British one. The road to a more direct 
engagement with world history was neither short nor predetermined. The results 
of the Neapolitan conference make it clearer, we hope, the fundamental assump-
tions on the basis of which Bayly took this further momentous step.
The seven essays collected here can be classified in two general categories that 
also summarize a chronological development in Bayly’s research work. To begin 
with, there are the essays concerned with the Indian, imperial and colonial his-
tory; secondly, the contributions devoted to world history. As is known, though, 
there is not a clear-cut division between the subjects that are closely interwoven. 
In other words, the historiographical path followed by Bayly never supersedes the 
original themes, but has extended them and developed them into a wider frame.
The essay by Maurizio Griffo (“The British Roots of Indian Politics: Bayly 
and the Cambridge School”) studies the first works of Bayly, dedicated to the 
emergence of Indian nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bay-
ly’s approach to Indian nationalism came in the wake of the so-called Cambridge 
School. This historiographical orientation aimed to show that Indian national-
ism was not an idealistic aspiration to independence and self-government, but 
was more easily understandable as a selfish commitment to place and office. 
From this angle, the Indian nationalistic movement had not to be studied ac-
cording to its ideological profile but according to the utilitaristic rationale of its 
promoters. These were not indomitable rebels, but were in some way connected 
with the colonial power. The first essays by Bayly and his first book, which derive 
from his PhD thesis, deal with the political and social evolution of the town of 
Allahabad and its surroundings from 1880 to 1920. Bayly’s narrative is in full 
accord with the tenets of the Cambridge School. The British domination in In-
dia is sustained by the active involvement of Indian collaborators. However, the 
need to rationalize the efficiency of the administrative machine from the 1880s 
onwards imposed on the British the need to give the indigenous collaborators 
spheres of influence (in local courts, municipalities, universities). So, the col-
laborators slowly acquired niches of patronage and power that, in the long run, 
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eroded the foundations of British dominion. Nevertheless, Bayly’ s analysis also 
gives some credit to the national ideology. In the conclusion of his first book, 
Bayly underlines the fact that the Congress, from the mid-1920s onwards, was 
able to represent the aspirations and hopes of large sectors of Indian society, 
building on the foundations of the mass movement campaigns the identity of 
Indian nationalism. 
The contribution by Michelguglielmo Torri (“India from the Pre-Colonial 
to the Colonial Era: The Shaping of the Indian Middle Class and the Roots of 
Communalism. Thinking Back on Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars”) con-
centrates on Bayly’s subsequent step into the field of Indian colonial history—i.e. 
Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Ex-
pansion, 1770-1870, the influential and seminal work published in 1983 which 
consolidated Bayly’s reputation as a first class scholar in the field of colonial 
India history. Bayly’s book analyses northern Indian society in the first century 
of the British expansion. Torri’s wide-ranging and accurate essay is divided into 
two different sections: a long and analytical summary of the book, followed by 
a critical discussion of the achievements of Bayly’s research. The long summary 
of the text is justified because Bayly’s book is a dense work based on a very wide 
range of unpublished sources. It is a work that, as has been noted by some com-
mentators, weaves together the subjects of two or three books.
In particular, notes Torri, there are two insights that Bayly’s research gives us. 
First of all, from his reconstruction, the fact emerges that the time preceding the 
British conquest of India was not a phase of decline and military anarchy. On the 
contrary, the crisis of the Mughal Empire saw the emergence of dynamic succes-
sor states able to ensure a flourishing economy. Secondly, the English historian 
makes it clear that, in the period between 1830 and 1850, the East India Com-
pany not only did not promote action to modernize the Indian subcontinent, but 
instead fuelled a very serious economic crisis—a crisis which is at the root of the 
Great Revolt of 1857. If these major heuristic insights of Bayly’s study profoundly 
revolutionize our knowledge of the history of India across the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, according to Torri, his investigation neglects some other 
essential factors for understanding the nature of British colonial domination.
Torri stresses in particular that Bayly, in describing the manner in which the 
East India Company acquired its dominion over the Indian peninsula, neglects 
the role of violence and assumes therefore an interpretative perspective that cuts 
out an essential aspect. In fact, without considering the British military superi-
ority, it is not even clear why some of the most dynamic sectors of Indian society 
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sided with the conquerors. In other words, in Torri’s opinion, the social groups 
which collaborated with the British were not free to choose the best ally, but were 
forced to collaborate because they had no alternative. In a substantially similar 
manner, Bayly, describing the evolution of Indian society in the nineteenth cen-
tury, does not dwell on the famine that struck Indian society or on the low effi-
ciency shown in that situation by British administrators, an attitude, underlines 
Torri, which is revealing of the nature of colonial rule.
A final critical survey is carried out regarding the emergence of the Indo-Mus-
lim conflict. In Bayly’s reconstruction, incidents of intercommunal violence have 
been recorded frequently since the second half of the eighteenth century. Ac-
cording to Torri, this is an insufficiently reasoned statement, which backdates a 
phenomenon that fully manifested itself only in the twentieth century. It is an 
affirmation that Bayly himself, in later interventions, will tend to attenuate.
The theme of the collaborators, faced from another perspective, is also at the 
centre of the contribution of Guido Abbattista (“Information, Communication 
and Knowledge in the Government of Empire”) who examines Empire and Infor-
mation, published by Bayly in 1996. The British historian’s research in this case 
addresses an aspect usually neglected by historiography. Colonial rule was based 
on a dense network of informers, mediators, messengers and spies who provided 
useful information to connect the Indian reality as a whole. This knowledge 
process is defined by Bayly as “orientalism in action”—a controversial definition 
that reiterates how, in colonial domination, there was an interaction with Indian 
society and, above all, an active role of the colonized. A large score of informers 
also existed in the Mughal Empire: the British inherited it and perfected it in a 
sofisticate informative network that saw a strong mix of colonial power and local 
elites. This system of relationship/knowledge went into crisis with the rebellion 
of 1857, which reveals its lack of functionality and, above all, the destabilizing 
nature of that way of interaction with Indian society.
Teodoro Tagliaferri’s essay (“Bayly’s Imperial Way to World History”) focus-
es on Imperial Meridian, a book published in 1989, where Bayly reconceptualizes 
the notion of imperial history and sets the premises for making it converge with 
global history.
The periodization of Imperial Meridian covers the fifty years following the 
American War of Independence, a pivotal age when the British reorganized their 
imperial system, and a periodization that will be resumed, more than a decade 
later, in The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Moreover, prefiguring a glob-
al historical approach, the reconstruction carried out in Imperial Meridian unites 
From the History of the Empire to World History
12
a geographical area that goes from North Africa to Indonesia, where the lines 
of development show significant affinities, characterized by important develop-
ments in the process of state-building and the growth of an articulated social 
structure. However, the analogies of development that Bayly identifies cannot 
hidden the differences in power and evolution between Eastern and European 
societies.
Another noteworthy aspect of the 1989 book is the full inclusion into the 
field of colonial history of the political and social events in the motherland. The 
impulse for the reorganization of the empire was motivated not so much by the 
industrial development as by the political events of the period—first of all, the 
crisis that led to the independence of the thirteen American colonies and, subse-
quently, the development of the French Revolution and the emergence of Bona-
partism. The British reorganization resulted in a re-legitimization of the empire 
and in the creation of what is called a constructive conservatism, an original mix 
of power politics and paternalism. In its non-European projection, the renewed 
imperial impulse did not crush the subject populations, but produced a fruitful 
hybridization in which locals actively participated.
The contribution of Maurizio Isabella (“Liberalism and Globalization”) ex-
amines the volume published in 2011 that Bayly dedicated to Indian thought in 
the liberal age (Recovering Liberties). Compared to other syntheses on the subject 
of liberalism, Bayly does not favour the coherence of conceptual construction, 
but wants to draw attention to the way in which some key political ideas related 
to political balance are carried out in a different context. In particular, what he is 
interested in highlighting is that, in the reception of liberal ideas, the focus is on 
the way in which those ideas are reinterpreted and adapted to meet the political 
needs, more than on fidelity to texts. In this perspective, classic liberal authors, 
such as Benjamin Constant or John Stuart Mill, are less important than heter-
odox authors such as Giuseppe Mazzini or Auguste Comte. More ingeniously, 
Bayly’s analysis seeks to underline how the differences between European and 
non-European political cultures are not so marked, because they share some 
common tenets such as an aversion to tyranny and the preference for a govern-
ment based on consensus.
Marco Meriggi’s contribution (“The Local and the Global: Bayly’s Birth of 
the Modern World”) examines probably the best known of Bayly’s works. Merig-
gi observes that the book covers what is commonly termed the long nineteenth 
century, but does it with a larger span and a more polycentric approach than had 
been done in works of synthesis written previously by other historians. It offers a 
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more comprehensive approach which justifies the definition of global history, an 
approach that is linked to Bayly’s previous study experience, because the fabric of 
the world historian is built on the foundations of the historian of colonial India 
and the British Empire. In Bayly’s narrative, there is a fruitful and significant 
historical dialectic between the global and the local. The spur for the global 
comes from the Western world—above all from Europe, and mostly from Great 
Britain and the British Empire. But the local is not a passive object of dominion: 
instead it reacts actively in a creative way. In other words, Bayly’s global world 
is not only polycentric, but also polymorphic. Bayly’s enhancement of the pe-
ripheral areas follows a definite axiological trend. Indeed, Meriggi notes that the 
British historian is more interested to study how non-European countries absorb 
the Western influence than to study how they rebel against colonial dominion. 
This approach is a creative evolution of the theme of the collaborators as a key to 
understanding the British penetration in India, adapted to the new dimension 
of global history. More problematic, according by Meriggi, is the idea of a kind 
of republican ecumene that Bayly singles out as a common feature of different 
countries, a generalisation that, in Meriggi’s opinion, disregards the undeniable 
and essential diversities of the various local contexts.
Laura Di Fiore (“The Origins of Indian Nationalism”) analyses Origins of 
Nationality in South Asia, a book published in 1998 that collects the Radhakr-
ishnan Memorial Lectures delivered at Oxford University in 1996 and several 
essays published in the previous fifteen years. Notwithstanding its miscellaneous 
origin, the book presents a strong unity. Its focus is on Indian nationalism, which 
Bayly reconsiders from a wider perspective than in previous works. Summarizing 
several decades of research work, the British historian argues against modernist 
interpretations of Indian nationalism, as expressed by scholars like Guha, Nandy 
or Chatterjee, who consider Indian nationalism a by-product of British impe-
rialism. For Bayly, Indian nationalism is not an imported product but has an 
autochthonous origin predating the establishment of colonial domination. 
At least from the seventeenth century onward, according to Bayly, it was 
possible to detect in India a loyalty towards the regional native country, a feel-
ing which is not far from that we find in Europe in the same period; but, in 
the subcontinent, it is possible also to detect a wider sense of belonging. In the 
Mughal period, promoted especially by Akbar, grows what Bayly calls an impe-
rial patriotism. Last but not least, it is necessary to consider, too, what the British 
historian calls the Indian ecumene—i.e. the existence of a wider community, 
perceived by the people dwelling in the different parts of the subcontinent as in 
From the History of the Empire to World History
14
some way unitary. On this background is grafted the later ideological nation-
alism of the struggles for independence. So Indian nationalism, far from being 
a cultural imposition of the colonial power, is understood as the outcome of a 
complex historical process—as a movement wherein the indigenous population 
is not confined to a secondary role, but acts as a protagonist.
In conclusion, if the essays collected here do not amount to an organic and 
integral profile, they can provide the materials from which to draw some general 
guidelines useful for understanding Bayly’s itinerary. Beginning with researches 
on colonial India, his investigation expanded first to the whole of British Empire 
and then to a world history aimed at reconsidering historical events, phenomena 
and processes in terms of their global connectedness. Bayly’s was not a linear 
path: each new field of inquiry did not cancel but rather enriched and made more 
complex the previous levels. The joint efforts of the scholars contributing to this 
volume make it possible to catch sight of an important red thread that seems 
to run throughout his work, linking the methodology employed in The Birth of 
Modern World with the strategies he put in place to unravel the complexities of 
the ‘global imperial’. This leitmotif consists in the heuristic prominence granted 
by Bayly to various types of elites placed at crucial junctions of the economic, 
political and cultural flows of ecumenical relevance, which he continued to re-
gard as the chief actors in the play of asymmetric interactions between regional 
histories that gave shape to the common past of contemporary world society.
M.G.
T.T.
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1
maurizio griffo
The British Roots of Indian Politics: 
Bayly and the Cambridge School
1. Indian Nationalism according to the Cambridge School
For those who are not familiar with colonial India studies, it is hard to under-
stand how charismatic and influential Bayly was. In this case, a personal memory 
might be more useful than a bibliographical review. In the summer of 1994, I 
happened to see Bayly in the archive at the India Office in London.1 That August 
morning, a veritable procession had taken place—at least five, six people, both 
British and Indian scholars, suspended the perusal of their documents and spent 
some time greeting him, talking to him, inviting him for a coffee at the archive 
bar. That sustained and spontaneous tribute was a definitive demonstration of 
the kind of authority he was in the field of subcontinental history, but a trusted 
rather than an intimidating one.2
At that time, Bayly was not yet a world history mentor, but his Indian studies 
path was already twenty years old. His first works were about colonial India: 
two articles and a book, which was a corrected and widened version of his PhD 
1 At the time, the new location of the British Library was not yet open, and the Indian admin-
istration’s archive was allocated in a detached site in Blackfriars Road.
2 Bayly’s dialogic and maieutic solicitation skills towards other scholars, especially the young 
ones, were unanimously acknowledged. See the obituaries in the British press: R. Drayton, 
Sir Christopher Bayly Obituary, http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/apr/23/sir-chris-
topher-bayly; Professor Sir Christopher Bayly, Historian – Obituary, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/obituaries/11558389/Professor-Sir-Christopher-Bayly-historian-obituary. See also David 
Armitage’s words reported by Paul Lay in his obituary in History Today, 13th May 2015, online 
edition, http://www.historytoday.com/paul-lay/christopher-bayly-1945-2015.
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thesis.3 More precisely, these studies were researches into the origins and develop-
ment of Indian nationalism. Bayly had not started these studies on his own: they 
were part of a research programme where many other scholars, PhD students and 
young researchers were involved, all willing to give new life to that field. Bayly 
was, as a matter of fact, a non-organic member of what later would be called the 
Cambridge School.4
The kind of researches promoted by that group have influenced the interpre-
tation of Indian nationalism and, at the same time, shed a different light on the 
classic version of the related facts, causing numerous controversies and historio-
graphic fine-tunings. The main accusation, coming especially from the Indian 
historians, was that they practised a neo-imperialist historiography, simply reit-
erating in a more sophisticated way the old English colonisers’ motivations for 
occupying India.5
At least for some decades, the commitment to the Indian independence move-
ment had meant confrontation with the texts of the Cambridge School as a bibli-
ographic imperative, which also meant being for or against its heuristic approach. 
Here we will not analyse its origins, related to African studies or other interest-
3 The PhD thesis is The Development of Political Organization in the Allahabad Locality, 1880-1925 
(University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1970). The two articles: “Local Control in Indian Towns. The 
Case of Allahabad, 1880-1920,” Modern Asian Studies, 5 (1971), no. 4: 289-311; idem, “Patrons 
and Politics in Northern India,” Modern Asian Studies 7 (1973), no. 3: 349-388. The book: The 
Local Roots of Indian Politics. Allahabad 1880-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Part of the 
work that had been excluded from the 1975 volume was published only many years after: C.A. 
Bayly, “Rural Conflict and the Roots of Indian Nationalism: Allahabad District since 1800,” in 
The Indian National Congress and Indian Society, 1885-1985: Ideology, Social Structure and Political 
Dominance, edited by P.R. Brass and F. Robinson (Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1987), 219-241.
4 Compared to other scholars in that group, Bayly’s position can be described as excentric, as 
he had studied at Oxford. The author gives many details about the choice of his PhD thesis 
topic in C.A. Bayly, “Epilogue: Historiographic and Autobiographical Note,” in idem, Origins 
of Nationality in South Asia. Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern In-
dia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 310-313. About Bayly’s excentricity compared to 
the Cambridge School, see A. Ganachari, “Studies in Indian Historiography: ‘The Cambridge 
School’”, Indica, 47 (2010), no. 1: 70-93, 79. Dipesh Chakrabarty believes that Bayly has never 
been part of the Cambridge School, a judgement that is, however, expressed in relation to the 
whole of his historical production and not just his first writings. See “Reading (the) Late Chris 
Bayly: A Personal Tribute,” South Asia History and Culture 7 (2016), no. 1: 1-6, 2. 
5 See T. Raychaudhuri, “Indian Nationalism as Animal Politics,” The Historical Journal, 22 
(1979), no. 3: 747-763; C. S. [Colin de Souza], “New Garb of Imperialistic Historiography,” 
Economic and Political Weekly, 9, nos. 45-46 (9 November 1974): 1897-1898.
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ing aspects like the Oxfordian roots, but we will mention some fundamentals: 
the Cambridge interpretation, contrary to contemporary fashion, had researched 
Indian nationalism not starting from its ideology or doctrine, but trying to un-
derstand its role in the development of the Indian society. For the Cambridge 
School the analyses of the social relationships, deriving networks and patronage 
of India at the time are far more relevant to this topic than the ideological matrix 
and the cultural suggestions of nationalism. The approach has been defined by 
some scholars as Namierite, because it interpreted the political life of India, in the 
pre-independence phase, with categories similar to those used by Lewis B. Namier 
to analyse the political events of eighteenth-century England.6 
In general, one should always bear in mind that the Cambridge School re-
used, through modern social analysis, the concept of collaborators referring to 
the colonial expansion in Africa, meaning that the English domination in India 
had become so deep and strong thanks to the cooperation of some natives, who 
had benefited from the British presence in Southern Asia. Understanding how 
that happened and why those relationships ultimately failed was the key to the 
knowledge of the growth and development of Indian nationalism.
This historiographic background is fundamental in order to evaluate Bayly’s 
first researches, as it gives the measure of his personal judgement in the context 
of a strongly standardized historical interpretation. The accusation of neo-im-
perialism directed towards the Cambridge School finds an extra explanation in 
the expository style of its members. The patronage system characterizing Indian 
political life was not only described through reconstruction of the relationships 
among notables, associations and groups, but also through the use of sarcasm 
and unflattering comparisons.7 These formal aspects are sometimes to be found 
6 On this topic, see H. Spodek, “Pluralist Politics in British India. The Cambridge Cluster of 
Historians of Modern India,” The American Historical Review, 84 (1979), 3: 688-707, 692. As 
underlined by Sarvepalli Gopal, “Namier was accused of taking the mind out of politics; this 
school has gone further and taken not only the mind but decency, character, integrity and self-
less commitment out of the Indian national movement”: review of South India. Political Institu-
tions and Political Change, 1880-1940, by C.J. Baker and D.A. Washbrook (Delhi: Macmillan, 
1975), The Politics of South India, 1920-1937, by C. Baker (Delhi: Vikas, 1976), The Emergence 
of Provincial Politics, 1880-1920, by D.A. Washbrook (Delhi: Vikas, 1977), The Indian Econom-
ic and Social History Review, 14 (1977), no. 3: 405-411, 405.
7 This stylistic perspective is underlined in M. Torri, “Colonialismo e nazionalismo in India: 
il modello interpretativo della Scuola di Cambridge,” in idem, Regime coloniale, intellettuali e 
notabili in India. Politica e società nell’era del nazionalismo (Milan: Angeli, 1996), 51.
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in Bayly himself, when he describes, for example, the attitude of the Indian 
moderates during the extremist turmoil against the division of Bengal: they 
“were not united so much by reverence for Bagehot and Mill, as by success and 
status”.8 Later, while writing about the bland enthusiasm of Allahabad politi-
cians for the sabotage of the brand new provincial councils, he also compared 
two Muslim politicians to the characters in one of Aristophanes’ comedies (The 
Knights), wherein there was strong disapproval of the demagogy of Athenian 
political life.9 This classical tone also emerges when Bayly briefly but signifi-
cantly compares Madan Mohan Malaviya and Mahatma Gandhi. The former, 
though better mastering the English language and the procedural techniques 
of the Imperial Council, was the result “of a true Brahminical upbringing” that 
was “out of range of European experience”, while he had found in Gandhi, with 
his loincloth and ascetic spirituality, “a character more deeply impregnated with 
western values”.10 In a few lines a double picture emerges, expressing the variety 
of Indian nationalism through the comparison of two outstanding personal-
ities—some kind of miniature Plutarch at the service of historical and social 
analysis.
2. Allahabad: General History from a Local Point of View
As mentioned above, the Cambridge School—because of its anti-doctrinal 
approach, focused on the social connections in Indian political life—had de-
valued nationalism by breaking it up in a multitude of local cases. In general, 
though, this is not completely true, as a number of its researches can be defined 
as pan-Indian and their main focus is still the analysis of nationalism in its his-
torical and social aspects. 
However, this is far less true in relation to Bayly’s first essays. They were 
presented like studies of a local case aimed at understanding Indian nationalism 
from a specific point of view. This aim can also be read in the volume preface, 
where it is said that: “this book is history from a local standpoint rather than a 
local history”, meaning that its ultimate goal was to describe Indian political life 
8 Bayly, The Local Roots, 186.
9 Ibid., 259.
10 Ibid., 216-217.
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between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries “in the context of local polit-
ical systems and men of local influence”.11 In the same way, upon looking at Bay-
ly’s very first essay, published in 1971, one will not fail to note that the English 
historian was already talking about “some general suggestion about the changing 
patterns of non-official influence in northern Indian cities”, specifying that, even 
though the majority of the examined materials were about the city of Allahabad, 
his conclusions were subject to much broader generalization, always taking into 
account the “contest of varying urban societies and different periods of time”.12 
This pan-Indian perspective was already implicit in the choice of subject: Alla-
habad is the city of the Nehrus, Motilal and Jawaharlal, the residence of one of 
the most influential families of the national Indian movement and the birthplace 
of the first premier of independent India, the man who had a key role in the new 
state and in strengthening its internal politics and international relations.
Bayly looks at the history of the whole subcontinent from a specific point of 
view throughout his analysis, never forgetting its national character, which is 
why, in the summary of his book, he restates, going back to his first article, that 
the lens adopted for the capital of the United Provinces can be also applied to 
other regions, not only in Northern India, but also, with some amendments, to 
the South and the West of the subcontinent.13
Moreover, the attention to the pan-Indian dimension transpires from the 
whole analysis carried out by the author. An illuminating example can be traced 
in the conclusion of the eighth chapter, the one about the radicalization he had 
seen in the period between 1909 and 1918, which he had identified on the basis 
of two events: the so-called Minto–Morley reforms in 1909, introducing the 
separate electorate for Muslims and increasing the authority of the provincial 
councils, and the end of the Great War, when the social energies which had been 
constricted during the conflict were released. As a conclusion, Bayly recalls an 
opinion about Indian politics expressed in 1910 by Harcourt Butler, member of 
the Indian Civil Service, who worked in the United Provinces at the time and 
would later become General Lieutenant and then Governor of the United Prov-
inces. In a note, Butler had expressed a positive judgement on the 1909 reforms 
because, in his opinion, by extending the electoral base, they had limited the 
11 Ibid., vii.
12 Bayly, Local Control in Indian Towns, 289.
13 Bayly, The Local Roots, 275-278.
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power of the Westernized Indians and, thanks to the separate electorates, had 
increased the social antagonisms diluting “nationalism in provincial and local 
sentiment”. Butler’s optimism, says Bayly, would have been contradicted by the 
subsequent evolution, as in a few years India had to face a political crisis which 
had originated from those very 1909 reforms. Widening the constituency, the 
reforms had actually highlighted the centrifugal inclination of the local com-
munities and had “released younger men, radicals, and local dissents from the 
control of existing intermediaries”.14
As a consequence of the war and of the turmoil of the Home Rule movement, 
“important changes had taken place which were to shift the balance of local con-
trol decisively against the colonial government”. Concluding his analysis, Bayly 
recalls a passage in Butler’s note where the non-political character of the Indian 
society is underlined, as there are, actually, only two parties, “the party for the 
Government which is always in power, and the party against it, which is always 
in opposition”. Implicitly agreeing with the social analysis of the British func-
tionary, Bayly observes Butler’s lack of political foresight, though, as, a few years 
after, “progressive professional men”—often related to the Congress—“were rap-
idly becoming ‘the party in power’ at the local level of politics”.15
As we can see, this analysis, focused on the provincial reality, actually de-
scribes the whole subcontinental situation. Starting from this point, it is possible 
to arrive at two considerations. First of all, the idea of a power shift dislocating 
the British domination in India can also be found in another monograph by the 
Cambridge School, though in reference to another period of time. In Brian R. 
Tomlinson’s book, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, published one year 
after Bayly’s monograph, one can read that the crucial turning point—when the 
main features of the Indian political system and those related to the post-inde-
pendence phase were established—was actually the moment of the elections for 
the Provincial Councils in 1937, as it represented the opportunity for some of the 
local parties’ personalities, or for some Government-aligned movements, to face 
a transformation and converge on the Congress.16 From that moment on, the 
14 Ibid., 243.
15 Ibid., 243-244.
16 See B.R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-1942. The Penultimate 
Phase (London: Macmillan, 1976), 75-85.
Maurizio Griffo, The British Roots of Indian Politics: Bayly and the Cambridge School
21
Congress became the main interlocutor for the different parts of Indian society, 
inevitably prefiguring ‘the party in power’ of the future.
A second consideration regards what kinds of source Bayly refers to. As al-
ready mentioned, one criticism levelled at the Cambridge School has been that 
it reiterated, in a new guise, the thesis of the scarce cohesion and the endemic 
conflict of Indian society, advanced by the British administrators as a justifi-
cation of English domination in South Asia. Nevertheless, Bayly uses a British 
functionary’s analysis in order to somehow reverse its meaning. Generally speak-
ing, one should bear in mind that the British civilians had a deep knowledge of 
Indian society and often produced shrewd analyses which is worth examining in 
depth. Often colonial India history scholars have in their background roots in 
the British presence in the subcontinent. In other words, there is a sort of conti-
nuity in the researches about colonial India, which also have a biographical root 
for British scholars: some members of the Indian Civil Service became historians 
of India after the end of the Empire, such as Penderel Moon; some others, like 
Hugh Tinker, started on that path after winning the last competitive examina-
tion for the Indian Civil Service in 1942, not being able to start their service. Be 
that as it may, Bayly’s approach has nothing to do with the nationalist rhetoric 
of the generous adhesion of Indian political personalities to the mass campaigns; 
he tries instead to attribute the success of the campaigns to a specious adhesion 
driven by a utilitarian rationale. 
The Great War represents a critical turning point for the British domina-
tion, as it highlights uncontrollable drives already existing in the Indian society. 
Nevertheless, the crisis in Allahabad did not find a natural resolution in the first 
Gandhian disobedience campaign in 1919, which, on the contrary, saw little 
success in the capital of the United Provinces.
A veteran of the campaigns against the partition of Bengal a decade before 
was at that time ruling the Satyagraha Sabha in Allahabad, and the Sabha had 
not received the endorsement of the Congress and the local Home Rule league, 
both represented by Motilal Nehru. The boycott of the new provincial councils 
was also not that successful, as “the demands of provincial and local representa-
tion and patronage were still to outweigh the advantages of a general political 
movement”.17 Only the subsequent turmoil of the caliphate turned into a small 
success in the capital city of the United Provinces. The Non-Cooperation Move-
17 Bayly, The Local Roots, 261.
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ment represented a breakthrough which Bayly describes as fundamental, as, in 
spite of “the cautious response of Allahabad’s political leaders” to Gandhi’s ap-
peal, not only was “the surge of popular feeling which they unleashed” to be 
taken into account, but two other consequences of that event also turned out 
to be extremely significant. First of all, the movement affected the relationship 
between the Indian leadership, mainly consisting of those who used to be British 
collaborators, and the colonial Government. With the mass campaign, “a potent 
political myth of national struggle and sacrifice” had been created, which would 
have “formed the background to all contacts between the British and the Indian 
leaders thereafter”.18 After that date, it would no longer have been possible for the 
British Government in India to find a balanced controlling position like in the 
past, maybe through specific concessions and some kind of well-aimed openings 
about particular matters.
The second consequence is not less significant, though, and it comes, in Bay-
ly’s opinion, directly from the Non-Cooperation Movement. In that political 
phase, the Congress had no rivals to question its role as a collector of Indian 
national aspirations. This way, “it retained the monopoly on national aspiration 
and the articulation of dissidence which it had established in the 1880s”, a result 
which not only reflected the actual situation, but also came from the ability to 
keep different leanings together. In this phase, indeed, the Congress “had shifted 
decisively towards an inclusive populist idiom”,19 so the traditional constituen-
cy of administrators and merchants had come together with the working class, 
some radical activists and the supporters of the caliphate. This supremacy of the 
Congress would not have gone to waste as, even after the crisis of the first Gan-
dhian turmoil, the Congress would have kept an ideal and practical hegemony in 
the political life of the subcontinent, a conclusion which widened the problemat-
ic horizon sketched in Bayly’s first two essays.20 
18 Ibid., 270.
19 Ibid.
20 Both in the 1971 essay and in the one of two years later, Bayly focused his attention more on 
the relationships between the local leaders with the colonial Government than on the ability of 
the Congress to draw the national interests together.
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3. The Collaborators change their Skin
This, however, is not the end of the story. To complete our discussion, it is 
necessary to take a backward step and consider the factors that motivate Bayly’s 
research. The question which spurred his whole work was a discrepancy between 
economic and social development on one side and political evolution on the 
other. In the foreword to his first book, it is said that “the rapid growth of the 
nationalist movement in the United Provinces”21 and the subsequent persistent 
authority of some Allahabad leaders in the National Movement would have been 
impossible even just ten years earlier, when, in the midst of the turmoil against 
the partition of Bengal—the so-called Swadeshi movement—the Congress was 
not strong enough or deeply rooted enough in the city, its political leaders did 
not participate in the boycott, and the extremists came from almost all other 
Indian, Bengali or Punjabi provinces. Usually, says Bayly, this lack of incisive-
ness is attributed to crucial social factors, such as an inadequate education or 
consolidated land ownership interests. Nevertheless, from 1908 to 1917, there 
is no record of improvements in the field of education or of changes in the land 
ownership, so the answer to this question, in his opinion, is not to be found in 
macro-social factors, but in the way the public life of the Indian city developed 
over a longer period of time.22
Bayly’s explanation focuses on the collaborators’ role, the personalities who 
mediated the consensus between the colonial Government and Indian society. 
These local dignitaries—also called rais by Bayly—were bankers, merchants and 
usually also Government tax collectors. Their authority was used by the colo-
nial Government “to control the periodic outbreaks of violence and communal 
strife”.23 For that purpose, they got honorary judiciary roles and were co-opted 
onto municipal or neighbourhood committees, which increased their prestige 
until they became partially elective after 1884. In the English historian’s opin-
ion, their monitoring role was fostered by the lack of social cohesion in Alla-
habad and its surroundings, which gave the British administrators the chance to 
constantly negotiate personal interests through minuscule concessions.
21 Bayly, The Local Roots, 2.
22 Ibid., 279.
23 Ibid., 88.
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This balance, though, which may seem advantageous for the colonial author-
ities, was not that stable and could be altered on the basis of general political 
choices in London or in Calcutta. In particular, from the 1880s there was an 
impulse towards an administrative rationalization aimed at improving the effi-
ciency of the colonial government. Tightening the mesh of the administration 
provoked unpredictable reactions, though, and most of all some uncontrollable 
effects, as Bayly describes when talking about a Government tax raise request: 
“if local resources were to be drawn out, then local representation was required”, 
but these new representative forms “gave lawyers, teachers, and publicists the 
chance of carving out for themselves niches of power and patronage in the mu-
nicipalities”.24
Bayly’s analysis follows different phases, with the Indian push and the Gov-
ernment counteraction facing each other more or less successfully. So in the 
1880s a crisis and a subsequent stabilization took place, mainly thanks to the 
electoral municipal councils. At the end of the century, the Government ap-
peared to be stable and no dangerous twists seemed to be around the corner, and 
it stayed like this even during the extreme turmoil surrounding the partition of 
Bengal. The 1909 reforms altered the political stability imperceptibly, while the 
Great War, a macro-politic event, also occurred, causing a new imbalance, this 
time in favour of India. Even though the analysis ends in 1920, it is clear that, 
in Bayly’s opinion, this centrifugal force could not be stopped and became over-
powering from the 1930s onward.25
As this summary shows, the decisive step in the process of growth of Indian 
nationalism was the establishment of consultative and participatory institutions 
by the British, institutions created in an imperial logic not to emancipate the 
Indians, but to better support colonial rule. Nevertheless, it was thanks to these 
institutions that the Indian elites obtained concrete means of power, created sig-
nificant connections in the city and its surroundings, and weakened the English 
authority in the whole subcontinent. From this point of view, nationalism was an 
involuntary by-product of the English presence in India.
From 1909 onwards, the collaborators emancipated themselves and over-
turned the imperial balance. From this point of view—considering nationalism 
as something brought about by the British presence in the subcontinent—Bayly’s 
24 Ibid., 91.
25 Ibid., 17.
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interpretation completely reflects that of the Cambridge School. This is also true 
regarding the underestimation of the impact of the Great War, which appears in 
the background but is not seen as a fundamental element in the radicalization of 
the independence movement.
What is highlighted in Bayly’s analysis instead is how some choices made on 
a local level were successful only in the short/medium term, while they turned 
out even to be counter-productive in the long run. Also, the underestimation of 
the nationalist ideology, though in a more sober way compared to other authors 
of the Cambridge School, is clear. The actions of the rais and their followers are 
reduced to a specious logic, without any idealistic light. In the same way, the reli-
gious cleavage, underlined by Bayly as allowing room both for Hindu devotional 
revivalism and Muslim associations and initiatives, is not seen as a crucial faith 
factor but rather as another tool for factional struggle. 
The ideological dimension in nationalism is not excluded, though, from this 
heuristic horizon. Among the long lasting factors characterizing colonial Indian 
public life, Bayly describes how, though loyalism was widespread and attempts to 
negotiate little concessions in different contexts were common, “there was even in 
the earliest days a striking undercurrent of anti-British feeling of a most strident 
kind”, a permanent feeling, which, if precisely measurable, would be “remarka-
bly constant through from 1860 to 1947”.26 With respect to this background of 
latent hostility, ideological nationalism, be it secular or religious, offered power-
ful help to “more localized aspirations and resentments” in “organizations which 
directly challenged the colonial regime”.27 In other words, the nationalistic ideol-
ogy earned the role of a link between the ambitions of self-determination, even if 
still inchoate, and the latent anti-British sentiment present in the Indian society.
4. Conclusions
Compared to the heuristic approach of the Cambridge School, the first es-
says and the first book of Bayly seem to correspond to the Cantabrigian inter-
pretative scheme, even though with some important problematic articulation. 
Bayly’s analysis, in particular, is not entirely reductionistic and derogatory, but 
26 Ibid., 2.
27 Ibid., 7.
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includes a partial appreciation of Indian nationalism. The national sentiment, 
mainly expressed as a hostility to the English presence, has a crucial role in the 
development of events.
Compared to Bayly’s research as a whole, these early works are significant 
because they show a continuity of inspiration that can be appreciated in at least 
two ways. First of all, there is the interpretative category of collaborators, as a 
key to understanding the British colonial penetration in South Asia. This was 
confirmed in his subsequent book dedicated to delineating the conditions of the 
northern Indian society at the time of the development and consolidation of co-
lonial rule. On that occasion, summing up his work, the British historian notes 
how it is considered “a truism of colonial historiography that Europeans could 
not have established their trade and administration in Asia or Africa without the 
compliance of key people in indigenous society”, and then specifies that his book 
“has tried to give such an assumption greater depth and precision in the case 
of India”, where the historical research on the colonial phase was somehow less 
developed than the research concerning other geographical areas. This statement 
itself brings about further observations, as when Bayly describes how “the pace of 
‘expansion’ and the form of colonial relationship was determined mainly by the 
form of the society penetrated in the years before the full force of industrializa-
tion was brought to bear on the non-European world”.28
We therefore find both continuity and conscious development in Bayly’s 
evaluation of Indian nationalism. If, in his first book, the Indian nationalism 
was not only devalued to a lesser extent than by other authors of the Cambridge 
School but also considered as an important factor for understanding the his-
torical course, in the rest of his research activity Bayly comes to appreciate it in 
an even more articulate way. In these later developments, Indian nationalism 
is not a collateral result of the English presence but has a defined identity de-
veloped over a long period of time. In pre-colonial India, in Bayly’s opinion, 
local loyalty and patriotism already existed in a similar way to Europe at the 
beginning of the modern age. With respect to these historical developments, 
28 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Ex-
pansion 1770-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 463. In a later book—a 
general synthesis focused on the conquest and the consolidation of the English presence in In-
dia—Bayly, referring to the various turmoils and especially to the big revolt in 1857, underlines 
again the widespread hostility to the British domination. See C.A. Bayly, Indian Society and the 
Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 178-199.
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the subsequent nationalism, which began to manifest itself in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century, does not present itself as a breaking point but as an evo-
lution, where the elements of continuity with the pre-colonial phase—though 
enhanced with thoughts osmotically borrowed from the English presence—are 
absolutely strong.29 At this stage, Bayly had overcome the heuristic approach of 
his first researches into Indian history developed in the Cambridge School en-
vironment. At the same time, the widely comparative structure identifying the 
new interpretation of Indian nationalism already anticipates his future outreach 
towards global history.
29 This wider interpretation of Indian nationalism is clearly presented by Bayly in the Radhakr-
ishnan Lectures he held in Oxford in 1996. The lectures, together with other essays showing his 
increasing focus on the topic, are collected in Bayly, Origins of Nationality.
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Michelguglielmo Torri
India from the Pre-Colonial to the Colonial Era: the Shaping 
of the Indian Middle Class and the Roots of Communalism. 
Thinking back on Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars
1. Introduction
Christopher Bayly’s text under review, first published in 1983, reached a wider 
diffusion in 1988 following the decision of the Cambridge University Press to re-
print it in its prestigious Cambridge Paperback Library.1 This, and the numerous 
extremely positive reviews which accompanied its first edition, consecrated Rulers, 
Townsmen and Bazaars as a milestone in the field of modern Indian history. In 
fact, the book is an extremely important and extraordinarily complex 489 page-
long monograph, based on an amazingly large set of primary and unpublished 
secondary sources. No doubt, it changed—or should have changed—the received 
vision related to some nodal points concerning the history of India in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. Yet the monograph has a set of problems, which 
were (usually implicitly) noted by some of its reviewers. The first among these 
problems is the extreme complexity of the book. For example, Peter Robb pointed 
out that Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars was “also two or three books interwoven”; 
so much so that, in his opinion, “the author must at times have wished that he 
had tackled them separately.”2 On their part, Eric Meyer and Henri Stern, namely 
1 C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian Society in the Age of British Expan-
sion, 1770-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The quotations from this 
book are from the 1988 paperback edition and are indicated in the text of this article with page 
numbers between parentheses.
2 P. Robb, review of Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, 48 (1985), no. 3: 571-574. Robb goes on to state that: “It is a study of the eco-
nomic and social history respectively of North India in general terms; it is a detailed monograph 
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a historian and an anthropologist, taking an absolutely unusual step, felt the need 
to join hands in reviewing Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars.3 
The feeling of disorientation that, because of its complexity, this monograph 
is bound to cause in readers without a solid background in the history of eight-
eenth and nineteenth century India—and even in some who do have such a 
background—is increased by the fact that, on the one hand, the title and, par-
ticularly, the subtitle of the book are misleading, while, on the other hand, its 
objectives are not as immediately clear as one would wish. 
Starting from the title, the book is focused not so much on ‘townsmen’ as on 
two categories of them, namely merchants and service people. Also, coming to 
the subtitle (North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870), the 
analysis of the book does not cover the whole of North India; in fact, although 
there are references to some other northern India areas, it focuses on a limit-
ed although important part of North India, which, to a large extent, coincides 
with what, in the 1850s, became the United Provinces and nowadays is Uttar 
Pradesh.4 If the geographical net cast by Bayly is much more limited than is 
claimed in the subtitle of his book, the chronological one is much wider: indeed, 
the author moves from the period after Aurangzeb’s death (1707) to the first two 
decades of the twentieth century.5 
As far as the goals set by the author are concerned, they seem to vary. Bayly 
states that the aim of his work “is to trace the fate of Indian towns, merchants 
and service people during the period of transition between the heyday of the 
last indigenous states and the establishment of the mature colonial system after 
1857” (2). However, strictly connected to this aim is a second, as, in the author’s 
own words: “In doing so, the book highlights the way in which conditions in 
Indian society determined the emergence and form of British India” (ibid.). Nev-
ertheless, still in the introduction, Bayly points out that “one of the themes” of 
his book is “the triumph of the state, both Indian and British, over its compet-
on trade, merchants and the Indian city; it includes a brilliant, micro-account of indigenous 
business methods.” In fact, the book is much more (and sometimes less) than that.
3 E. Meyer and H. Stern, “Compte Rendu de C.A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars,” An-
nales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 46 (1991), no. 3: 693-697. 
4 The geographical areas actually analysed in Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars are discussed on 
pages 15-28, and highlighted in map 2 on page 16.
5 The last section of the last chapter of the monograph under review is entitled “Corporations, 
Qasbahs and the New Politics, 1870-1920”.
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itors [namely the non-state potentates present in the area which Bayly analyses] 
and the settlement of the agrarian and commercial economy” (30). Later in the 
book, Bayly points out that: “The aim throughout the work has been to trace the 
emergence over the longer term of some of the key elements which came to make 
up the ‘middle classes’ of North India in the later nineteenth century”. This, adds 
Bayly, has the further goal “to provide a more adequate account of the connec-
tion between India’s colonial and pre-colonial history” (369). 
All this can be rather confusing, as the way in which the author organizes 
his analysis is sometimes confusing. Although scattered in the book there are 
synthetic résumés of what has been argued up to that point, and although, at 
times (but not always), at the end of a chapter or at the beginning of another, the 
themes that will be dealt with are anticipated, there is no systematic summing 
up, neither as an introduction, nor as a conclusion, of the topics analysed in the 
single chapters. No doubt it is true that, as pointed out by Peter Robb, “the au-
thor continually provides a thread to show the way.”6 However, it is equally true 
that it is not always easy to detect and keep hold of an Ariadne’s thread that, like 
the course of a river which sometimes disappears in the karstic subsoil to reap-
pear later, seems at points to vanish under thick layers of more or less connected 
but always intricate topics dealt with by the author.
All the above justifies the organization of the present article. Its first part 
(paragraphs 2-12) is a summary of Bayly’s main argument, which is consider-
ably longer and more detailed than any of those provided in the many reviews 
published soon after the publication of the book. This said, it is necessary to 
add immediately that, in spite of its length, the résumé provided hereafter leaves 
out some of the topics, even important ones, Bayly analyses in his book. In fact, 
the following résumé is, in a way, an attempt to disentangle one of the “two or 
three books” from the others which make up Bayly’s monograph. Of course, 
this is an effort guided by the present writer’s perception of what represents the 
most important part of Bayly’s analysis; accordingly, the résumé itself is already 
an (implicit) evaluation of the work under review. However, a more explicit dis-
cussion of the crucial contributions made by the book under review to the com-
prehension of the history of India is broached in the second part of the present 
article (paragraphs 3-17). Also, in the second part, this writer will deal with some 
among the theses of the book which he considers contentious.
6 Robb, review of Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 57.
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2. Analysing the Rise of the Merchant Class and the Service Gentry
The book under review has as its starting point the reconstruction of a phase 
of Indian history that had previously been not so much overlooked as observed 
from a unilateral perspective. This was the rise of British colonial power as an 
almost compulsory and certainly beneficial result of the economic crisis and mil-
itary anarchy allegedly characterizing India in the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury. Bayly, however, paints a quite different image; no doubt, the crisis of the 
Mughal Empire in eighteenth century India brought about the decline of some 
of its key areas, in particular Delhi and its hinterland, but it also saw the rise of a 
set of strongly centralized successor states. These states became hubs of economic 
development by favouring the growth of, and relying on, new socioeconomic 
forces on the rise. 
Basically, these socioeconomic forces were twofold. One was made up by 
merchants and moneylenders/bankers, two roles which often coincided in the 
same person; the other was made up by the ‘service gentry’, namely military men, 
bureaucrats, experts in Islamic law and literati, all different roles that, even if not 
always coincident in the same persons, usually overlapped in the same families 
or lineages. It was this category of men who staffed the bureaucracy of the new 
states and formed the backbone of their armed forces. 
Bayly points out that, while both groups had been in the making in the 
Mughal period (but one could point out that they were already present at least 
from the time of the Delhi Sultanate), it was in the eighteenth century that 
their economic and administrative importance became crucial, while their de-
mographic weight grew.
3. The Merchants-Bankers-Moneylenders as Member of a Class in the Making
The merchants-cum-bankers were required by the eighteenth century indige-
nous states to perform several crucial tasks. They managed the trade which sup-
plied the rulers and their dependants with both the necessaries and the luxuries 
of life and, by doing so, controlled ready cash and other monetary instruments 
of payment, such as hundis (promissory notes), which were accepted for any eco-
nomic transaction. The control of money allowed the agricultural surplus to be 
transformed into cash, making it available to the rulers, whose need for it had 
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greatly increased compared to the Mughal period.7 Also, the control of cash al-
lowed the merchants-cum-bankers to finance the expenditures of the state, from 
military expenditure to that related to religion and economy. 
The headquarters of the most substantial merchants-cum-bankers were the 
mohullas (urban residential neighbourhoods) of the “great consumer cities” (227) 
in the area studied in the book. The lesser men belonging to this group were pres-
ent in the smaller urban centres and in the countryside. Over the course of time, 
the activities of the bigger men branched out into the countryside, giving rise to 
an extensive network of which their lesser brethren became part. This growing 
merchant class-in-the-making was mainly made up by the local merchant castes: 
Agarwals, Khattris, Oswals and Maheshwaris. During the eighteenth century, 
the men hailing from these castes marginalized the formerly dominant Gujarati 
and Muslim merchants, giving rise to a new merchant class in the making, which 
“was formally divided by caste and functions” but kept together by “common in-
terests and values”. These common interests and values “were expressed through 
the organisation of markets, mercantile credit and Hindu or Jain religion which 
transcended these divisions.” This brought about a situation where “different 
levels of solidarity subtly interlocked with each other to create a corporate culture 
of great vitality which could mobilize considerable reserves of political influence” 
(451). In fact, according to Bayly, this component of the future twentieth century 
Indian middle class was predominantly if not exclusively made up by Hindus 
(and Jains, who, from a socio-religious point of view, although members of an 
ancient autonomous religion, played a role somewhat akin to that of a Hindu 
merchant caste). In fact, as shown by Bayly particularly in chapters 10 and 11, 
the Hindu religion and morality played an important role both in the sense of 
belonging of this social group and in the personal and professional behaviour of 
its members.
4. Naissance and Rise of the Service Gentry
On its part, the service gentry had its headquarters in the qasbahs, namely 
the small towns which connected the rural hinterland to the major cities. Very 
often the qasbahs had grown around the tombs of Sufi saints, who were equally 
7 Mainly because of their need to pay for standing armies.
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venerated by Hindus and Muslims.8 As pointed out by Bayly: “From piety or 
policy, the Sultans and their Mughal and Nawabi successors maintained a steady 
flow of endowments to the holy families descended from the original saint-mis-
sionaries” (350). Before the mid-seventeenth century, “the qasbahs were already 
flourishing centres of scholars, artisans and office holders” whose political and 
military life, however, “revolved around the great Muslim courts of Jaunpur or 
Delhi”. In 1590, the Muslims still “held only small patches of land as zamindars 
in Awadh and the Doab” (ibid.), but from the end of Akbar’s reign (1605) on-
ward, “Sayyid Muslim families rapidly gained land-rights all over Awadh and 
also throughout Doab”. In the late eighteenth century, “they probably held the 
proprietary rights in two-thirds of the Awadh villages and made a significant 
contribution to the ecology of the area […] by irrigation investment and the cul-
tivation of fruit groves” (351). Moreover, during Aurangzeb’s reign (1658-1707), 
in an evolution bound to further strengthen the hold of the Muslim gentry of 
the lands surrounding the qasbahs where they lived, “many zamindars [many of 
whom were Muslims] appear also to have begun to assimilate their zamindaris 
to revenue-free holdings, thus avoiding state land tax and other dues” (351-352). 
In due course, the Muslim lineages based in the qasbahs developed a sense of 
pride for their home towns, which they came to consider as their own watan 
(homeland) (352).
5. The Merchant-Bankers in the Pre-Colonial Period
Bayly puts a lot of effort into analysing the growth of the merchants-cum-bank-
ers and the service gentry and their connection first with the Mughal successor 
states and then with the British. As far as the merchant group is concerned, Bayly 
points out that during the Mughal period the officials of the Mughal Empire 
were rewarded, as a rule, with the grant of revenue rights ( jagirs) on pieces of 
land which were periodically swapped and, most of the time, were located far 
from the actual residence of the grantee. This forced these Mughal officials to 
leave the administration of their jagirs to “local men who were skilled at financial 
8 “In many places tombs of Sufi saints became the particular resort of Hindu men and women 
seeking relief from illness or wishing to obtain the intercession of the saint in their conflicts and 
tribulations” (Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 350).
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management and understood the marketing of produce” (164). In other words, a 
social stratum comprising merchants and bankers/moneylenders already existed 
in Mughal times and was well connected to the political power of the day. But 
the role, and therefore the influence, of this group boomed after 1707, when 
management of the state revenues was increasingly farmed out to them. The 
system allowed the new regional rulers to have at their disposal “a known and 
regular source of income without the problem of local collection” (ibid.). This 
explains why the farming out of state land revenues (usually on one, two or three 
year leases) became common in Northern India by 1740. But in certain parts 
of North India, particularly in Awadh and Benares, the system came to include 
“practically all the ruler’s ancient taxation rights between 1740 and 1780” (165). 
Not only land revenues, but duties on trades and bazaars, too, were farmed out. 
In the area studied by Bayly, this system initially favoured the rise of a lim-
ited number of great entrepreneurs; as the author points out, “the main revenue 
farmers in Awadh in 1770 amounted to some fifteen men; in Benares around 
thirty-six” (ibid.). But for all their apparent power and wealth, these great men 
“straddling the agrarian and commercial worlds […] were vulnerable to groups 
better entrenched in both” (ibid.). The result was that the dominance of these 
great men was short-lived: they disappeared from the scene because of economic 
failure, or because they died without leaving heirs or, more rarely, because they 
reconverted their activities by becoming zamindars. Their disappearance left in 
control of the rural economy the groups which were already in a dominant posi-
tion in either the agrarian or the commercial worlds. To the first group belonged 
the former under-managers and local revenue farmers of the disappeared big 
entrepreneurs, namely Brahmin, Kayasth and, to a lesser extent, Sayyid local 
administrators. To the second group belonged the big merchants/moneylenders 
residing in—and dominating the economy of—the great cities. These “were the 
men who advanced money to the revenue-farmers and stood as sureties” for them 
with the rulers for punctual payment (168). In order to do that, the big urban 
merchant-bankers had to keep a close eye on what was going on in the rural lo-
calities and, to do that, relied on agents who monitored the work of the local rev-
enue managers. These agents “generally appear to have been village shopkeepers 
linked by trading connection, and sometimes by caste, with the big merchants of 
the city” (ibid.). Basically, though, whoever was active in trade and moneylend-
ing at the local level could and was included in the networks headed by the big 
urban merchant-bankers. These networks did not only expand vertically, from 
the big cities to the rural localities, but also horizontally, encompassing wide 
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geographical areas. In fact, the big merchants were able to command resources 
across great distances, extending well beyond the geographical area of any single 
eighteenth century Indian state, which put them in a position of strength vis-
à-vis the single rulers. Any pressure on the part of a ruler aimed at extracting 
a quantity of resources from the merchants which was seen as excessive and 
not consonant with the prevailing customs could bring about the decision by 
the merchants of closing the bazaars and moving out to a nearby potentate, 
with devastating consequences for any eighteenth century indigenous state. Of 
course, the merchants were in a position to act as a unified group because, during 
the eighteenth century, they increasingly acquired a corporate ethos. 
Bayly hastens to point out that although there is ample evidence of the fact 
that merchant capital was becoming increasingly important in the economy, this 
“does not necessarily imply that merchants were aspiring to a direct political 
role” (171). However, the fact remains that “the covert and subtly exercised power 
of the merchant bodies imposed limitations on what eighteenth century rulers 
could do, and allowed commerce to achieve a more privileged position in regard 
to the military aristocracy” (172). 
6. Merchant-Bankers and Service Gentry up to the 1830s
One of the key points repeatedly made by Bayly is that the British conquest 
and early administration of India was, if not made possible, certainly favoured by 
the shifting of merchant-bankers and service gentry behind the Europeans. “The 
incoming colonial power and European traders”, claims Bayly, “succeeded when 
they were able to cajole, entice or manipulate these intermediate groups.” “British 
conquest”, he concludes, “often meant no more than the slow drift to the East 
India Company of soldiers, merchants and administrators, leaving Indian rulers 
with nothing more than a husk of royal grandeur” (6). 
This explains why, at least up to the 1830s, the English conquest of North 
India did not witness any dramatic change in the role and fortunes of the Indian 
merchants of the Gangetic Valley. Their position had become so well entrenched 
that, as Bayly argues, when the English took over direct control of huge swathes 
of North Indian territory during the first half of the nineteenth century, either 
they were able to secure the cooperation of the Indian merchants in managing 
the land revenues of their new possessions or they had difficulty in extracting 
them. As a consequence, during the period up to the 1830s, “local merchant 
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communities which had seized their first opportunities in the dissolution of the 
Mughal hegemony pressed home their advantage. They found new security on 
the great trade routes [opened by the new European rulers] and in British rev-
enue courts; their quid pro quo was to guarantee the British revenue system as 
they had guaranteed its Mughal predecessors” ( 227). 
On their part, the Islamic gentry were somewhat less successful in adapting 
themselves to the changing times. As the author points out: “In Awadh the hold 
of the Islamic gentry on the small towns over revenue-rights already appears to 
have weakened before the imposition of British rule in 1856” (354). This was a 
result of the fact that during the reign of the last king of Awadh, Wajid Ali Shah 
(1847-1856), the qasbah zamindars came under pressure both from the state and 
the Rajput clans in the countryside. The state resumed control of some of the 
revenue rights which had been held by the Muslim gentry for decades, whereas 
“during Awadh’s terminal crisis in the 1840s [the Rajput clans] managed to prise 
away rights which had been slowly accumulated by the Sayyids in the previous 
century” (ibid.).
Although the author does not explicitly say as much, one can surmise that 
the weakness of the Muslim gentry, already evident at the moment of the British 
annexation of Awadh, made this group less important in the eyes of their new 
masters. This, in turn, might contribute to explain why the early British land 
revenue settlements were “notoriously harsh, especially in Allahabad and the 
middle parts of the Doab” (354-355). Furthermore, much charitable land, whose 
possession had been in the hands of sections of the Muslim gentry, was resumed 
by the colonial state. “On the other hand”, points out Bayly, “British legalism 
and the search for ‘ancient proprietors of the soil’ ensured that some at least of 
dispossessed eighteenth-century gentry were able to re-establish a toe-hold in 
the revenue system” (355).9 However, at the end of the day, “almost everywhere 
political change, the rise of monied men and the resurgence of Hindu landhold-
ing communities put pressure on the Islamic gentry” (ibid.). Again, this was at 
least partially countervailed by the fact that, up to the mid-1830s, the Muslim 
gentry maintained their hold “on major appointments both within the Nawabi 
and outside” (356).
9 Bayly makes the example of the Barah Sayyids of Muzaffarnagar and Meerut Districts, who 
“were able to creep back into some of the villages from which they had earlier been ejected, once 
British settlement operations began” (Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 355).
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7. The Crisis of the 1830s-1840s 
Both the merchants-bankers and the service gentry, however, were put under 
strong pressure by the beginning of a major crisis in the 1830s. The reasons for 
the crisis were multifarious. Firstly, “the Gangetic area and western India suf-
fered a virtual depression which derived from acute problems of liquidity” (264). 
Secondly, there was the collapse of the major European houses of agency in 1827 
and 1828, which “brought about a general disruption in the flow of cash and 
credit which began in the export sector but rapidly affected internal trade also” 
(ibid.). Thirdly, Eastern India was facing a decline in its exports which went on 
from 1830 to 1860.10 This crisis badly reverberated even in the Gangetic Valley. 
On top of that, in the 1830s the Gangetic area suffered from a cycle of weather 
instability—actually “the worst period of weather instability which the region 
had seen since the Chalisa famine of 1781-3” (292)—which brought about fam-
ine, migration and internal plunder.
However, argues Bayly, once all the above factors are taken into account, 
they matter less than “a more important transformation […] whose social conse-
quences were to persist beyond the Great Rebellion itself”. This was the “general 
crisis of the Indian political system” (265), namely the radical change of policy 
of the East India Company. This had two complementary aspects: one was “the 
British diplomatic offensive against the Indian states symbolized by the famous 
‘Policy of Lapse’ and the anti-taluqdar settlements of 1830s and 1840s in the 
North-Western Provinces” (ibid.); the other was “a cutback […] in the meagre 
Company expenditure on military and civil government; a withdrawal of its em-
barrassed patronage of Hindu and Muslim places of worship; and a curtailment 
of the Company’s residual trading functions” (266). Thus, the British brutally 
restricted the spending capacities of the Indian ruling aristocracies which, as 
shown by Bayly, in the previous hundred years had been the real engine which 
had kept the Indian economy moving and even growing, notwithstanding the 
dramatic decline of the Mughal Empire and the economic collapse of some of 
its key areas. 
10 This was the result of the fact that “agricultural produce from the region met increasing com-
petition in foreign markets as other areas within and outside India began producing the cotton, 
indigo, opium, silks and saltpetre which had given rise to the heady but narrow growth after the 
end of the Napoleonic wars” (Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 265). 
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The new policy was bad for both the merchants and the gentry, but had an 
additional downside for the Muslim gentry. 1836 saw the abolition of Persian 
as an official language in the North-Western Provinces, which took away one 
of the advantages that the local Muslim gentry had when competing for state 
appointments. This was compounded by the annexation of Awadh in 1856. This 
“slimmed down the administration here as elsewhere, and gave new men from 
Bihar, Bengal and the east of the North-Western Provinces the chance to com-
pete on equal terms with the local gentry even on their own turf” (356). These 
two decisions were a permanent reversal for the Muslim gentry, whose members, 
although still well represented in the colonial bureaucracy and able to find some 
openings in the surviving princely states, experienced a real and considerable 
socio-economic decline in the following decades (ibid.). 
The anti-aristocratic policy could have been counterbalanced by a rise in the 
Company’s spending, but, on the contrary, the Company further cut back its 
expenses and took some other measures aimed at negatively impacting the Indi-
an economy. Among these there was the decision, taken for political reasons, to 
close the local mints of Farrukhabad, Saugor and Benares, which was “one of the 
contributing causes of the money and credit famines of the early 1830s” (267).
8. The Changing Social Landscape as a Consequence of the Crisis
All the above factors plunged the Indian economy into a gigantic crisis from 
which it started to recover in the mid-1840s. However, it was a “patchy revival” 
(298), and a full recovery came only in the 1860s. Also, it was a revival which 
revealed a starkly changed socio-economic landscape. In fact, the steady decline 
of courtly consumption was continuing while, “as yet, expenditure by the Brit-
ish government and westernized elites had failed to create a substantial alterna-
tive demand” (299). At the same time, the role of the Indian merchants in the 
state and in the agrarian society was dramatically reduced. This was a direct 
consequence of the creation of the British “great revenues systems”, which, by 
the mid-1840s, became “established features of the landscape” (ibid.). Also, the 
spreading of district treasury bills as media of exchange gradually supplanted the 
hundis. Both changes resulted in a drastic curtailment of the Indian merchants’ 
economic role. 
Before and during the crisis, the merchants had continued to finance agri-
culture, but the effect of the crisis on agricultural production and the activities 
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of the British law courts, which enforced the sale of land for debt, completely 
upset the system which had hitherto prevailed. That had been a system including 
“merchant, peasant, artisan and ruler” in which, up to the crisis, “it was not in 
the interest of one element to reduce any of the others to complete dependence” 
(ibid.). The crisis, however, brought about a situation in which “commercial fam-
ilies often had little choice but to buy into land-rights in order to retain some 
benefit from the capital which had been immobilized in the form of advances 
to landholders” (ibid.). It was the coming together of the negative politico-eco-
nomic circumstances which characterized the 1830s-1850s crisis which utterly 
transformed the eighteenth century Indian merchant-banker-entrepreneur into 
the “‘usurious capitalist’, the carrier of an unproductive or stagnant form of en-
trepreneurship which did little but expertly cream off the surplus of the peasant 
family in the form of interest payments” (ibid.), who became a fixed feature of 
the post-1830s colonial economy.
As shown by Bayly, the new Company policy had disastrous effects not only 
at the economic, but also at the political and social levels. At the political level, 
the new policy determined a crisis of legitimacy as, to Indians, the Company, 
while “exercising with even greater determination its right to revenue”, appeared 
negligent in fulfilling its duty as a ruler (266). This was a duty that traditionally 
entailed massive expenditures and distribution of ritual gifts by the state. This 
crisis of legitimacy powerfully contributed to the explosion of the Great Revolt 
of 1857-1858. 
9. The Historic Roots of Communalism
Even more insidious, however, were the negative long-term effects that, ac-
cording to Bayly, this policy had on the Indian society. As he notes, “the de-
cline of the aristocracy and gentry and the altered position of the merchant class 
opened new fissures between the Hindu and Islamic corporations of town and 
qasbah” (ibid.). Whereas the economy recovered, “the moral and social effects of 
the dislocation of the 1830s” persisted and yielded poisonous fruits in contribut-
ing to the rise of communalism (ibid.). The background to this development is 
explained by Bayly in a few crucially important pages. First of all, Bayly does not 
accept the thesis that “a blithe tolerance characterised relations between Hindus 
and Muslims in the pre-colonial period”; on the contrary, he flatly states that 
“communal conflict occurred before colonial rule” (335). Nonetheless, he him-
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self provides several instances of good relations between Hindus and Muslims 
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century in the area which he analyses. 
However, according to Bayly, these good relations were based on the presence of 
a state (first the Mughal Empire, then the indigenous successor states) which was 
willing and able to act as a fair and firm arbiter between the two communities 
and the elites and corporations which represented them. This system, although 
giving ritual precedence to the Muslims, did respect the religious sensibilities of, 
and allowed ample spaces of autonomy to, non-Muslims. Starting in the nine-
teenth century, though, two developments took place in the cities which gradu-
ally sapped the existing social equilibrium. 
The first was the gradual loss of both prestige and power by the traditional 
city magistrates: kazis, muftis and kotwals. The kotwal was the chief executive 
and police officer who derived his authority directly from the secular ruler of 
the state, who, in turn, took his decisions advised by the kazi, the chief registrar 
who was also a kind of censor of morals. Moreover, both the kotwal and the kazi 
sought the advice of both the mufti—an informal representative of the Muslim 
faithful of the city and a link with the ulama (the doctors of the Islamic law)—
and the Hindu headmen (308, 336). 
All this means that the city magistrates traditionally acted as final arbiters in 
managing the relations between the different elites, corporations and, ultimately, 
communities, which, in turn, accepted the legitimacy of the city magistrates’ 
role. But the situation started to change with the decline of indigenous states, 
and changed permanently with the coming of colonial rule. The kotwal was 
reduced to “an inferior officer of police”, the kazi to “little more than a glorified 
registrar” and, to top it all, “the religious sensibilities of learned Islam no longer 
bore on the officers of the government through the mufti” (342).
The other development which powerfully contributed to alter the existing 
equilibrium was the socio-economic change which, during the same period, 
saw the emergence in the cities of new dominant groups. As Bayly points out: 
“Since about 1800 in many cities and bazaars of the west [the western part of 
the Gangetic Valley] there had been steady commercial change and a shift of 
economic power to mercantile groups such as Jains of the Delhi region, Agar-
wal Banias around Kanpur or Chaubes in the Muttra region. These filled the 
vacuum left in the qasbahs society by the decline or withdrawal of the Islamic 
service people” (337). These new groups were reluctant or downright unwilling 
to subordinate themselves to the “older relations of ranking and precedence”, 
while the old magistrates no longer had the prestige and power to force them. In 
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fact, most of the time, when these magistrates tried to do this, they were seen as 
acting in a partisan way, favouring one community (the Muslims) over the other 
(the Hindus). 
Of course, the crisis of the 1830s and 1840s, by strengthening the Hindu 
merchant class vis-à-vis the Muslim gentry, powerfully contributed to the weak-
ening of the old order. Things distinctly worsened in the 1830s, when “the new 
breed of British district officials” started to act on the basis of the conviction that 
their task was “to balance rights, not to enforce religious and social duties” as 
they had hitherto existed (336). Also, the new British rulers, though playing a 
crucial role in weakening the old order, did not develop new institutions which 
could fill the vacuum left by the decline of the old magistracies, which was en-
couraged by the British district officials’ own personal initiatives, “sufficiently 
fast” (342). 
10. The Great Revolt of 1857-1858
As noted above, in spite of the “patchy revival” of the late 1840s, the conse-
quences of the crisis prolonged themselves into the Great Revolt of 1857-1858. 
As Bayly points out: “Though the rebellion is generally seen as a rural or even 
peasant uprising, towns and bazaars played an equal important part in the cal-
culations of the rebels”. In fact, in the west of the United Provinces, the rebellion 
“took the form of a series of skirmishes around the key urban centres” (360). 
The author’s handling of the Great Revolt is short (seven pages) and rather 
impressionistic. However, it is important for the comprehension of some of Bay-
ly’s key theses. He characterizes the uprising as “a succession struggle fought out 
in the context of an abrupt collapse of British power” (365). This, claims Bayly, 
seemed at times “to degenerate into a struggle between Islamic qasbah towns 
and the [Hindu] lineage centres of the interior zamindars” (360). These religious 
tensions were also apparent inside the commercial towns. “Quite widely it was 
the Muslim artisans and bazaar craftsmen”, states Bayly, “who initiated conflict 
by attacking [Hindu] commercial men and landlords” (364). 
However, although the momentum of his analysis points towards a charac-
terization of the 1857 uprising as a civil conflict between Hindus and Muslims, 
what Bayly intends to demonstrate is his above quoted thesis, that good relations 
between Hindus and Muslims were based on the presence of a state willing and 
able to act as a fair and firm arbiter between the two communities. Accordingly, 
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Bayly qualifies what can at first appear as a characterization of the 1857 revolt as 
a communal conflict by bringing in the role of the indigenous political regimes. 
“Where viable [successor] regimes established themselves speedily as in Delhi or 
Lucknow, communal tension was minimised”, states Bayly. On the other hand, 
“in areas such as Rohilkhand or the Doab, where British rule had rapidly eroded 
the authority of indigenous powers, political conflict might easily take on a reli-
gious tinge” (365). 
Another important point made by Bayly concerns the role of the merchants 
during the rebellion. The fact—generally accepted by previous historians—that 
the merchants sided en masse with the British needs severe qualification. “Actu-
ally”, says Bayly, “there are a substantial number of cases on record where com-
mercial people gave quite strenuous support to the rebels” (361). On the other 
hand, the commercial families which had fewest connections with the old royal 
courts and which had prospered from the growth of the commercial economy 
after 1816 “threw in their lot with the British almost unanimously” (361-362). 
Quite interestingly, though, “for every merchant who threw in his lot with the 
British or the rebels, there were ten who hedged their bets” (362). The change 
in the merchants’ attitude came only when the British were able to take the of-
fensive and the troops originally meant for the opium war against China disem-
barked in Calcutta. Only at that point did “the commercial community of the 
Gangetic cities” come out openly “in support of the British” (ibid.). That greatly 
helped the British war effort, as the “volume of supplies going to isolated British 
garrisons increased rapidly, while incoming troops had no difficulty in securing 
transport and credit facilities” (ibid.). 
The British were generous with their late allies, rewarding them “handsomely 
with offices and grants of land sequestered from the rebels” (363). This siphoning 
off of land wealth from the rebellious, mostly Muslim, aristocracy to the mer-
chants sometimes favoured old families, sometimes new men. In all cases, many 
among those which emerged as the wealthiest families in the period from the 
1860s to the 1930s—for example the Tandons, who played such a distinguished 
role during the freedom movement—enriched themselves as a result of their 
pro-British stance during the Great Revolt.11 
This development brought about a “substantial immobilisation of capital and 
skills in rentier land-management” (ibid.). As shown by Bayly, for reasons which 
11 Bayly grounds his assertion on his study of the commercial ledgers of the merchant families. 
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he details particularly in chapters 10 and 11, the economic style of the Indian 
merchant class had always been characterized by prudence and conservatism. 
However, the consequences of the 1830s crisis and of the Great Revolt, by reori-
enting much of the merchants’ activities from trade, financing and contracting to 
“the comfort of a low regular return from landed property”, contributed if not to 
an outright loss of entrepreneur spirit, at least “to confirm the conservative style 
of the late nineteenth-century business community” (ibid.).
11. The Indian Society after the Great Revolt
After the Great Revolt, the colonial state was forced to a more active pres-
ence, particularly in the areas which had been the epicentre of the uprising. It is 
true that, as pointed out by the author, the colonial state “was no Meiji govern-
ment of Japan” and that “the sums spent on agricultural improvement in relation 
to the total size of the land revenue” were “puny” (428). However, mainly mil-
itary considerations prompted the colonial state to implement a policy of much 
higher expenditure compared with what had been the rule in the three decades 
preceding the Great Revolt. This, unwittingly, returned the role of engine of the 
economy that had characterized the 18th century indigenous potentates to the 
colonial state.
In its pursuit of military security, the colonial state steeply increased its ex-
penses in three fields: the construction of costly new barracks, particularly in 
the major cities such as Allahabad, Meerut and Delhi; the massive surge—again 
predominantly in those areas where the revolt had been stronger—in European 
troops;12 and the building of an extensive railway network. In addition, there 
was the vigorous continuation of canal construction, which had begun in 1848.
Although canal construction “created some unfortunate side effects”, it sub-
stantially contributed to wealth and security, particularly in the drier regions of 
the Meerut division (429). In turn, the building of new barracks, the spending on 
the maintenance of the troops deployed in the Gangetic Valley, and the expendi-
12 “In the immediate aftermath of the Revolt”, states Bayly, “the number of European troops 
almost trebled from the 1853 strength to 61,000 and a larger proportion of them were deployed 
in the western districts of the North-Western Provinces which had provided the greatest chal-
lenge to British supremacy” (Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 428). 
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tures of those high spenders who were the European troops “gave an immediate 
stimulus to wages and prices in the environs of the bazaars” (428). As far as the 
new railways were concerned, although much of the railway material, including 
railway sleepers, was imported,13 “local labourers and contractors received some 
of this large expenditure in the form of wages and payment for bullocks, gravel 
and bricks” (429). 
The expansion of the railway network had an additional and more momen-
tous consequence, determining the shifting of the currents of traffic crossing 
the Gangetic valley from the Ganges to the new railroads, and at the same time 
making traffic more reliable and secure. In turn, this brought about a noticeable 
rise in the daily wages of the labourers working on the railway lines, the spring-
ing up of new agricultural bazaars and, eventually, the creation of new urban 
centres (ibid.). 
The decades after the Great Revolt also witnessed “what might be called the 
‘colonisation of taste’, which began to modify the balance of consumption and 
the physical appearance of north Indians and their cities” (ibid.). It was in those 
decades that stone-built houses ceased to be an exclusive preserve of European 
civil lines and cantonments, making their appearance “in the new service quar-
ters of the old cities, and, later, in the district town” (430). Also, “with these new 
buildings came new tastes in clothes and personal property. For the service peo-
ple of the booming law courts foreign cloth replaced homespun, leather replaced 
cloth bags and kerosene lamps replaced the little flames of vegetable oil” (ibid.).
In turn, the rise in state expenditures and the “colonisation of taste” were 
accompanied by the—admittedly “slow and patchy”—growth of the internal 
market which, in turn, was a function of “the growing momentum of population 
increase and the diffusion of small technological improvements in the country-
side” (ibid.).
However, according to Bayly, all the above did not amount to a real trans-
formation of the Indian society and economy. “The monies disbursed by govern-
ment into society were small in volume even if agriculture made some significant 
13 Of course, these items were imported from Great Britain, powerfully contributing to its 
economic prosperity. On this topic, which is unaddressed by Bayly, the most stimulating essay 
which has come to my attention remains the one written by Marcello De Cecco, Economia e 
finanza internazionale dal 1890 al 1914 (Bari: Laterza, 1971), particularly chapter IV. For an 
English translation, see The International Gold Standard: Money and Empire (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1984).
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local advances as a consequence of canal irrigation.” Also, “exports provided only 
limited stimulus”. Accordingly, in the author’s assessment, “Growth and change 
there were, but uneven and insufficient to break the bounds of institutions as 
tenacious as the mercantile firm or the peasant family farm” (435). 
12. Indian Urban Society on the Eve of Nationalism
As far as the urban reality of the area studied by Bayly is concerned, then, 
in spite of the crisis of the 1830s-1850s and the Great Revolt of 1857-1858, there 
was strong continuity at the social level, represented by the (rising) merchant 
class and the (declining) Muslim gentry of the qasbahs. By the close of the nine-
teenth century, the merchant class, “formally divided by caste and function”, 
was firmly bound together by “its common interests and values”, which were 
expressed “through the organisation of markets, mercantile credit and Hindu or 
Jain religion.” As a result, “Different levels of solidarity subtly interlocked with 
each other to create a corporate culture of great vitality which could mobilise 
considerable reserves of political influence” (451, emphasis added). It was this social 
group which dominated Hindu society, and it was only by acting as “theorists, 
organisers, strategists and spokesman” of this social group that the rising West-
ernized elite could acquire a substantial social basis.14 Significantly, at the first 
Indian National Congress held in Allahabad in 1888, traditional leaders and cor-
porate bodies of the bazaars joined “to give the westernized lawyers of the High 
Court Bar a stronger base” (450). Likewise, the Muslim League—at least in the 
UP—found its base among the service gentry who had their homes “in qasbahs 
or the Muslim quarters of the district towns” (451).
In summing up the results of his research, Bayly points out that they “imply 
that some of the conditions which fractured the life of modern North India into 
Hindu and Muslim camps must be dated much earlier than is commonly sup-
posed” (455). He goes on to state: “It was not a question of ‘Two Nations’ from 
14 Bayly seems to consider the Westernized elite as a social class, although one of minor im-
portance when compared to other, more solidly grounded social classes. The Westernized elite, 
however, was not a class, but rather a group of intellectuals (in the Gramscian meaning) who 
acted as speakers and organizers of existing social classes or social classes in the making. On 
this, see Michelguglielmo Torri, “‘Westernised Middle Class’, Intellectuals and Society in Late 
Colonial India,” Economic and Political Weekly, 24, no. 4 (27 January 1990): 2-11, 6. 
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time immemorial, or even of the inevitable conflict between members of the two 
religions as a result of ‘modernisation’. But the social formations which consoli-
dated themselves between 1700 and 1830—what we have called the ‘merchant 
class’ and the ‘service gentry’—had tended to develop within two very different 
economic and cultural contexts, the Islamic qasbah or mohulla and the Hindu 
corporate town.” “While strong, indigenous states retained power,” concludes 
Bayly, “these parallel developments did not necessarily presage conflict. But from 
the 1830s the disintegration of the old magistracies and notabilities left broader 
space for contention” (455-456).
13. Bayly’s Crucial Contributions to our Understanding of the History of India
At the end of the day, the real Ariadne’s thread for the labyrinthian book 
under review appears to be the effort to analyse the rise and the distinguishing 
features of the indigenous middle class in the making from the beginning of the 
eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, if not in India at large, at least 
in the United Provinces. Indeed, Bayly’s painstaking reconstruction not only 
shows the insufficiencies of the traditional explanation of the rise of the modern 
middle class in India as the outcome of modernization and Westernization,15 but 
has a wider methodological meaning. In fact, Bayly convincingly disproves two 
basic propositions, enunciated by Karl Marx and Max Weber, which have been 
extremely influential, if not in the field of Indian studies (at least as they have 
evolved since the 1960s), certainly in moulding the vision of India held by the ge-
neric ‘educated person’ in the West (and not only there). These two propositions 
hold that “the cellular, caste-based society of India frustrated the development 
of wider solidarities except the state itself” and that the state “was largely an 
agency of plunder” (471). In contrast, Bayly’s work compellingly demonstrates 
that groups such as the merchants and the service gentry developed a common 
ethos and a sense of identity which crossed caste identities (and sometimes even 
religious identities16) and allowed them to act as unified groups. Likewise, it 
15 As articulated in monographs such as B.B. Misra, The Indian Middle Classes: Their Growth in 
Modern Times (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), and B.T. McCully, English Education 
and the Origins of Indian Nationalism (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1966).
16 Bayly points out that in the mainly Muslim qasbahs in the area he studies, Hindu families of 
service gentry lived side by side with their Muslim counterparts, sharing the same culture and, 
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demonstrates that the Indian state, far from being “an agency of plunder”, was a 
main engine in promoting economic development. 
That said, my contention is that some of the most important contributions of 
the monograph under review to advancing our comprehension of the history of 
India lie not so much in the development of this central theme as in dealing with 
two related topics, namely the eighteenth century and the crisis which overtook 
India in the 1830s-1850s.
The image of the eighteenth century that emerges from Bayly’s analysis is 
unambiguously different from that originally painted by the colonial conquerors, 
administrators and historians, later incorporated as the orthodox academic histo-
riographical view, according to which the eighteenth century was characterized in 
India by steep economic decline and military anarchy. In contrast, Bayly shows, 
as noted above, that the breakup of the Mughal Empire saw the emergence of a 
set of dynamic states which played a key role in the maintenance of a flourish-
ing economy. No doubt, points out Bayly, the breakup of the Mughal Empire 
caused the decline of some of its core areas, particularly Delhi and its hinterland. 
The areas of decline, however, were quite limited in extent, and anyway, their 
decline favoured other, more stable areas which benefitted from the movement of 
aristocracies, merchants, artisans and, sometimes, peasantry from the declining 
areas to the new rising regions. These regions, as a rule, were both the favoured 
ones from an ecological viewpoint and the centres of new rising potentates which 
played a key role in guaranteeing good conditions of safety to their subjects 
and in vigorously promoting economic expansion. Internal trade continued to 
flourish, and a network of new inland trade routes, which took the place of the 
old Mughal arteries, bound together the economically strong regions of the area 
studied by Bayly, connecting them to the outer world in the subcontinent and 
beyond. Accordingly, the eighteenth century, rather than being characterized 
by decline and collapse, saw a shift and a redistribution of human resources and 
material wealth—according to Bayly, an “orderly” one (460)—from the old core 
areas of the crumbling Mughal Empire to the new political centres represented 
by the successor states. Moreover, before the colonial conquest, the new political 
and economic core areas had already become centres of a renewed economic ex-
pansion, as farmers, merchants and aristocrats fanned out from them to colonize 
or re-colonize virgin or declining areas. 
one supposes, the same attachment to their common watan.
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Bayly’s findings concerning the persistence of a vibrant economy in the mid-
dle and upper Gangetic Valley, confirmed by those of Stewart Gordon related 
to the areas which came under Maratha sway17 and preceded by those of Asok 
Sen in relation to Tipu Sultan’s Mysore,18 have conclusively changed the received 
historical view of the eighteenth century. 
Bayly’s second crucially important contribution to our comprehension of the 
history of India relates to the 1830s-1850s crisis. In the received orthodox his-
torical view, those decades are described as the ones in which, at long last, good 
government came to (British) India through a policy of reforms.19 Of course, 
although generally accepted as a truism, the conclusion that good government 
came to (British) India because her colonial government became more honest 
and more efficient is based on a non sequitur. In fact, the above optimistic conclu-
sion does not take into account that the East India Company (EIC) government 
in India, far from being intended to the promotion of Indian welfare, aimed, 
first, at enriching the EIC directors and shareholders in England, and, second, 
at favouring British interests in general. In other words, a good and honest EIC 
government could logically result not in enhanced welfare for the Indian subjects 
of the Company, but in their increased exploitation on behalf of British inter-
ests. Without squarely dwelling on the received historical view, Bayly’s analysis 
thoroughly and conclusively devastates it. North India, far from being vigorously 
driven by her British masters on the way to modernization and prosperity, was 
forcibly pushed into the biggest economic crisis experienced in some centuries. 
And, as Bayly’s analysis implicitly but conclusively shows, this happened mainly 
because of the working of the new, modern and honest system of government 
created by the British in the late 1820s. In other words, after the publication of 
the book under review, any general appraisal of the history of India in the first 
17 S. Gordon, The Marathas 1600-1818 (New Delhi: Foundation Books, by arrangement with 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); idem, Marathas, Marauders and State Formation in Eight-
eenth-Century India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).
18 A. Sen, “A Pre-British Economic Formation in India of the Late Eighteenth Century: Tipu 
Sultan’s Mysore,” Perspectives in Social Sciences I. Historical Dimensions, edited by Barun De 
(Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1977), 46-119.
19 Exemplary of this historiographical trend is J. Rosselli, Lord William Bentinck. The Making 
of a Liberal Imperialist (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975).
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half of the nineteenth century is bound to be a profoundly changed one when 
compared to that hitherto accepted.20
14. Some Contentious Points
Once the fact has been clarified that the monograph under review has 
changed, or should change, our vision of the history of eighteenth and nine-
teenth century India, some dubious points present in it must be highlighted.
I must confess that in reading the book under review, it powerfully, even 
imperiously, brought to my mind Peter Brown’s The World of Late Antiquity.21 In 
both Bayly’s and Brown’s decisively important monographs, a period which had 
hitherto been seen as characterized by profound, catastrophic and long-drawn 
upheavals is skilfully reinterpreted as an age of orderly, even harmonious change. 
I still remember Brown’s analysis, which I read some forty years ago, as so entic-
ing to be almost hypnotic. However, I also remember that, as I finished Brown’s 
book, the spell cast on me by the wonderfully crafted reasoning of one of the 
major historians of our time soon started to pale. Simply put, as soon as the fasci-
nating music played by Brown stopped, the doubt set in that such a catastrophic 
and epochal event as the fall of the Western Roman Empire and the violent rise 
of the new states could really be seen as nothing more than an orderly and har-
monious process of change. Eventually, my doubts found their confirmation in 
Bryan Ward-Perkins’s splendid monograph on the fall of Rome and the end of 
civilization.22 In it, the wealth of mainly archaeological data expertly marshalled 
by its author cut like a Damascene steel sword through Brown’s fabulous and 
fabulously interwoven tapestry of words, cutting it to pieces.
By saying this, I am not anticipating the coming of a Ward-Perkins-like Indi-
an historian who will cut Bayly’s Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars to pieces. Simply, 
I want to emphasize that Bayly’s grand painting lacks some crucially important 
20 Unfortunately, the most widespread histories of India, all originally written before the pub-
lication of the book under review, even when reprinted after it, have not taken Bayly’s analysis 
into account. This author has attempted to do it in his Storia dell’India (Bari: Laterza, 2000).
21 P. Brown, The World of Late Antiquity. From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad (London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1976, first edition 1971).
22 B. Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005).
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parts, in particular the role of violence and of famines. Also, the depiction of the 
historical roots of communalism, although central to Bayly’s analytical effort, 
presents some serious shortcomings. The remaining sections of the present article 
will explore these three problems. 
15. The (Missing) Role of Violence
The first crucial flaw in Bayly’s analysis is the disconcerting lack of attention 
to the overwhelming role of violence in making possible the rise of colonialism in 
India. In fact, Bayly’s leitmotif as far as the British conquest of India is concerned 
is clearly set in the book’s introduction, where the author recalls Sir John Seeley’s 
statement, made as early as 1883, according to which: “The East India Company 
[…] had merely taken advantage of the disturbed conditions after the end of the 
Mughal empire in 1707, and that was mainly by dint of the support of important 
groups of Indians” (2). As already recalled, this is a statement which is developed 
some pages later, when Bayly argues that the political and economic success of 
the British depended on their ability “to cajole, entice or manipulate” Indian 
merchants and service gentry, who slowly drifted to the East India Company, 
causing the final and decisive weakening of the Indian states (6). This, indeed, is 
a leitmotif that is followed all through the book and is in fact applied not only to 
the transition from the pre-colonial to the colonial era, but even to that between 
the Mughal Empire and its successor states. 
Of course, the above thesis is an evolution and a refinement—or, maybe, 
an involution—of Gallagher’s and Robinson’s thesis that the European coloni-
al empires were based on organic cooperation between the colonial rulers and 
important indigenous groups,23 so much so that, according to Gallagher and 
Robinson, when the latter withdrew from the partnership with the Europeans, 
the colonial empires crumbled. 
Gallagher’s and Robinson’s thesis has much to recommend it and its applica-
tion has undoubtedly contributed to round and deepen our knowledge of how 
the European colonial system actually worked. But when this thesis is stretched 
23 J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Re-
view, 2nd series, 6 (1953), no. 1: 1-15; reprinted in J. Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall 
of the British Empire, edited by A. Seal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1-18.
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so far as to render the role of military force invisible or only dimly visible, it pow-
erfully contributes to misrepresent and obscure historical reality. The point here 
is that cooperation between the important intermediate groups present in the 
Indian society and the new British rulers was firmly predicated on the military 
might of the European newcomers. In other words, the choice for the important 
intermediate Indian groups to cooperate or not to cooperate with the newcomers 
simply did not exist. To survive, Indian social groups, no matter how influential 
they were, were forced to collaborate with the rising power of the EIC; any other 
choice would mean the destruction of any political and economic power or so-
cial influence they had. Differently put, the movement of merchants, aristocrats 
and soldiers from the indigenous states to the new rising colonial state was not 
the smooth by-product of a free choice but the forced result of the Company’s 
overwhelming and steadily increasing military power. Had the Company’s army 
not decisively won at Udhua-nala, Baksar and Kora, it is difficult to think that 
the merchants, aristocrats and soldiers who had supported the nawabi of Bengal 
and the nawabi of Awadh would have blithely and smoothly moved behind the 
Company.
As already noted, this was a process that was analogous to the one that, in 
the first half of the eighteenth century, had seen the shift of merchants, aristo-
crats and soldiers from the declining Mughal Empire to the successor states. But, 
differently from what has been argued by some scholars,24 it was not this move 
that caused the decline of the Mughal Empire: it was the decline of the Mughal 
Empire which triggered it. And in the case of the Mughals, as in the case, later in 
the century, of the successor states, it is difficult to think that the exodus of the 
aristocrats, merchants and soldiers to the successor states would have taken place 
had the Mughal armies been successful against Marathas and Persians—which, 
from a strictly military point of view, was not an impossibility. However, there 
was a difference between the process that marked the shifting of power from 
the Mughal Empire to its successor states and that characterizing the analogous 
move from the successor states to the Company Raj. In the first case, the aris-
tocrats, merchants, soldiers and even organized peasant groups who abandoned 
the sinking Mughal ship had at least the choice among several successor states; 
in the second case, the options on offer were basically limited to the Company’s 
24 For example, K. Leonard, “The ‘Great Firm’ Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 21 (1979), no. 2: 151-167.
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Raj, which was steadily and rapidly spreading its military power all over the 
subcontinent.
Also, it is worth stressing that, while the collaboration with the EIC was the 
one option left, it did not guarantee the survival of the indigenous collaborators. 
The Company had an unpleasant tendency to exploit its collaborators as long 
as it considered them useful, only to discard them like squeezed lemons once it 
decided that they were not useful any more.25 At the end of the day, the British 
policies which led to the crisis of the 1830s-1850s and the Great Revolt of 1857-
1858 can—nay, must—be seen in this perspective.
All the above drastically changes the portrait of harmonious change and free 
cooperation between the incoming British rulers and the existing indigenous in-
termediate groups painted by Bayly. In this field, much additional work is to be 
done to arrive at a more satisfactory portrait of historical reality and, unfortunate-
ly, in this perspective, the monograph under review is not even a launching pad. 
16. The (Missing) Analysis of Famines
Scattered in the pages of the monograph under review there is more than 
one hint of famines (85-86, 88-92, 102, 224, 292-299, 331-335, 406), but these 
hints are like a far-away background noise which is barely perceptible. Of course, 
famines in India were a cyclical fact of life, like the monsoons or, rather, their 
failure or overabundance; however, the way in which the states reacted to fam-
ines changed over time, and an analysis of their anti-famine policies can shed 
much light on many of the problems studied in the monograph under review.
The study of famines, however, is cursory in Bayly’s book. Of course, this 
lack of attention is far from being unusual; sadly, in the past 50-60 years, the 
question of famines and famine policies has been one of the most understudied 
25 The present author has examined the problem of the relationship between the British on the 
one hand and Indian merchants and bankers on the other in a different geographical setting, 
namely the city of Surat, proving the exploitative nature of the relationship and the fact that it 
did not guarantee the survival of the indigenous collaborators. See M. Torri, “Trapped inside 
the Colonial Order: The Hindu Bankers of Surat and their Business World in the Second Half 
of the 18th Century,” Modern Asian Studies 25 (1991), no. 2: 367-401; idem, “The British Mo-
nopoly on the Surat Trade to the Middle East and the Indian Ship-Owning Merchants’ Strug-
gle against it: 1759-1800,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 28 (2017), 1: 101-134.
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among the truly momentous problems in the history of India. Somehow, the idea 
has been generally accepted—and, by and large, seems to have been accepted 
by professional historians too—that the analyses of Indian famines by many 
Indian pre-Gandhian nationalist intellectuals and their British liberal friends 
were nothing more than ideological propaganda pieces. As such, they have been 
regarded less as serious factual inquiries into a major problem in Indian history 
than as the expression of a nationalist ideology in the making. Symptomatically, 
Mike Davis, the scholar who, after a gap of decades, produced a major work on 
Indian famines, their socio-political context and the role of the state in dealing 
with them, is neither an academic historian nor a historian of India.26
From the limited viewpoint of the present analysis, the absence of an enquiry 
into the role of famines is particularly striking because of what it can reveal 
in relation to the collaboration between the British colonizers and influential 
Indian social groups. In fact, the radical differences between the anti-famine 
policies implemented by the Indian indigenous states and the colonial state and 
the radically different consequences of these policies for Indian society are both 
glaring and revealing.
The Mughal Empire and the successor states reacted to famines with proac-
tive policies. During the famine of 1661, Aurangzeb “opened his treasury and 
granted money without stint. He gave every encouragement to the importation 
of corn and either sold it at reduced prices, or distributed it gratuitously amongst 
those who were too poor to pay”.27 On his part, Muhammad Shah, when con-
fronted by a famine on ascending the throne in 1719, relied on the services of 
Fateh Chand, whom the Emperor later rewarded with the title of Jagat Seth 
(‘banker of the world’), to inject money into the economy by making use of 
26 M. Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts. El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World 
(London & New York: Verso, 2001). Davis’ work does not deal only with Indian famines, but 
the analysis of Indian famines is a major part of it. Before the publication of Davis’ monograph, 
the most important work on Indian famines had been published some forty years earlier. See 
B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India. A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India, 1860-
1965 (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963). Of course, when stating that Indian famines are 
understudied, I do not imply that they have not been studied at all. I simply intend to stress that 
the amount of scholarly attention on a phenomenon which caused such an appalling amount of 
human loss, devastating Indian society across huge expanses of land, has been less studied than 
many other topics of much less import.
27 The First Famine Commission Report (1880), quoted in Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 286.
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hundis.28 Again, as remembered by Bayly himself, during the Chalisa famine 
of 1783-1784, the nawab of Awadh allegedly employed 40,000 people from the 
Lucknow hinterland to build the great monuments of the city, and had freely 
distributed Rs. 5,000-10,000 daily (102, 331). All these policies minimized hu-
man losses and, more generally, the social devastation brought about by famines.
The reaction of the colonial state to famines, with a solitary exception in the 
second half of the eighteenth century in South India,29 was completely different. 
The colonial state—maybe because of ideological blindness,30 or maybe because 
its priority was the good functioning of the British imperial system worldwide 
rather than the wellbeing of its Indian subjects—left the free market in charge of 
redressing the situation. The only policy that the colonial state implemented in 
support of its starving Indian subjects was marching them to deliberately faraway 
labour camps—which were concentration camps to all intents and purposes. 
Here, the unfortunate inmates were forced to perform exhausting—and mainly 
pointless—hard work, on a diet that was poorer than that in some Nazi exter-
mination camps.31 All this, of course, had the result of pushing the number of 
human losses to dreadful heights, causing literally millions of deaths. And while 
all this happened, India went on exporting huge quantities of food.32 
Summing up, famines in the colonial period were akin to gigantic hammer 
blows which hit wide geographical areas, devastating the local indigenous soci-
ety, including those intermediate groups—merchants and service people—on 
whose cooperation the colonial state was supposedly based. By stating this, I do 
not want to put a question mark over the fact that the working of the colonial 
state was grounded on cooperation between its European lords and the most 
28 J.H. Little, House of Jagatseth (Calcutta: Calcutta Historical Society, 1967), 47. Funnily and 
significantly enough, the author, in remembering the event, muses on the fact that “in any case 
it is difficult to understand how the circulation of hundis could avail such a crisis”. Nowadays, 
after the work of Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen, why injecting money in the economy helps to 
overcome a famine is no longer a mystery. It is worth stressing that the Mughal aristocracy, 
although without the benefit of the knowledge of modern economic theory, seems to have been 
fully aware of how to cope with a situation of famine.
29 R. Ahuja, “State Formation and ‘Famine Policy’ in Early Colonial South India,” The Indian 
Economic Social History Review, 39 (2002), no. 4: 351-380.
30 As argued by Srinivasa Ambirajan, “Political Economy and Indian Famines,” South Asia, 1 
(1971), no. 1: 20-28.
31 Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts, 39 (Table 1.3), and passim.
32 Ibid., passim.
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important indigenous intermediate groups. What I do intend to stress, however, 
is that the colonial state famine policy is as clear a demonstration as any that the 
intermediate groups’ collaboration with the British did not even guarantee the 
mere physical survival of the collaborators if the real holders of power decided 
otherwise. 
Let me further clarify this point through an admittedly overbold compari-
son. Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi, in his I sommersi e i salvati,33 while describ-
ing the experience of the inmates in the Nazi extermination camps, stresses that 
the first violence—and, indeed, most of the usual daily violence to which the 
internees were subjected—was at the hands of the kapos, namely other inmates 
who had been co-opted by the Nazis as supervisors of their brethren. In this 
way, the Nazis minimized the cost of running the extermination camps and 
rendered it more efficient. So, you see, the kapos can be compared to the collabo-
rators with the Indian colonial state. But, of course, being a kapo did not change 
the ultimate position of the inmate co-opted for the task; a kapo could exercise 
considerable power over his brethren and be as violent and brutal as he wanted 
when dealing with them, but his final destiny was exactly the same as that of the 
people whom he bullied and victimized: the gas chamber. No doubt, even the 
merchants, the gentry and the ‘rich’ peasants who were caught up in the vice of 
the deadly famines of the colonial era, or at least most of them, ended up, like 
the kapos, not differently from their humbler brethren, dying like flies because of 
starvation or because of infectious illnesses against which their undernourished 
bodies had no defences left. 
17. The Thesis of the Historical Roots of Communalism and its Limitations
The last contentious point on which I wish to dwell is Bayly’s reconstruc-
tion of the historical roots of communalism. As recalled above, according to 
Bayly, the rise of the so-called Muslim separatism34 from the 1870s onward was 
not only—and, maybe, not so much—the result of the policies of the coloni-
33 For an English edition of Primo Levi’s memoir, see, for example, The Drowned and the Saved 
(New York: Vintage International, 1989).
34 I speak of the “so-called Muslim separatism” because I strongly dislike this label, which I 
consider communally flawed. A more correct one is, in my own view, that of “Indo-Muslim 
nationalism”.
Michelguglielmo Torri, India from the Pre-Colonial to the Colonial Era
57
al government and the working of the new Westernized schools and colleges, 
which favoured the shaping of a new Indian-Muslim identity. Rather, it had 
in-depth historical roots, related to the different religious features of the two 
main components of the modern Indian middle class. Looking at the problem 
from this standpoint, particularly cogent appears to be Bayly’s criticism of Paul 
Brass’s characterization of the Indian Muslims in the United Provinces. Brass 
argues that in 1859-1931, the Muslims in the United Provinces, in spite of all 
the rhetoric about the poverty and backwardness of the Indian Muslims (which 
they themselves contributed to craft), were indeed a privileged community, more 
advanced than the local Hindu community.35 Bayly, quite convincingly, coun-
ters Brass’s argument by pointing out that, although still a privileged group, the 
Muslims of the United Province had historically been moving along a long-term 
declining trend. As a consequence, in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and the first decades of the twentieth century, the UP Muslims’ perception of 
being a disadvantaged community, far from being a figment of ideology, was an 
accurate appraisal of their (historically deteriorating) social position. In turn, 
this explains the UP Muslims’ crucial role as the intellectual and organizational 
leaders of the Muslim community.
All the above is undoubtedly correct, at least up to a point. In fact, the con-
clusion—implied in Bayly’s analysis, but not openly articulated—that, because 
of their different cultural-religious features, the two main segments of the Indian 
middle class were bound to be pitted one against the other in a communal con-
frontation, triggering the so-called Muslim separatism, seems to be based on a 
far from unassailable axiom. This is that social groups characterized by different 
religious connotations are bound to clash, politically and socially, unless a strong 
state keeps them in check.
Now, if Bayly’s analysis is correct, it is logical to deduce that Muslim separatism 
in the late colonial period was as much the result of the different religious connota-
tions of the two main segments of the rising Indian middle class as of the inability 
(or unwillingness?) of the colonial state to keep in check communal tensions. It is, 
however, a fact that Bayly, in the monograph under review, appears rapidly to lose 
sight of the implications of the second half of his statement, namely that a strong 
state could keep different communities in check, preventing communal conflict. 
35 P.R. Brass, “Muslim Separatism in United Provinces: Social Context and Political Strategy 
before Partition,” Economic and Political Weekly, 5, nos. 3/5 (January 1970): 167-186.
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Rather, he focuses his attention on proving the existence of communal tensions 
during the pre-colonial and early colonial period. Chronologically, he starts from 
the “bloody massacres of Ahmed Shah at Agra and Muttra in 1761” which, accord-
ing to the author, “were calculated acts of religious savagery” (335), and continues 
by enumerating a series of communal clashes which, in Bayly’s opinion, character-
ized the 1820s, the 1830s and the Great Revolt of 1857-1858.36 
No doubt the instances of communal tensions and clashes occurring in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries enumerated by Bayly are real—at least 
most of the time.37 Accordingly, they cannot be wished away and must be con-
36 According to the author, in the 1820s and 1830s “there were a series of bloody Hindu-Mus-
lim clashes in the cities and rural bazaars of north India” (Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 
335). For Bayly’s tendency to characterize the Great Revolt as at times similar to a communal 
clash between Hindus and Muslims, see above.
37 I must confess that I am puzzled by Bayly’s reference to Ahmad Shah’s (I suppose Ahmad 
Shah Abdali’s) “calculated acts of religious savagery at Agra and Muttra in 1761”. In Bayly’s 
heavily footnoted monograph, there is no reference for this assertion. On my part, far from 
being able to locate any supporting evidence for it, I have been incapable even of finding any 
indication that this “religious savagery” ever took place. According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, at 
the beginning of 1761 the Abdali was fully engaged in confronting the Maratha army and cer-
tainly did not have either the incentive or the possibility to divert part of his forces to commit 
“calculated acts of religious savagery at Agra and Muttra”. On 14 January 1761, the Abdali 
confronted the Maratha army, headed by Sadashivrao Bhau on the fields of Panipat, decisively 
vanquishing it. Again according to Sir Jadunath, after the battle the Abdali Shah first visited 
Panipat, paying tribute to the tomb of the saint Bu Ali Qalandar, and then set out for Delhi, 
where he spent February and the first half of March, happily engaged “in seizing property ‘be-
yond imagination’”: J. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, 4 vols. (Bombay: Orient Longman, 
1970-1972, first edition 1932), vol. 2 (1971), 270-271. At the beginning of March, the Abdali 
was planning to advance towards Agra, but his troops mutinied, forcing him “to decide on a 
prompt return to Afghanistan” (ibid., 272). He left Delhi on 20 March. Sir Jadunath points 
out that, according to a Maratha report, “there was a three days’ plunder of Delhi by his [the 
Abdali’s] retreating troops” (ibid.). However there is no hint either that the plunder of Delhi 
had communal undertones or that the Afghans ever had the chance to sally to Muttra and Agra, 
to commit “calculated acts of religious savagery”. Ahmad Shah returned to India only the next 
year, but he did not even advance as far as Delhi, let alone Agra and Muttra, as he was fully en-
gaged in trying, rather unsuccessfully, to subdue the rebellious Sikhs in the Punjab. Summing 
up, in 1761, Ahmad Shah never reached either Muttra or Agra, which makes Bayly’s assertion 
rather difficult to accept. Of course, this leaves open the possibility that Bayly misquotes the 
date of the alleged massacre. By persisting in my attempt to locate the event, I came across what 
James Grant Duff writes concerning the Abdali’s actions in Muttra and Agra some years before. 
Duff states that, in 1758, Ahmad Shah Abdali crossed the Attock with a large army and entered 
Delhi. As a consequence, “Delhi was plundered, and its unhappy people, again subjected to 
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fronted and explained. A main gauge for doing so is to clearly define if the instanc-
es put together by Bayly represent the norm or, on the contrary, are exceptions. It 
is logical to expect some frictions between two social groups which live together 
but are characterized by different socio-economic and religious features and cus-
toms. The problem, therefore, is not if there were frictions and clashes or not, as, of 
course, they were bound to happen. Rather, the problem is whether these frictions 
and clashes were frequent and recurrent enough to be judged the norm in the social 
interaction between the two groups or, rather, must be judged as exceptions. In this 
perspective, the bottom line is that the examples marshalled by Bayly are simply 
too few and too unsystematic to be construed as proof of the existence of some in-
depth religious-based fissure in the pre-colonial and early colonial Indian society. 
These examples, at most, point to the need for a more thorough examination of the 
communal interactions in Indian society before the late colonial period. In con-
clusion, by themselves, Bayly’s examples are insufficient to disprove the thesis that 
communal relations in India, at least from the time of Akbar and up the 1870s, 
were, as a rule, tolerably harmonious and that the 1857-1858 Great Revolt, in spite 
of some exceptions, was characterized by Muslim-Hindu cooperation. In turn, this 
means that the assumption that the Indian middle class, as it took shape in the 
second half of the nineteenth century in the United Provinces, was bound to split 
politically along communal lines is based on very flimsy factual foundations.
Bayly himself must have been dissatisfied with the conclusions that he had 
reached in the book under review in relation to the problem under discussion. It 
is a fact that he went back to the subject in an article published two years after 
Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars.38 The article, focused on the “pre-history” of com-
munalism, is a very nuanced one which, observed from the vantage point of Rulers, 
Townsmen and Bazaars, appears to be engaged in both deepening Bayly’s analysis 
of communalism before 1870, and, maybe more important, qualifying it. 
pillage, and its daughters to pollution. The city of Muttra shared a like fate, and Agra was only 
saved by the breaking out of a violent disease in the camp of the Afghans, which compelled 
their king to abandon his conquests, and hasten beyond the influence of pestilence, to the more 
congenial climate of Cabul.” See J. Grant Duff, A History of the Mahrattas, 3 vols. (London: 
Longmans, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1826), vol. 2, 130. What happened in Delhi and 
Muttra (but not in Agra) could well have been calculated acts of savagery, but the “unhappy 
people” and their daughters, who were its victims, were both Hindu and Muslim. There is no 
indication that only the former were subjected to the indignities described by Duff. 
38 C.A. Bayly, “The Pre-History of ‘Communalism’? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860,” 
Modern Asian Studies, 19 (1985), no. 2 : 177-203.
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The author puts his effort into perspective by pointing out that: “If religious 
revitalization did not necessarily give rise to religious or communal conflict, it is 
also the case that the widespread Hindu-Muslim symbiosis of the pre-colonial and 
early colonial periods did not totally exclude the possibility of riot and disturbance 
along communal lines.”39 He goes on to make an accurate analysis of the nature of 
eighteenth century religious syncretism and of the fact that the undeniable exist-
ence and relevance of this Hindu-Muslim syncretism did not preclude instances of 
religiously motivated conflict. This, he points out, was sometimes strengthened by 
the socio-economic differentiation among the groups involved. 
Without dwelling on Bayly’s analysis, what is important to stress here is his 
conclusions. The author states:
While this paper does not provide much support for the old nationalist view that 
pre-colonial and early colonial times (with the deplorable exception of Aurangzeb’s 
reign) were characterized by entirely peaceful relations between the major religious 
groups, it cannot be taken to endorse the ‘two nations’ theory either. What seems diffi-
cult to show is that there is any unilinear or cumulative growth of communal identity 
before 1860 […]. But ultimately, the evidence presented in this paper tends to re-em-
phasize the importance of preconditions in social structures for sustained communal 
violence […]. Religious differences were more likely to become communal conflicts 
when they coincided with shifts in political and economic power. Conflicts between 
Hindu and Sikh peasantry and Muslim gentry, or between Muslim peasantry and Hindu 
gentry did not inevitably lead to polarization on communal lines.40 
This is a rather different conclusion from the one that, although not explicitly 
stated in Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, forms the subtext of the book—namely, 
that the Hindu and Muslim sectors of the modern Indian middle class were, if 
not predestined, at least strongly predisposed to communal confrontation. As 
Bayly himself concludes: “Preconditions are not the same as causes.”41 
This is a salutary warning which must be applied to Bayly’s own analysis of 
the historical roots of communalism in Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. 
39 Ibid., 180.
40 Ibid., 202, 203 (emphasis added).
41 Ibid., 203.
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Guido Abbattista
Information, Communication and Knowledge  
in the Government of the Empire. 
Reflections on Bayly’s Empire and Information
When he published Empire and Information,1 Bayly had already written three 
major books: The Local Roots of Indian Politics (1975), Rulers, Townsmen and Ba-
zaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1780-1870 (1983) and 
Imperial Meridian (1989),2 all works strongly connected with the 1996 book. In 
other words, Empire and Information is the culmination of an already very rich 
research path on the history of colonial India, which began with the 1975 book 
on Allahabad derived from the doctoral thesis carried out under the guidance 
of Jack Gallagher. Thanks to this path, Bayly has been able to put to good use 
his knowledge of the archives of the Benares region, a knowledge of previous-
ly unexplored sources to which the Cambridge historian had access thanks to 
his linguistic knowledge and the intermediacy of consultants, making the 1996 
book a pioneering and highly innovative work which has profoundly changed 
the way we look at the history of modern India, the dynamics of the construction 
of British imperial power, and the birth of Indian nationalism. 
In Empire and Information, if we want to simplify to the maximum, Bayly 
brings into the open, with reference to Northern India (i.e. the central region of 
Benares, the so-called United Provinces of the British period, between Bengal 
1 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information. Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in In-
dia, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Quotations from this text are 
referenced with page numbers in brackets.
2 C.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics. Allahabad 1880-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975); idem, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Ex-
pansion, 1770-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); idem, Imperial Meridian: 
The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London: Longman, 1989).
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and Rajputana) between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
complex world of Indian spies, informers, mediators, couriers, messengers and 
political secretaries. These were figures the English recruited and on whom they 
relied to collect, through the exploitation of personal networks—family, paren-
tal, social networks of which those characters were part—information about the 
territory, the cities, their inhabitants and the Indian reality as a whole. But the 
heuristic and interpretative scope of the book goes far beyond these aspects of 
social and political history. The book aims at demonstrating how the forms as-
sumed by British politics in India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were the result of a complex mechanism of interaction between pre-co-
lonial local traditions and new structures of imperial power, according to a his-
toriographic perspective that was no longer Anglocentric, but capable of placing 
at the centre of the observation Indian reality, as would happen in subsequent 
books such as Origins of Nationality in South Asia (1998) and Recovering Liberties 
(2011).3
Indeed, through field experimentation, Empire and Information directly 
touches some of the key issues of historiographical (and literary, historical-an-
thropological and sociological) debate from the 1770s onwards: the nature of co-
lonial power between domination and negotiation; the complex set of phenom-
ena included under the category of ‘Orientalism’, introduced by Said, caught in 
its most immediately performative dimension; the relationship between forms of 
knowledge and exercise of power; the forms and role of the public sphere; and 
the nature of national sentiment as the result of complex cultural constructions 
and representations. From this point of view, Bayly’s interpretation—thanks, 
too, to the teaching of Eric Stokes—comes into direct contact with the works by 
authors such as Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Edward Said and Benedict 
Anderson, who, from the early 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, contribut-
ed to a profound redefinition of how we conceive the ways of exercising power, 
the historical phenomena of colonial and imperial domination, the interaction 
between Western and Asian cultures, and the problem of ‘native agency’, un-
derstood through a dimension of historical temporality focused on continuity 
3 C.A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South Asia. Patriotism and Ethical Government in the 
Making of Modern India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); idem, Recovering Liberties. 
Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011).
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and permanence rather than on breakages. At the same time, it dialogues with 
interpretations by scholars who, in turn, have modified the way we understand 
the most specific phenomena of birth, nature and evolution of British imperial 
domination in India, like Ranajit Guha, the guru of the Subaltern Studies, or 
the historian of anthropological formation Bernard Cohn, but also Eugene F. 
Irschick and Nicholas B. Dirks.4 
Strengthened by this complex critical and historiographical background, 
Bayly traces in Empire and Information an analytical path through three main 
phases of the history of the advent and structuring of British power in Northern 
India. In Bayly’s book, the treatment of the pre-1765 period is characterized by 
the description of Mughal power in the northern areas as already traditionally 
based on networks of personal relationships, structured information-gathering 
systems, and the implementation of political control through information com-
ing from networks of political and social mediators, and on the affirmation of 
a highly literate public sphere, certainly limited and elitist but nevertheless es-
sential to the orderly development of the administrative work under the control 
of the Mughal imperial authority. In describing this “indigenous public sphere” 
(180), Bayly emphasizes the presence of factors such as the existence of limits to 
the political authority deriving from Islamic law and the relative vision of society 
and religious life; a relative idea of  a just and unjust government; the existence 
of an apparatus of juridical schools and jurisconsults with independent opinions 
and a strong idea of custom; and the existence of a multiplicity of places and 
actors carrying a lively political debate even in the absence of the market, as a 
separate area from the family and private domestic sphere and periodical press 
communication. Bayly’s is a representation that arises from the analysis of very 
rich unpublished materials preserved in the Indian archives (memorials, notes, 
instructions, correspondences, reports).
We must also observe how that representation has exerted a considerable influ-
ence, beyond the sphere of academic historiography, on a certain progressive Indi-
4 B. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996); E.F. Irschick, Dialogue and History: Constructing South India, 1795-
1895 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994); N.B. Dirks, The Hollow Crown: 
Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993); idem, 
Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2001); idem, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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an public discourse. Take, for example, the case of Amartya Sen, tending to depict 
Mughal India from the age of Akbar as an open, tolerant society characterized by 
the form and exercise of negotiated and consensual authority, which would have 
sown the seeds of democracy before the advent of European domination.
The second fundamental moment of Bayly’s periodization is that which goes 
from 1785 to the 1820s, which the Cambridge historian analyses from the point 
of view of the creation of a refined intelligence system capable of identifying and 
relying on pre-existing networks, informants and the indigenous public sphere. 
In short, the British power, expanding in the centre-north starting from Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa, aims to become part of the public sphere, using it to its own 
ends and building in synergy with it an Anglo-Indian cognitive “ecumene” that 
allows the accumulation of a “colonial knowledge” (6) in crucial matters such as 
taxation; topographical, economic and fiscal control of the territory; public order; 
defence; identification; description and repression of crime; and administrative 
management of the caste system. It is therefore a period of high commingling 
and negotiation with the local elites by the exponents of British power, whose 
operational effectiveness develops parallel to the ability to collect and use infor-
mation for the purpose of building an information order managed by an expert 
bureaucracy, who, in turn, inherit the relational and sapiential heritage of tradi-
tional bureaucracies. In this process, which Bayly analyses through an original 
conceptual instrumentation, the two orders of knowledge—the “patrimonial” or 
“affective” one of Moghul ancestry and the “incorporated” or “abstract” and “in-
stitutional” (7-8, 179) one of the British matrix—interact, balancing reciprocally 
in a dialectic between native agency and instances of colonial politics through 
which is recognizable what Bayly, alluding to the real forms and protagonists of 
the knowledge of Oriental realities behind the stimuli of government practice, 
calls an “orientalism in action” (144).
The importance of this interpretation concerning the mechanisms of forma-
tion of colonial knowledge is perfectly understandable when compared with the 
vision developed by Bernard Cohn. According to Cohn, colonial knowledge is 
structured autonomously and unilaterally as a direct projection of power. For 
Bayly, though, the imperial power cannot amount to sheer domination, but can 
consolidate itself through the construction of an efficient informational order, 
the realization of which can take place only through interaction with local forces 
and their active participation.
The third moment of Bayly’s periodization is that from the 1830s to the 1850s, 
with the date limit inevitably fixed at 1857 with the Great Mutiny. This is a phase 
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of crucial importance, during which negotiated and participated colonial knowl-
edge tends to be supplanted by the entrance of “useful knowledge” (212-246), an 
expression that is only apparently generic: in reality—as well demonstrated by 
the use that Joel Mokyr makes of it in his book The Enlightened Economy (2009) 
with reference to the economic and social modernization of England in the ear-
ly 1800s5—it is able to synthesize an idea of typical Enlightenment ancestry, 
pertaining to a Westernizing brand of progress through public education, West-
ern scientific and technological knowledge, and the diffusion of communication 
through the press, especially the periodical press. The intent of modernizing In-
dia by disseminating “useful knowledge” and its interaction with “native knowl-
edge” (273) is documented by Bayly in the central chapters of the book with 
reference to the fields of astronomy, medicine, language and geography, wherein 
the projects and the cognitive energies of the Anglo-Indian government unfolded 
to the highest degree. Projects, programmes, institutional initiatives and major 
publications of fundamental importance began at this stage, giving substance 
to an “orientalism in action” through which a reclassification of colonial knowl-
edge was realized on the basis of hierarchies, reflecting the vision of the world 
proper to the Britons of the beginning of the nineteenth century. This process 
also involved the introduction of educational systems often linked to mission-
ary initiatives; technical and agronomic literacy initiatives; the construction of a 
modern, efficient and low-cost postal system; the birth of a publishing industry; 
and the dissemination of printed books in a reality that a generation before had 
been totally devoid of it but which now substantially helped the emergence of a 
culture that was not only anglophone, but also vernacular.
However, even in this case, the process was not totally detached from the 
traditional forms of local knowledge, but rather a bi-directional process. As Bayly 
points out, “These institutionalised forms of knowing, however, were still influ-
enced by people present—and presenting themselves—in Indian society. The co-
lonial information order was erected on the foundations of its Indian precursors” 
(179). It was not a process that Indian society suffered passively. On the contrary, 
Bayly speaks explicitly of a “colonial paradox” according to which traditional in-
formation, cultural and sapiential networks continued to exist alongside the or-
der of imperial knowledge, giving rise to a “juxtaposition” rather than to the re-
5 J. Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
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placement of one order with another (ibid.). If the order of information available 
to British power was extraordinarily rich and structured, still quite out of British 
control were Indian sensibilities, experience and visions of life and society, which 
remained impervious to the British power and strengthened themselves by devel-
oping from within a criticism of sociologies, interpretations of religious systems, 
and ideas of crime elaborated by British institutions. In short, the British Empire 
in the mid-nineteenth century is presented as a monster, an information-devour-
ing system, according to the suggestive image by Rudyard Kipling6—a creator 
of mechanisms of development of local opinion without the ability to control 
and orient it, so that precisely these areas of interaction became, as Bayly demon-
strates, the most fruitful places for the incubation of nationalist ideas. Precisely 
these kinds of cultural experience, if adequately understood, reveal the limits of 
Orientalism, which does not appear, in the manner of Said (and Cohn), as the 
fruit of a political agenda that generates its own denigrated ‘otherness’, but rather 
as a complex fabric of relationships and interactions.
From this point of view, the revolt of 1857 only revealed the “paradox of 
colonial rule” (ibid.). A government devoted to information-gathering and struc-
turing dramatically realized its own inadequacy, ignorance and weakness in the 
face of the onset of forces that it had contributed to create but had not been able 
to control. Bayly’s conclusion is that “the new media and the diffusion of western 
knowledge had unsettled society. The dissidents saw the changes not so much 
as a contest between a stagnant Orient and dynamic western science, as one 
between still-vital Indian knowledges and the foreigners’ abstract rule-making, 
which divorced information from godly wisdom” (246).
Ultimately, the first major crisis of the British Empire in India is presented 
by Bayly as a crisis in the order of information—what he calls the most dramatic 
example of “information panics” (143). This is demonstrated by the inability to 
foresee, anticipate or even think about the possibility of a great uprising revealed 
by a dominant power endowed with great influence, great means and solid con-
victions about the superiority of Western knowledge, and the inertia and immo-
bility of traditional ones—a dominant power inadequate, though, not only to 
achieve a complete control of the society under its government, but also to realize 
the depth of the forces of change that it had triggered.
6 R. Kipling, Plain Tales from the Hills (London: Macmillan, 1899; first edition 1888), 224.
Guido Abbattista, Information, Communication and Knowledge in the Government of the Empire
67
One of the most interesting and lasting conclusions of Empire and Informa-
tion concerns the concept of Orientalism itself. Bayly convincingly proves that, 
if observed in the concrete practice of the exercise of power, one cannot speak 
of Orientalism as an indistinct cultural attitude generated by the hierarchically 
superior position of the West over the Eastern world. Studied in British India 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in the concrete practice 
of power management—or what Foucault terms ‘governmentality’—Oriental-
ism was a diversified complex of notions stemming from mediation, negotiation, 
collaboration, and interaction between a culture in power and local traditions, 
to the elaboration of which local groups contributed directly in a process not 
unilaterally directed from above according to the needs of power. 
Empire and Information is a fundamental contribution that has radically 
changed the way of looking at the history of modern India under English dom-
ination, demonstrating at the same time the relativity of a periodization that, 
from the perspective of imperial and global history, cuts across traditional chron-
ological limits. It is also a great reservoir of ideas for studying forms of imperial 
domination based on the collection and use of information, and the creation of 
colonial knowledge.
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Teodoro Tagliaferri
Bayly’s Imperial Way to World History
1. World History as the Story of Globalization
Bayly’s intellectual itinerary exemplifies at its highest levels one of the most 
remarkable aspects of the transformations taking place on the contemporary his-
toriographical scene: the merging into one another of the processes of renewal 
that have almost simultaneously affected the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
traditions of both imperial history and Weltgeschichte during the last generation.1 
Analysis of the role played by the “global connections” in planetary moderniza-
tion, on which both The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 and the posthu-
mously published Remaking the Modern World, 1900-2015 focus, shows substan-
tial analogies and several points of more direct contact with the methodological 
ideas, scientific programme and ethical-political premises of the international 
movement for the professionalization and academic institutionalization of world 
history which developed after the end of the Cold War, and in particular with 
1 J. Osterhammel, “World History,” in The Oxford History of Historical Writing, 5 vols., Gen-
eral Editor D. Woolf (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011-2012), vol. 5, Historical Writing 
since 1945, edited by A. Schneider and D. Woolf, 106; T. Tagliaferri, La repubblica dell’uman-
ità. Fonti culturali e religiose dell’universalismo imperiale britannico (Soveria Mannelli: Rub-
bettino, 2012), 133-147; S. Conrad, Globalgeschichte. Eine Einführung (Munich: C.H. Beck, 
2013), 57; T. Tagliaferri, contribution to “Connessioni globali e storia transnazionale,” edited 
by M. De Giuseppe and A. Roccucci, Il mestiere di storico. Rivista della Società Italiana per lo 
Studio della Storia Contemporanea, 7 (2016), no. 2: 57-60. For Bayly’s own views about these 
historiographical developments, see C.A. Bayly, “Afterword,” in A. Burton, Empire in Ques-
tion. Reading, Writing, and Teaching British Imperialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2011), 293-302; idem, “History and World History,” in A Concise Companion to History, edited 
by U. Rublack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-25; idem, introduction to Remak-
ing the Modern World, 1900-2015: Global Connections and Comparisons (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2018), 1-11.
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its US branch.2 But the approach tested in the fortunate volume of the Blackwell 
History of the World published in 2004 can also be seen as the result of another 
trend in which Bayly had taken part in previous decades, when he had repeatedly 
placed himself on the cutting edge of the attempts made by the imperial histori-
ans to redefine the object of their discipline by studying British colonialism “as a 
theme in world history”—that is, “as part of the larger and dynamic interaction 
of European and non-western societies”, and a formative factor of today’s glo-
balized society.3 
It is precisely the centrality they assign to the category of globalization which 
offers the two historiographical currents joining together in Bayly’s work a nat-
ural meeting ground. While the world historians select globalization as their 
own privileged subject of investigation, and the historians of the British Empire 
regard its study as providing the only analytical framework appropriate to under-
stand the rise and decline of European world hegemony,4 both groups of scholars 
tend to interpret it as a phenomenon which has been coextensive with human 
2 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); idem, Remaking the Modern World. Some key themes of this last 
volume were preliminarly discussed in idem, “Michael Mann and Modern World History,” The 
Historical Journal, 48 (2015), no. 1: 331-341. This is a review of The Sources of Social Power, by 
M. Mann, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986-2013), vol. 4, Globalizations, 
1945-2011. 
3 W.R. Louis, “Foreword,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, 5 vols., Editor-in-chief 
W.R. Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998-1999), vol. 1, The Origins of Empire, edited 
by N. Canny, vii; idem, “Introduction,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 5, His-
toriography, edited by R.W. Winks, 41 (reprinted as “The Historiography of the British Empire” 
in idem, Ends of British Imperialism. The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization. Collected 
Essays [London: Tauris, 2006], 955-998; T. Ballantyne and A. Burton, “Empires and the Reach 
of the Global,” in A History of the World, 6 vols., General Editors A. Iriye and J. Osterhammel, 
vol. 5, A World Connecting, 1870-1945, edited by E. Rosenberg (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2012), 338. The best starting point for an overview of Bayly’s life and career 
is the “Historiographical and Autobiographical Note” attached to C.A. Bayly, Origins of Na-
tionality in South Asia. Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 307-322. See also “‘I am not going to call myself a global 
historian’. An Interview with C.A. Bayly,” by B.M. John, Itinerario. International Journal on 
the History of European Expansion and Global Interaction, 31 (2007), no. 1: 7-14; “Christopher 
Bayly interviewed by A. Macfarlane on 24th July 2014,” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x-
I7BJZQTpTE); C. Clark, S. Bayly, “Christopher Bayly and the Making of World History,” in 
Bayly, Remaking the Modern World, xiii-xviii. 
4 P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, “Afterword. Empires and Globalization,” in idem, British Im-
perialism, 1688-2000, second edition (Harlow: Pearson, 2002, first edition 1993), 661-681.
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experience since antiquity, and therefore in a way similar to the definition given 
by the Egyptologist and theoretician of cultural memory, Jan Assmann, who 
describes globalization as: 
a process of general dissemination (of merchandise, technologies, news, political in-
fluence, religious ideas) across political and cultural boundaries and of the ensuing 
integration and coalescence of various previously isolated zones into one system of 
interconnections and interdependencies, where everything, that is, all nations, empi-
res, tribes and states cohere in some way or other by political, economic, or cultural 
relations.5
Bayly’s proximity or critical interlocution with some forerunners and leading 
exponents of the “New World History”,6 like Marshall Hodgson, William Mc-
Neill, Kenneth Pomeranz and Jerry Bentley, is well documented by a group of 
writings (some of them published shortly before The Birth of the Modern World) 
which record the maturation of his thought about three crucial components of 
his approach to the “long nineteenth century”: the diagnosis of the “Great Diver-
gence” between the West and Asia; the periodization of the history of globaliza-
tion; and the critique of Eurocentrism and the compartmentalization of regional 
histories.7 But the profound congruence of the conceptual framework of Bayly’s 
5 J. Assmann, “Globalization, Universalism, and the Erosion of Cultural Memory,” in Memory 
in a Global Age. Discourses, Practices and Trajectories, edited by A. Assmann and S. Conrad 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 121; idem, “Cultural Memory and the Myth of the 
Axial Age”, in The Axial Age and its Consequences, edited by R.N. Bellah and H. Joas (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), 376. See also M. Bandeira Jéronimo, “Imperial 
Globalizations,” in Explorations in History and Globalizations, edited by C. Antunes and K. 
Fatah-Black (London: Routledge, 2016), 212-230.
6 L. Di Fiore and M. Meriggi, World History. Le nuove rotte della storia (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 
2011), 16-90; The New World History: A Field Guide for Teachers and Researchers, edited by R. 
E. Dunn, L. J. Mitchell, and K. Ward (Oakland, CA.: University of California Press, 2016).
7 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 41; idem, “South Asia and the ‘Great Divergence,’” 
Itinerario. European Journal of Overseas History, 24 (2000), nos. 3-4: 89-103; idem, “‘Archaic’ 
and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750-1850,” in Globalization 
in World History, edited by A.G. Hopkins (London: Pimlico, 2002), 47-73; idem, “From Ar-
chaic Globalization to International Networks, ca. 1600-2000,” in Interactions. Transregional 
Perspectives on World History, edited by J.H. Bentley, R. Bridenthal, and A.A. Yang (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 14-29; J.H. Bentley, “Regional Histories, Global Processes, 
Cross-Cultural Interactions,” ibid., 1-2, 5-6; P.F. Bang and C.A. Bayly, “Comparing Pre-Mod-
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book with the methodological proposal of the North American scholars emerges 
in full evidence especially when the architecture of the series for which it was 
written—the Blackwell History of the World—is taken into account, as well as the 
historiographical ideas of its planner and editor, the British medievalist Robert 
Ian Moore, which were formed, in turn, in close dialogue with a galaxy of au-
thors that included among others, besides Hodgson, McNeill and Bentley, L.S. 
Stavrianos, Philip Curtin, Alfred Crosby, Janet Abu-Lughod, David Christian 
and several contributors to the first years of the Journal of World History.8
In order to outline this comparison, it will suffice to recall that the terrain 
of competence that the American world historians claim for their discipline in 
the academic division of labour consists in the study of the “global past” and the 
evolution of the “human community” (an expression employed in the mission 
statement of the World History Association and borrowed from the subtitle of 
McNeill’s The Rise of the West).9 In their terminology, the much-abused term 
‘global’ acquires a specific conceptual meaning: historical events and processes 
qualify as global when they “work their influence”, and make their influence ac-
tually felt, in “more than one civilization or cultural region” and unfold therefore 
on an “interregional”, “hemispheric” or literally “ecumenical” scale. Among the 
examples of global historical phenomena of this kind, the imposition and the ex-
ertion of economic, military and governmental control on colonial territories and 
attempts at empire-building involving peoples rooted in remote or different civi-
lizational backgrounds, like Europeans and Asians in the obvious case of British 
ern Empires,” The Medieval History Journal, 6 (2003), no. 2, Special Issue, Tributary Empires in 
History, edited by P.F. Bang and C.A. Bayly: 169-187, 182-183; C.A. Bayly, “Hodgson, Islam, 
and World History in the Modern Age,” in Islam and World History: The Ventures of Marshall 
Hodgson, edited by E. Burke III and R.J. Mankin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2018), 38-54. See also B. Bongiovanni, T. Detti, and P. Ginsborg, “L’alba di una globalizzazi-
one imperfetta,” edited by B. Bongiovanni, Passato e presente, 27 (2009), no. 1: 11-29, and, for 
further details, T. Tagliaferri, “Christopher Bayly e ‘the return of universal history,’” in idem, 
La persistenza della storia universale. Studi sulla professione di storico (Rome: Bordeaux, 2017), 
18-22.
8 R.I. Moore, “World History,” in Companion to Historiography, edited by M. Bentley, London, 
Routledge, 1997, 918-936. 
9 W.H. McNeill, The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community, second edition 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991; first edition 1963); P. Manning, Navigating 
World History. Historians create a Global Past (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 3-15; 
World History Association, “History, Mission and Vision of the WHA,” http://www.thewha.
org/about-wha/history-mission-and-vision-of-the-wha/, accessed February 25, 2017. 
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India, are entitled to a prominent place alongside cross-cultural migrations and 
the creation of diasporic communities; the establishment of long distance trade 
networks; the impact of innovations in transport and communication technol-
ogies; the encounters and exchanges of social, religious, cultural, political and 
institutional traditions; missionary initiatives; the diffusion of botanical and an-
imal biological species; and the spreading of diseases.10
Correspondingly, by “human community”, the New World Historians mean 
both the ethical standpoint, transcending the limitations of “nation-states, dis-
crete regions, or particular cultures”, from which they make profession of prac-
tising the study and teaching of history, and the specific field of social activity 
which has been generated throughout history by the interactions among human 
groups that have taken place in the “transregional” and “cross-cultural” geohis-
torical spaces.11 The “human community” is, in other terms, a kind of macro-so-
ciety composed of regional “great societies” interacting both among themselves 
and with the global society that includes them all.12 
Moreover, the “human community” grows and changes shape in the course 
of time. It has a “morphological” history of its own,13 which can be empirically 
reconstructed, which is susceptible to periodization, and which may provide the 
thread for a unified narrative of world history centred on the prolonged genesis 
of the present epoch of “global cosmopolitanism”, when “all the cultural variety 
of mankind is embraced within the bounds of an intimately interacting whole”.14 
As far as the modern and contemporary age is concerned, the “global past” coin-
cides with those phases in the history of the human community through which 
10 J.H. Bentley, “A New Forum for Global History,” Journal of World History. Official Journal 
of the World History Association, I (1990), 1: iii-v, iv; idem, “Myths, Wagers, and Some Moral 
Implications of World History”, Journal of World History, 16 (2005), 1: 76-81. 
11 WHA, “History, Mission and Vision”; P.D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); J.H. Bentley, Old World Encounters: Cross-Cul-
tural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
Interactions, ed. Bentley, Bridenthal, and Yang. 
12 G. Wallas, The Great Society. A Psychological Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1914); A. J. Toyn-
bee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey. A Study in the Contact of Civilizations (London: 
Constable, 1922), 361; McNeill, The Rise of the West, 57-58, 63, 131, 135. See T.H. Qualter, 
Graham Wallas and the Great Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1980). 
13 A.J. Toynbee, “The Philosophy and Morphology of History,” in Science et conscience de la 
société. Mélanges en l’ honneur de Raymond Aron, 2 vols., edited by J.-C. Casanova (Paris: Cal-
mann-Lévy, 1971), vol. 2, 19-33.
14 McNeill, The Rise of the West, 727, 729.
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it first assumed the general character of panmixìa and subsequently evolved into 
the particular kind of panmixìa prevailing today.15
Translated into Bayly’s terminology, the “cross-cultural interactions” empha-
sized by Bentley and the “history of the human community” outlined by McNeill 
correspond respectively to the “lateral history” (or “history of connections”) that, 
in The Birth of the Modern World, the British scholar aimed to combine organi-
cally with the more conventional “‘vertical history’” dealing with the diachronic 
development of single regional histories, and to “globalization”, understood in its 
basic meaning of “progressive increase in the scale of social processes from a local 
or regional to a world level”.16 
A concrete and very significant example of periodization based on the con-
cept of “human community” is provided by McNeill’s The Rise of the West. In his 
influential 1963 book, the recognized founding father of New World History in 
the United States identified three main epochs in what Bayly and Assmann have 
more recently defined as the history of globalization. The first was that of the Mid-
dle Eastern ascendancy (1700 to 500 BCE), when the “human community” first 
emerged—already presenting the features of a “cosmopolitan civilization” that 
encompassed a number of local civilizations and cultures—from the expansion 
of a Babylonian “‘great society’” formed at the beginning of the second millenni-
um BCE. The next epoch spanned the two thousand years from the “closure” of 
the entire Eastern hemisphere (occurring between the fifth century BCE and the 
third century CE) to the threshold of the early modern age, and saw the establish-
ment of the “Eurasian cultural balance”, or “Eurasia’s equilibrium”, as it has been 
recently renamed by John Darwin. In this second period, the “human commu-
nity” expanded into an even wider “Eurasian ecumene”—a unified space within 
which a variable constellation of four or five mildly connected civilizations inter-
acted without any one of them losing its autonomy or gaining ascendancy over 
the others. The third epoch, the epoch of “Western dominance”, opened in the 
aftermath of the early modern “closure” of a “global ecumene” which now became 
almost literally coextensive with the inhabited world. This period saw the Eurasian 
equilibrium first “changing” to the advantage of the West (1500 to 1700 CE), then 
15 On this concept, see below, 107.
16 Bayly, “‘Archaic’ and ‘Modern’ Globalization”, 48-49; idem, The Birth of the Modern World, 
4. Cf. J.H. Bentley, “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History”, The 
American Historical Review, 101 (1996), no. 3: 749-770; F. Leonardi and L. Maggioni, World 
History. La storia delle civiltà secondo W.H. McNeill (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2015).
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“tottering” (1700-1850 CE), finally to give rise, since the mid-nineteenth century, 
to the radical reconfiguration of the “human community” corresponding to the 
initial form of the “global cosmopolitanism” of our day.17 
Albeit in many ways outdated, The Rise of the West, whose republication in 
1991 could be seen as a minor symptom of the incipient “‘return of universal 
history’” diagnosed at the time by Jürgen Osterhammel,18 has been one of the 
inspirations for the resurgent belief in the possibility and necessity of producing 
big works of synthesis compliant with scientific standards in the form of “large-
scale empirical narratives, as opposed to totalizing ahistorical metanarratives”, 
which is to be regarded as an essential aspect of the present revival of world histo-
ry.19 Since the 1980s, several American scholars (including Bentley and McNeill 
himself) have advanced and attempted to realize in their writings the project of 
an “ecumenical world history” centred on the “contributions by all peoples and 
societies to the making of larger global orders”.20 The underlying idea was that 
the development and the metamorphoses of the “human community” could pro-
vide a coherent framework for a comprehensive and non-Eurocentric narrative of 
world history which would explain the genealogy of the contemporary mondi-
alized society in terms of the history of globalization. The most immediate and 
relevant precedent for this kind of present-centred and practically-oriented ap-
proach to “ecumenical history”, dating back to the decades of the pre-First World 
War globalization and renewed by Arnold Toynbee in the 1920s,21 was precisely 
McNeill’s 1963 book. The Rise of the West can be read as a deliberately teleolog-
ical account of the rise of “global cosmopolitanism”, which McNeill portrayed 
17 McNeill, The Rise of the West, 56-58, 110, 247, 295, 316, 563; J. Darwin, After Tamerlane. The 
Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-2000 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), 164.
18 J. Osterhammel, review of Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830, 
by C.A. Bayly (London: Longman, 1989), Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Ori-
ent, 36 (1993), no. 1: 91-93, 91.
19 J.H. Bentley, “World History and Grand Narrative”, in Writing World History, 1800-2000, 
edited by B. Stuchtey and E. Fuchs (New York: Oxford University Press for The German His-
torical Institute, London, 2003), 50-51; idem, “Myths, Wagers,” 77-78. See 21th-Century Nar-
ratives of World History. Global and Multidisciplinary Perspectives, edited by R. Charles Weller 
(Cham: Springer, 2017).
20 W.H. McNeill, “Mythistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians,” The American Histor-
ical Review, 91 (1986), no. 1: 1-10, 7, reprinted in idem, Mythistory and Other Essays (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 3-22; Bentley, “Myths, Wagers,” 52, 78-79.
21 McNeill, “Mythistory,” 7; T. Tagliaferri, Storia ecumenica. Materiali per lo studio dell’opera 
di Toynbee (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2002); idem, La repubblica dell’umanità, 221-258.
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as the ultimate outcome of a process of progressive enlargement of the scale and 
growth of the historical significance of the spaces of cross-cultural interaction. 
In its concluding chapter, he made explicit that the title, The Rise of the West, was 
intended “as a shorthand description of the upshot of the history of the human 
community to date”, when mankind was faced with the alternatives of a nuclear 
catastrophe and “the eventual establishment of a world-wide cosmopolitanism”. 
McNeill’s narrative culminated with a diagnosis of the present and a “vision of 
the future” centring on the possible advent of a “cosmopolitan world society”, 
which would have been erected on the scaffolding of a “world state” enabled by 
its “world-wide political-military authority” to exercise “an overarching world 
sovereignty” (by analogy with the Roman unification of the Mediterranean or 
the imperial unification of Ancient China) and which would have initially borne 
“a Western imprint”, being actually “an empire of the West”, given the role played 
by the West in the history of the “human community” since 1500.22
The Human Web, published in 2003 and written by McNeill in collaboration 
with his son John, largely represented an updated version of the same conceptual 
model. The book aimed to provide the reader with “A Bird’s Eye View of World 
History” by emphasizing “the centrality of the webs of interaction” as both sig-
nificant factors of historical change and human creations whose transformation 
“constitutes the overarching structure of human history”.23 The history of the 
world lends itself, in other words, to be entirely and organically described in 
terms of the widening, thickening, growing power of conditioning exerted on 
both the social life and the biosphere by “the human web”. In this work, there-
fore, the evolving morphology of the webs of interaction takes the place of the 
history of human community as the chief criterion of periodization of the global 
past, from the first “world wide web” operating before the Neolithic age, to the 
denser “local or regional webs” forming inside it as a result of the invention 
and diffusion of agriculture, to the “metropolitan web” of the subsequent age of 
civilizations, to the Euro-Afro-Asian “Old World Web” which arose at the be-
ginning of the vulgar era, to the “cosmopolitan web” of the Oceanic age, to end 
with the “single global web” of today.24 
22 McNeill, The Rise of the West, 806, 807.
23 J. R. McNeill and W. H. McNeill, The Human Web. A Bird’s-Eye View of World History (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 3, 5.
24 Ibid., 4-5
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A different but not incompatible or unrelated example of the same trend is 
the multivolume Blackwell History to which Bayly contributed The Birth of the 
Modern World and Remaking the Modern World. These two books can be num-
bered among the attempts (the most successful attempts, in the first case) made 
in recent years to employ the notions of global past and globalization sketched 
before in the construction of “empirical narratives” dealing with long periods 
and fundamental junctions in the development of the “human community”.
As declared by its editor Moore in the general preface, the ambition of the 
series, originally planned in more than twenty volumes, is to offer the reader 
“a (…) comprehensive (…) account of the entire human past” by combining 
two methodological approaches: the “oldest and simplest” ecumenical approach, 
that identifies “world history” with “the history of the contacts between peoples 
previously isolated from one another”, and the macro-regional approach, which 
consists in adopting as units of geohistorical analysis and comparison such re-
gional or hemispheric civilizations and “world systems” as (according to various 
lists of the volumes planned by Moore) Oceania and the Pacific, Latin America, 
Japan, China, South-East Asia, India, Russia taken together with Central Asia 
and Mongolia, Africa, the Islamic World, the Mediterranean (or the Western 
Mediterranean in the most recent prospectus), and the Western World.25 
The organization of the series reflects the belief that an “attempt to understand 
history as a whole” may be pursued with a reasonable hope of success only by 
alternating “volumes defined by regional parameters”, like those devoted to sin-
gle regions, “worlds” or maritime geohistorical spaces, and “volumes defined by 
global parameters”, like the two written by Bayly or the one originally commis-
sioned to Sanjay Subrahmanyam on The Early Modern World.26 The alternation 
and the crossover of the two methodological perspectives should therefore confer 
the Blackwell History a “barrel” shape, in which “the indispensable narratives of 
25 Moore, “Series Editor’s Preface,” in Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, xx; idem, “World 
History,” 929-930. See also idem, “World History: World-Economy or a Set of Sets?,” Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society, third series, 3 (1993), no. 1: 99-105. This is a review of Before European 
Hegemony. The World System, A.D. 1250-1350, by J.L. Abu-Lughod (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1989), and Asia before Europe. Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the 
Rise of Islam to 1750, by K.N. Chaudhuri (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Bay-
ly criticised Chaudhuri’s book for underplaying the role of “historical change” in human affairs 
in a review published in The English Historical Review, 107 (1992), no. 3: 680-682.
26 Moore, “World History,” 929, note 19; idem, “Series Editor’s Preface,” xix; Bayly, The Birth 
of the Modern World, iv.
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very long-term regional developments” are “bound together by global surveys of 
the interactions between regions, and the great transformations which they have 
experienced in common, or visited upon one another”, like global modernization.27 
It is clear, then, that in the overall economy of the series The Birth of the Modern 
World was one of the volumes to be drawn up according to “global parameters” 
and called to act as hoops, so to speak, of the historiographical barrel imagined by 
Moore. The task entrusted to its author was to treat the years between the American 
Revolution and the First World War as one of the great epochs of “convergence” in 
which historical processes assumed ecumenical dimensions and characteristics by 
virtue of closer contacts between the several civilizational spaces, and to examine 
them in terms of their reciprocal relationships and from a cross-regional point of 
view.28 Bayly’s 2004 book looks at the “long nineteenth century” as a period in 
which a dramatic acceleration in the pace of historical change coincided with an 
intensification and a transformation in the nature of the “global ‘connectedness’” 
that had already established itself among the regional societies during the early 
modern age. Its theme is, in a sense, the classic one of the revolutionary transition 
“from the Old regimes to Modernity”, but it deals with it on a planetary scale, as a 
product of “global connections” and in its interactive aspects.29 
2. Multiple Modernities and Dynamic Interactions in the Transition to the Glo-
balized World
The strategy employed by Bayly in his analysis of transregional interactions 
also appears to be in substantial harmony with the methodological attitudes of 
the New World History, as it rests on the refusal to consider modernization in 
merely Eurocentric terms. Certainly, while concurring with McNeill in placing 
against the background of contemporary “cosmopolitanism” a period marked by 
the long persistence of a condition of relative “equilibrium” in the balance of power 
among the Old World “great societies”, Bayly only disagrees with him about the 
exact moment in which “the West” would have risen to a position of ascendancy.30 
27 Moore, “Series Editor’s Preface,” xx.
28 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 19-20.
29 Ibid., 41, 49; Darwin, After Tamerlane, 6.
30 Bayly, “Marshall G. S. Hodgson”, 48. See below, 92 e n, 93n.
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According to the alternative periodization subscribed to by both Bayly and John 
Darwin (another global historian deeply influenced, like Bayly, by John Gallagh-
er, the founder of the Cambridge School of imperial history),31 the interregional 
equipoise subsisted for about a quarter of millennium, long after the Europeans 
had taken the initiative in the process of world unification starting with the early 
modern “closure” of the ecumene. The “Eurasian revolution” unfolded between 
the 1750s and the 1830s; after that, the new phase of globalization initially driv-
en by the West became so intense as to entail a partial “convergence” and recip-
rocal assimilation between the cultural regions of the world in conformity with 
patterns provided by the Western experience (like in the obvious example of the 
diffusion on a planetary scale of the national state—originally a product of Eu-
ropean history—as the fundamental model of organization of the political life 
and international relations between peoples of diverse civilizational traditions).32 
The very least that can be said, without incurring the risk denounced by the 
late Giuseppe Galasso of carrying to unacceptable extremes the just demand for 
“provincializing Europe”, is that Europeans and Westerners, also but not only 
through the means of imperial conquest and colonial control, have been leading 
actors in the transition to global modernity.33 This means that, in Bayly’s and 
Darwin’s approaches, a central historiographical task remains that of giving a 
realistic account and assessment of the unquestionably prominent role played by 
the “expansion of Europe” and the encounters between Europe and the other re-
gional spaces, in particular of the Eastern hemisphere, from the fifteenth century 
onwards in the making of the present globalized society.34
31 Darwin, After Tamerlane, xi. According to Richard Cobb, Gallagher “always described 
[Chris Bayly] as the best pupil he had ever had in either University [Cambridge and Oxford]” 
(“Jack Gallagher in Oxford,” The Cambridge Review, 7 November 1980: 21-24, reprinted in J. 
Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire. The Ford Lecture and Other Essays, 
edited by A. Seal [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], xxvi). See P. Di Gregorio, “‘Il 
più grande impero che il mondo abbia mai conosciuto’: alle origini del revisionismo sull’impe-
rialismo britannico”, Storica, 14 (2008), nos. 41-42: 89-122. 
32 Darwin, After Tamerlane, 157-217, 500-505.
33 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Differenc (Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); “Galasso: ‘La Storia è in crisi ma è ancora maestra di 
vita’”, Il Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 23 September 2017 (interview by Mirella Armiero).
34 T. Tagliaferri, “L’espansione europea nella prospettiva della nuova storia globale,” Il mestiere 
di storico, 11 (2019), no. 1: 5-26.
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The foremost theoretical innovation introduced into their respective disci-
plinary fields by the New World Historians and their fellow travellers working 
in the cognate areas of imperial history and “Expansion studies” during the last 
four decades pertains precisely to the way of conceptualizing the transregional 
and cross-cultural interactions between Europeans and non-Europeans which 
have shaped the trajectories of modern and contemporary globalization.35 Bayly 
himself has remembered how, in the Oxford of the early 1960s, when he was an 
undergraduate at Balliol College, the extra-European societies involved in the 
processes conducive to the expansion of Europe and overseas empire-building 
continued to be regarded by his university teachers as historically static, power-
less and passive vis-à-vis the unique dynamism, overwhelming superiority and 
extraordinary enterprise of their Western conquerors. Such was the enduring leg-
acy of the nineteenth century—“Britain’s imperial century” par excellence—36 
when the narrative of European colonialism “was written around the triumph 
of European society over native misrule” and “Indians and Africans were rarely 
more than a backdrop to the doings of colonisers, missionaries and merchants”.37 
This personal testimony referred to a state of things which, since 1945 and the 
dawn of decolonization, had already begun to change elsewhere in the British 
academic world and particularly at Cambridge, where Bayly went as a doctoral 
student in 1970, on the initiative of a group of scholars led by his supervisor John 
Gallagher who had been accomplishing the first, limited steps of a revisionist 
trend aiming “to return agency to indigenous actors”.38
In the jargon of the New World History, the use and overuse of the noun 
‘interaction’ (sometimes coupled with such adjectives as ‘dynamic’ or ‘bilateral’) 
fulfils the rhetorical purpose of underlining that the “linkages” and “connec-
tions” binding together regional societies and cultures in the globalized spaces 
should no longer be imagined like the imposition of an omnipotent ‘centre’ on 
35 R. Hyam, “The Study of Imperial and Commonwealth History at Cambridge, 1881-1981: 
Founding Fathers and Pioneer Research Students,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth His-
tory, 29 (2001), no. 3: 75-103, reprinted in idem, Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 498, note 19.
36 R. Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914: A Study of Empire and Expansion, third 
edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, first edition 1976).
37 C.A. Bayly, “What is Third World History?,” in What is History Today?, edited by J. Gardiner 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 158.
38 C.A. Bayly, “Ashin Das Gupta,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 43 
(2000), no. 1: 14-17, 16.
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helpless ‘peripheries’, since they emerge from and are operated by a much more 
complex multipolar field of forces with the positive contribution of “all the peo-
ples” concerned.39 Although these human groups are usually invested with differ-
ent and shifting degrees of power and influence, it cannot ever happen that one 
of them is utterly devoid of any historical effectiveness. The chief distinguishing 
feature of the New World Historians, as compared with their nineteenth and 
twentieth century predecessors, lies therefore in the propensity to endow the 
modern and contemporary extra-European worlds with four attributes: first, an 
endogenous dynamism prior to the “impact of the West”;40 second, the ability 
to condition the European expansion abroad; third, a real incidence on the con-
struction of “global orders”;41 and fourth, the capacity to re-act and feed back to 
the Western societies themselves.42 Seen from this perspective, explicitly adopted 
by the Blackwell History of the World, the transition to modernity analysed in 
Bayly’s 2004 volume appears in a very different light than in the past: no longer 
“as something which some people or some regions did to others less favoured 
or deserving, but as a series of transformations in which most of the people of 
the world participated, and to which most of them contributed, not simply as 
the objects or victims of the successes of others, but actively, independently and 
creatively”.43
As already hinted at before, the effort to highlight the polycentric nature 
of historical change does not carry Bayly to the point of denying the existence 
of temporary differentials of power between ‘the West and the rest’. His “long 
nineteenth century” remains the period in the growth of the human community 
when European “dominance” gave globalization a series of accelerations which 
propelled the several regional societies towards a unification that was carried out 
under the contingent hegemony of Western culture. Bayly continues therefore to 
identify the critical phase of the birth of global modernity with Robert Palmer’s 
and Eric Hobsbawm’s “Age of Revolution”, which he raises indeed to the rank 
39 Manning, Navigating World History, 4; Bentley, “World History and Grand Narrative,” 65.
40 P.D. Curtin, “The British Empire and Commonwealth in Recent Historiography,” The 
American Historical Review, 65 (1959), no. 1: 72-91, 73.
41 Bentley, “Myths, Wagers,” 77.
42 Tagliaferri, La repubblica dell’umanità, 133-135.
43 Moore, “Series Editor’s Preface,” xxi.
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of “an ‘axial age’ in the history of the world” coinciding with “the first epoch of 
global imperialism”.44
In Bayly’s thinking, on the other hand, the expansive élans of modern Eu-
rope interwove with previous developments that had seen as their chief protag-
onists the non-European societies assailed by the Western initiative. And this 
happened not only within the Eurasian arena, where the Europeans found on 
their path other ancient civilizations comparable with their own, but even in the 
case of those “native peoples” and “peoples without State” who still in the first 
half of the twentieth century were deemed unable to stem the “white deluge” and 
escape, in the long run, a destiny of assimilation, extinction or extermination.45 
Disagreeing with a too simplistic diffusionist interpretation of Westernization, 
Bayly tries to show how the reception of foreign models was grafted on autono-
mous “passages to modernity” which were well under way in the extra-European 
worlds long before their “encounters with the West”.46 And these “non-Western 
modernities” can help to explain in part the establishment of European impe-
rial supremacy as the response that the colonized societies themselves gave or 
accepted was given to systemic crises originating from their own internal and 
autochthonous changes.47
In The Birth of the Modern World, Bayly therefore adopted as the starting 
point for his analysis what he portrayed as a global “old regime” embracing the 
44 C.A. Bayly, “The First Age of Global Imperialism, c. 1760-1830,” The Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 26 (1998), no. 2, Special Issue, Managing the Business of Empire. 
Essays in Honour of David Fieldhouse, edited by P. Burroughs and A.J. Stockwell: 28-47; idem, 
The Birth of the Modern World, 61; idem, “The ‘Revolutionary Age’ in the Wider World, c. 
1790-1830,” in War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830, edited by R. Bessel, N. Guyatt, and J. 
Rendall (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 21-43; idem, “The Age of Revolution in Global Context, 
c. 1760-1840,” in The Age of Revolution in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, edited by D. Armitage 
and S. Subrahmanyam (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 209-217; T. Detti and G. Gozzini, Storia 
contemporanea, vol. 1, L’Ottocento (Milan: Pearson, 2016), 10-11. 
45 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 432-450.
46 Ibid., 49-83. See A.J. Toynbee, The World and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 
1952); idem, A Study of History, 12 vols., Issued under the Auspices of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1934-1961), vol. 8 (1954), Part IX, 
“Contacts between Civilizations in Space (Encounters between Contemporaries), B. A Survey 
of Encounters between Contemporary Civilizations, (II) Operations according to Plan, (a) En-
counters with the Modern Western Civilization”, 126-346.
47 University of Cambridge, Faculty of History, Historical Tripos, Part 1, Paper 21, “Empires in 
World History from the Fifteenth Century to the First World War,” Reading List, 2012-2013.
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sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During this epoch, the Eurasian space was 
occupied almost entirely—with the possible exception of its north-western Euro-
pean corner—by a chain of peasant-based and culturally composite great “agrar-
ian empires”. State power, in accordance with the ideal type of the “segmentary 
state”,48 fulfilled only restricted functions and showed a very limited capacity of 
territorial projection which was conditioned to the collaboration of peripheral 
elites. Correspondingly, the forms of political legitimacy reflected the depend-
ence of the imperial authority on the equilibrium between centripetal and cen-
trifugal forces. The ideology of the cosmic monarchy enhanced the attitude of 
the sovereign to represent more things at the same time—that is, different things 
for each one of the several groups of his ethnically, territorially and religiously 
diverse subjects, rather than the focal centre of a single shared collective identity 
(like nationality in the antithetical ideal type of the modern nation state).49 The 
ecumene of the agrarian regimes, moreover, was going through a dual process 
of globalization. Early modern globalization driven by the expansion of Europe 
coexisted and mixed, according to Bayly, with an older form dating back to 
antiquity—“archaic globalization”—which was propelled and shaped by three 
main factors: 1) the “humoral conception of the bodily well-being”, which put a 
high premium on the consumption of substances deemed able to confer health 
and happiness to their consumers and therefore generated a demand for goods 
only to be obtained through the long-distance traffic webs it helped to sustain; 
2) the missionary initiatives of the world religions with their widespread webs of 
shrines, monasteries and pilgrimages; and 3) the ecumenical circulation of such 
ethical and political ideals as universal monarchy and civic republicanism of 
Aristotelian origin, which contributed to give the Old World a certain degree of 
cultural homogeneity.50 
48 C.A. Bayly, “States and Empires in the Work of Burton Stein and his Contemporaries,” 
South Asia Research, 17 (1997), no. 2: 115-120. See also S. Subrahmanyam, “Aspects of State 
Formation in South India and Southeast Asia, 1500-1650,” The Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, 23 (1986), no. 4: 355-377; C.A. Bayly, “Bibliographical Essay,” in idem, Indian 
Society and the Making of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, The New 
Cambridge History of India, vol. 2, Indian States and the Transition to Colonialism, Part I, 1988), 
213; A. Southall, “The Segmentary State in Africa and Asia,” Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 30 (1988), no. 1: 52-82. 
49 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 27-41.
50 Ibid., 41-47.
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It is worth repeating that Bayly, by placing such a strong emphasis on the 
uniformities of early modern Eurasia, does not intend to deny for a moment the 
peculiarities of the West. Rather, he aims at redeeming Western exceptional-
ism from crude Orientalist readings of the so-called “European miracle” which, 
availing themselves of too rigid dichotomic schemes, totally deprive ‘the East’ of 
those traits of dynamism they regard as uniquely Western.51 In Bayly’s approach, 
the specificity of the European development emerges from the particular con-
figuration and intensity of phenomena of change which, in the light of the em-
pirical findings of area studies, can no longer be judged an exclusive monopoly 
of Europe and completely absent elsewhere. In conducting his “global compari-
sons”, Bayly therefore follows a strategy centred on categories which have already 
been well tested in specialist works related to single study cases and which seem 
suitable both to highlight historical changes in non-European societies and to 
correct the conventional image of Western modernization in the direction of 
a greater gradualism and temporal extension, so as to reduce the distances and 
draw attention to possible analogies and parallelisms between the different re-
gional experiences.52 
A good example of this methodology is provided by the enlargement and 
application on a planetary scale of the concept of ‘industrious revolution’. Bayly 
rejects the stereotype that portrays an undifferentiated Orient condemned to 
a perennial immobility by the predominance of stifling “tributary economies”. 
The zone of the Islamic and Asian empires, too, provided a major theatre for two 
crucial processes of growth which connoted the global ancient regime: the “last 
great domestication” (i.e. the huge advance of the limits of the areas reclaimed 
for agriculture and non-migratory or semi-nomadic pastoralism in the Eastern 
hemisphere) and the “industrious revolutions” (in the plural).53 This expression 
(in the singular) was first coined by the eminent economic historian Jan De 
51 E. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of 
Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); R. Vivarelli, I caratteri dell’età 
contemporanea (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005).
52 C.A. Bayly, “Writing World History: C.A. Bayly looks at the opportunities presented to the 
historian in 21st century, when trying to write the history of the world,” History Today, 54, no. 
2 (February 2004): 36; idem, “Reply” to J.N. Pieterse, “The Long Nineteenth Century is too 
Short”, and G. Viswanathan, “The State of the World”, Victorian Studies, 48 (2005), no. 1: 134-
145; C.A. Bayly, S. Beckert, M. Connelly, I. Hofmeyr, W. Kozol, P. Seed, “On Transnational 
History,” The American Historical Review, 111 (2006), no. 5: 1440-1464.
53 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 49-59.
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Vries to designate a slower, more prosaic movement of rationalization of Western 
economic life that far preceded the ‘Industrial Revolution’ proper, in consonance 
with another historiographical trend which tends to postpone the global impact 
of the latter towards the central decades of the nineteenth century. While the 
economic and social changes catalysed by industrialization were the result of 
factors which operated on the supply side through the abatement of production 
costs, the behaviour of the agents of the “industrious revolution” was ascribable 
to the influence exerted on the demand side by modifications pertaining to the 
sphere of material culture and consumer values. The emergence of new models of 
desire in the mentality of the middle sort of people, who were compelled to turn 
to the market to obtain the goods necessary to satisfy their socially conditioned 
needs, urged them to a more efficient use of their work energies on a household 
basis which fostered an ever-increasing production of commodities.54
In The Birth of the Modern World, Bayly tests the validity of De Vries’ theory 
in a variety of non-European contexts on the basis of the hypothesis that the role 
played in the Netherlands and England by the mechanical clock or the breakfast 
may have been fulfilled in China, Japan and India by such goods as, respectively, 
domestic furniture, samurai swords or pottery, in accordance with the values  and 
social horizons prevailing in each cultural region.55 In this way, Bayly’s attempt 
to define differences through a greater emphasis on analogies distances itself 
from more usual forms of comparison, because it comes to the delineation of a 
multiplicity of “passages to modernity”, without abandoning or sidelining the 
big question concerning the long-term reasons for the primacy of Europe and 
the consequent “Great Divergence” between her history and the history of the 
rest of Eurasia.56 
54 J. De Vries, The Industrious Revolution. Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 
to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
55 Bayly’s first foray into the anthropology of consumption was “The Origins of Swadeshi 
(Home Industry): Cloth and Indian Society, 1700-1930,” in The Social Life of Things. Com-
modities in Cultural Perspectives, edited by A. Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 285-321, reprinted both in idem, Origins of Nationality, 172-237, and in Material 
Culture. Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences, 5 vols., edited by V. Buchli (London: Routledge, 
2004), vol. 2, 56-88.
56 K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World 
Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Bayly, “South Asia and the ‘Great 
Divergence’”; P. O’Brien, “Ten Years of Debate on the Origins of the Great Divergence between 
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Bayly identifies four main “competitive advantages” of the European West 
on the economical, juridical, sociocultural and international plans. The first con-
sisted in the asymmetrical structure of early modern globalization, which saw 
the Europeans—the unifiers of the global ecumene—in a position to link up the 
various “industrious revolutions” and exploit the self-propelled modernizations 
of the other parts of the world in their own interests. The second advantage 
enjoyed by the European society was a political, institutional and legal frame-
work which proved particularly well suited to favouring the cumulative develop-
ment of its “industrious revolution”. Economic progress was also supported by 
a custom of public criticism and a “civil society” which, although not absolutely 
a Western prerogative, was much more developed, vocal and articulate there 
than anywhere else in Eurasia. The fourth factor advantaging Europe should 
be seen, according to Bayly, in the pluralistic, multicentric nature of her states 
system. This created a situation of chronic competition and conflict which acted 
as a permanent incentive for institutional and technological innovation and ex-
tra-European expansion, and both stimulated and exploited the early formation 
of patriotic identities on a national scale.57
In Bayly’s account, however, an essential condition for the subsequent es-
tablishment of European hegemony was the general upheaval that during the 
revolutionary age overwhelmed the global ancient regime as a whole. One of its 
most determining aspects was the quasi-simultaneity, convergence and intercon-
nection of the several “revolutions” to which it gave rise well beyond the borders 
of France, continental Europe or the Atlantic world.58 The first to be caught 
in this worldwide sequence of global events was the Eurasian East. The crises 
occurring in all the Oriental tributary empires (including China) presented nu-
merous and important traits in common. They mostly manifested themselves at 
the fiscal-military level, as a lack of resources for financing big imperial armies, 
but their origins should be traced back to the social and ideological spheres. 
The ascent of various types of middle classes benefitting from the “industrious 
revolutions” and other economic changes eroded the foundations of monarchi-
cal legitimacy in the long run. In a sense, the ill-famed agrarian regimes paid 
the Economies of Europe and China during the Era of Mercantilism and Industrialization,” 
in Reviews in History, 1008, December 2008, http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1008.
57 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 59-64.
58 Ibid., 86-120.
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the consequences of their too long underestimated historical performances. The 
endogenous transformations which they had encouraged or favoured generated 
an increasing imbalance between centres and peripheries. In the provinces, the 
early modern modernizations enhanced the power and prestige of dynamic local 
elites, who were able to exploit, in order to challenge the more traditional impe-
rial authorities, a growing sense of regional belonging and patriotism, along with 
new forms of moral or religious discourse (comparable in a way to contemporary 
Western public criticism), for which they acted as spokesmen or standard-bear-
ers. The imperial centres, on their part, suffered from the worsening of their rela-
tive oversizing and were increasingly paralyzed by the impossibility of adequately 
funding a commensurate expansion of their military apparatuses.59 
An additional factor of aggravation of the difficulties of the Oriental monar-
chies was finally introduced by the global impact of the crises which hit even the 
ancient regimes of Western Eurasia in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War.60 
The response to these crises propelled a breakthrough in the European initiative 
on the transoceanic geopolitical theatres at the same time that the other regional 
societies were experiencing their own internal troubles (with a few decades of de-
lay in the cases of China and Japan), because it combined revolution with height-
ened competition on a worldwide scale between aggressive imperial powers. The 
international fights between England and France drew their impulse from the 
clash of opposite patriotisms which revealed themselves capable of mobilizing 
metropolitan resources and consent to an unprecedented degree. In the crucible 
of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, political legitimacy itself had to be 
rebuilt on a new basis in both England and France. In both cases, the ideological 
reconstruction relied on palingenetic myths that elevated public authority to the 
status of messianic actors in a millennial narrative of reform and improvement 
of social conditions and human life, and these progressive ideologies found their 
raison d’être in the role that the European states were actually playing in giving 
fresh impetus to the local “industrious revolutions”.61
The globalizing confluence between the conflicts of various kinds originating 
from the endogenous changes which the Oriental societies had undergone in the 
course of the previous three centuries, and the exportation of the military and 
59 Ibid., 89-92.
60 Ibid., 92-100.
61 Ibid., 114-119.
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political-ideological struggles of the European Age of the Revolution, marked a 
new period in the history of the human community because, while contributing 
to multiply, tighten and thicken the linkages between the cultural regions of the 
world, these momentous events precipitated the final disruption of the “Eurasian 
equilibrium” which had preserved itself throughout the early modern age. But 
the “World Crisis”62 laid the foundations for the further material and ideological 
expansion of Europe in the long nineteenth century not only because it provided 
its agents with the occasions and incentives for territorial empire-building, but 
also in the sense that it allowed the Western model to present itself to the other 
regions of the Eastern hemisphere as a response to the contradictions they were 
internally facing and a solution (if not the only or the best available solution) for 
carrying on the processes of development of industrious classes and moderniza-
tion of the forms of statehood, collective identity, public discourse and religious 
experience which had begun to involve the supposedly unhistorical Orient well 
before the “Eurasian revolution”. The intricate geohistorical template emerging 
from the world crisis set the context within which non-Europeans started to 
appropriate and adapt for themselves the resources and means of various kinds 
put at their disposal by their asymmetrical symbiosis with the West so as to grow 
strong enough to resist, and ultimately to rise to challenge, the incoming “global 
imperial order”.63
3. The “Interactive Emergence” of the British Empire in Afro-Eurasia
As Eric Hobsbawm rightly suggested in a remarkable preface to the French 
translation of The Birth of the Modern World, Bayly’s insistence on regarding ec-
umenical modernization not as “something imposed from outside by the West, 
but a complex process made of evolutions interacting with each other and ema-
nating from both sides”, which bears witness to his full agreement with the New 
World Historians about the need to restore “agency” to non-Europeans, must be 
traced back to the formulation he had developed in prior works in response to 
the problem of the creation of the British Raj, according to which the inhabitants 
of the Indian subcontinent were “active agents and not simply passive bystanders 
62 Ibid., 88-89. 
63 Darwin, After Tamerlane, 368. 
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and victims” of empire-building.64 Contrary to the ingrained and die-hard cliché 
which portrayed it “as an immutable society within a declining Mughal empire, 
ready to let itself be subjugated by a foreign power”, eighteenth century India was 
a world vibrant with change and innovation whose promoters were already try-
ing “to forge their own tools to cope with the political instability of the region”. 
The British empire-builders acted not so much as conquerors from overseas, but 
as senior partners in efforts “imagined” by sectors of the Indian modernizing 
elites who aimed to modify to their advantage the balance of power in the sub-
continent. And even after being “accepted”, the European domination had to 
continue to rely “on a combinations of local forces and supporters, making sure 
that the Indians accepted the Raj in view of their own interests”.65 In short, if the 
British expansion was successful, this was so also because it satisfied the needs 
arising from a modernization originally initiated by autochthonous actors with 
whom the colonizers were constantly compelled to come to terms throughout 
the duration of their rule.66 
It is important to stress, however, that the conceptual model implemented 
in the volume of the Blackwell History was the outcome of a more prolonged 
and nuanced development in Bayly’s methodological views. In the 1970s, at the 
beginning of his professional career, he had established himself as a brilliant 
young historian of colonial India belonging to the so-called ‘Cambridge School’ 
of Indian history.67 In the next decade, his scientific interest turned to the tran-
sition from the pre-colonial to the colonial period.68 It was at this stage, when 
he advanced his theory of the “interactive emergence” of British domination in 
64 Bayly, Indian Society, 5; E.J. Hobsbawm, “Préface,” in C.A. Bayly, La naissance du monde 
moderne, 1780-1914, traduit de l’anglais par Michel Cordillot (Paris: Le Monde diplomatique 
en collaboration avec Editions de l’Atelier, 2006), 13.
65 Ibid. For Bayly’s views on the evolution of Indianist studies, see C.A. Bayly, “English-Lan-
guage Historiography on British Expansion in India and Indian Reactions since 1945,” in 
Reappraisals in Overseas History. Essays on Post-War Historiography about European Expansion, 
edited by P.C. Emmer and H.L. Wesseling (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 1979), 21-53; 
idem, “Modern Indian Historiography,” in Companion to Historiography, 663-677; idem, “Eric 
Thomas Stokes, 1924-81,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 97 (1998): 467-498.
66 For an alternative and much less optimistic view, see R.K. Ray, “Indian Society and the Es-
tablishment of British Supremacy, 1765-1818,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 
2, The Eighteenth Century, edited by P. J. Marshall, 508-529. 
67 See, in this volume, the essay by Maurizio Griffo.
68 See, in this volume, the essay by Michelguglielmo Torri.
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South Asia, that he actually outlined the very first sketch of what was to become 
his general approach to global history.69 The most complete prefiguration of the 
categorical framework employed in Bayly’s 2004 book, however, is found in a 
further turning point in his historiographical trajectory which coincided with 
the production of Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-
1830.70 
Published in 1989 in the Studies in Modern History Series directed by John 
Morrill and David Cannadine, and spanning the half century of expansion and 
refoundation of the British Empire from the pan-imperial crisis that accompa-
nied American Independence to the aftermath of the defeat of Napoleon, this 
important work, whose strong originality and potential paradigmatic value was 
immediately underlined on its appearance by such an authority as David K. 
Fieldhouse, marked a new phase in Bayly’s academic career.71 The specialist of 
colonial and pre-colonial India, soon to be nominated Vere Harmsworth Profes-
sor of Imperial and Naval History at Cambridge, had enormously widened the 
horizon of his historical reflection, extending it from the Raj to the totality of 
the “imperial system”—the British Isles included—and attempting the arduous 
task of organizing in a unified analytical and narrative field the corresponding 
multiplicity and variety of great geohistorical spaces.72 In accomplishing such a 
69 J.E. Wills, Jr., “Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domina-
tion,” The American Historical Review, 98 (1993), no. 1: 83-105. 
70 See Bayly’s programmatic essay “The Middle East and Asia during the Age of Revolutions, 
1760-1830,” Itinerario. Bulletin of the Leyden Centre for the History of European Expansion, X 
(1986), no. 2: 69-84, and, for a fuller account of the complex historiographical background 
to his 1989 volume, Tagliaferri, “Christopher Bayly e ‘the return of universal history’”, 31-48.
71 D.K. Fieldhouse, review of Bayly, Imperial Meridian, The English Historical Review, 106 
(1991), no. 1: 128-129; idem, “Can Humpty‐Dumpty be put together again? Imperial History 
in the 1980s,” The Journal of Imperial and Colonial History, 12 (1984), no. 2: 9-23.
72 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 100, 253; Atlas of the British Empire: A New Perspective on the Brit-
ish Empire from 1500 to the Present, edited by C.A. Bayly (London: Hamlyn, 1989). It is to be 
remarked, however, that since the 1970s Bayly had followed the footsteps of the Cantabrigian 
tradition which practised the specialized study of British imperial history as a way to under-
standing the world-historical process of “the Expansion of Europe” and insisted, therefore, on 
the euristic importance of “comparative colonial history”. See Tagliaferri, L’espansione europea; 
C.A. Bayly and D.H.A. Kolff, “Introduction,” to Two Colonial Empires. Comparative Essays 
on the History of India and Indonesia in the Nineteenth Century (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1986), 8. Cf. also C.A. Bayly, “Indian Merchants in a ‘Traditional Setting’: Benares, 1780-
1830”, in The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India, edited by C. 
Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (London: Athlone Press, 1978), 171-193; idem, “Inland Port Cities 
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veritable tour de force, Bayly came to envision an integral reconceptualization of 
imperial studies which already involved their substantial identification with the 
territory of research of the emerging New World History and with those aspects 
of the “global past”, investigated by both disciplines, to which should be traced 
back “the origin of contemporary international order”.73 A prominent global his-
torian of our days, Jürgen Osterhammel, who reviewed Imperial Meridian in 
1993, noted that, although formally an essay in imperial history, “the scope and 
ambition” of Bayly’s book were “nothing less than universal”; he suggested that it 
should be read “in the light of a current ‘return of universal history’”.74 Another 
reviewer stressed (exaggerating a little, perhaps, but anticipating the actual de-
velopment of Bayly’s historical writing) that the “real stuff” of Imperial Meridian 
was not so much “the British Empire” as “the world” mentioned in its subti-
tle.75 Bayly himself not only declared that the purpose of the book was to place 
“British expansion in the wider context of world history”, but made altogether 
explicit his intent to contribute to a “project”—to be prioritized by the “future 
histories”—aiming “to fit (…) together once again” the three disconnected “frag-
ments” into which the nineteenth- and twentieth-century professional historiog-
raphy had unfortunately broken the unity of the “history of the world” imagined 
by the Enlightenment: the history of Europe; the history of the neo-European 
settlement colonies; and “Orientalism” (i.e. the all-encompassing history of the 
non-Europeans parts of Afro-Eurasia).76 
in North India: Calcutta and the Gangetic Plains, 1780-1900,” in The Rise and Growth of the 
Colonial Port Cities in Asia, edited by D.K. Basu (Santa Cruz, CA: Center for South Pacific 
Studies, University of California, 1979), 11-15; idem, “Creating a Colonial Peasantry: India 
and Java c. 1820-1880,” Itinerario, 11 (1987), no. 1, Special Issue, India and Indonesia from the 
1830s to 1914: The Heyday of Colonial Rule: 93-106; C.A. Bayly and L. Blussé, “Introduction,” 
to Itinerario, 13 (1989), no. 1, Special Issue, India and Indonesia: General Perspectives: vii-xiii; T. 
Abdullah and A. Lapian, “Report on the Third Cambridge-Delhi-Leiden-Yogyakarta Confer-
ence: ‘The Ancient Regime in India and Indonesia’, Yogyakarta, 21-25 September 1986”, in In-
dia and Indonesia during the Ancient Regime, essays by P.J. Marshall, R. Van Niel et al. (Leiden: 
Brill, Comparative History of India and Indonesia Series, 3, 1989), xvii-xviii. 
73 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 2.
74 Osterhammel, review of Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 91.
75 F. Harcourt, review of Bayly, Imperial Meridian, International Journal of Maritime History, 2 
(1990), no. 2: 281-284, 282. Harcourt agreed, however, that the book constituted “a landmark 
in imperial history”.
76 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 13, 75, 256. See also idem, “The Orient: British Historical Writing 
about Asia since 1890,” in History and Historians in the Twentieth Century, edited by P. Burke 
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The argumentation carried out in Imperial Meridian in many respects fore-
shadowed Part I of The Birth of the Modern World, where Bayly situates the world 
crisis that acted as midwife at the birth of global modernity in the new Achsenzeit 
discernible precisely between the American War and the Restoration.77 While 
in his 1988 volume on Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire the 
recognition of a full capacity for historical initiative to the non-Westerners had 
led him to attribute the success of British colonialism in the subcontinent to 
its correspondence to needs and interests resulting from previous indigenous 
transformations,78 fifteen years later Bayly’s interpretation of the process which 
prepared the ground for the imperialist penetration and the nineteenth century 
hegemonic appeal of the West would come to embrace a whole range of “Passages 
from the Old Regimes to Modernity” that took place in Afro-Eurasia before and 
independently from the establishment of European dominance.79 However, in 
the chapters of Imperial Meridian dedicated to the rise of the “‘Second British 
Empire’” in the East,80 he had already followed the lead of Marshall Hodgson 
and adopted as a unit of analysis, if not Eurasia as a whole, the entire chain of 
great Islamic kingdoms extending from the Maghreb and the Balkans to Burma 
and the Indonesian archipelago.81 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88-119; idem, “Religion, Liberalism and Empires: 
British Historians and their Indian Critics in the Nineteenth Century,” in Tributary Empires in 
Global History, edited by P.F. Bang and C.A. Bayly (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
21-47.
77 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 61; “Storia e età assiale,” edited by M. Deodati, F. 
Miano, and S. Wagner, Studi jaspersiani, 3 (2015): 3-351. On modernity as a “second axial age” 
(after the first one theorized by Karl Jaspers), see Le ragioni del moderno, edited by C. Dipper 
and P. Pombeni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2014).
78 See above, 88-89.
79 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 49. 
80 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 2, 9, 11, 136-137, 248, 252; idem, “The Second British Empire,” in 
The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 5, Historiography, ed. Winks, 54-72.
81 M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); 
P. Rich, “Civilisations in European and World History: A Reappraisal of the Ideas of Arnold 
Toynbee, Fernand Braudel and Marshall Hodgson,” The European Legacy: Towards New Par-
adigms, 7 (2002), no. 3: 331-342. See also C.A. Bayly, “India and West Asia, c. 1700-1830,” 
Asian Affairs, 19 (1988), no. 1: 3-19; idem, “Beating the Boundaries: South Asia History, c. 
1700-1850,” South Asia and World Capitalism, edited by S. Bose (New Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 27-39.
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Bayly starts from the anti-Eurocentric assumption that the “empire in a 
world-historical sense [i.e. as a factor in global history] can only be understood 
by examining social change in the areas colonised as an essential component of 
an imperial system”.82 Although the central theme of the book is, after all, the 
rebuilding of the British Empire after the loss of the American colonies between 
1780 and 1830, Imperial Meridian devotes dozens of pages to the “longer-term 
patterns of class formation and state-building” which can be found in Asia and 
North Africa since the sixteenth century and which were destined to be “central 
to the emergence and form” of British supremacy. Bayly justifies the employment 
of this enlarged geohistorical and chronological scale by arguing that 
the genre of ‘imperial history’ or of ‘European expansion’ has no future unless it can 
draw on the growing body of studies of the extra-European world to illuminate the 
development [in the pre-colonial era] of social institutions and ideologies which were 
as formative of the nineteenth-century colonial world as were the policies of European 
governments or the profit-hunger of their merchants.83
At the beginning of the modern age, the territories composing the Afro-Eur-
asian scenario surveyed by Bayly were dominated by four large Islamic polities: 
the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire in Persia, the Mughal Empire in India, 
and the Muslim Empire of Mataram in Java. Bayly sees the histories of these 
great cultural spaces as both distinct from each other and interconnected in 
even wider “interregional units”.84 What they share in common (together with 
the many links binding them in an interactive whole, like religion)85 is a three-
phased evolutionary pattern which, far from confirming the nineteenth-century 
82 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 253.
83 Ibid., 75, 253.
84 Ibid., 14-15. See M.G.S. Hodgson, “Hemispheric Interregional History as an Approach to 
World History,” Cahiers d’ histoire mondiale, 1 (1954), no. 3: 715-723; idem, “The Interrelations 
of Societies in History,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 5 (1963), no. 2: 227-250, 
reprinted in idem, Rethinking World History. Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History, edited 
by E. Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3-28; E. Burke III, “Mar-
shall G.S. Hodgson and the Hemispheric Interregional Approach to World History,” Journal of 
World History, 6 (1995), no. 2: 237-250. 
85 C.A. Bayly and L. Tarazi Fawaz, “Introduction: The Connected World of Empires,” in Mo-
dernity and Culture: From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, edited by L. Tarazi Fawaz, 
C.A. Bayly, and R. Ilbert (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 1-27.
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stereotype of the Asian “‘decline’”, reflects a complex dialectic of “crisis and re-
organization”.86 In the initial stage, these vast patrimonial and agrarian states, 
which were legitimized in terms of the ideology of universal monarchy, ensured 
stability and order to their countries. In turn, the “‘Pax Islamica’” encouraged 
an interweaving of processes that contradicts “the notion of the diffusion of the 
modern capitalist system from West to East”. During the first two centuries 
of the modern age, not only the West, but the rest of Eurasia, too, underwent 
such developments as demographic growth, an increasing geographical division 
of labour, the rise of a class of landowners rooted in the localities, the setting in 
motion of a plurality of “Asian routes to commercial agriculture”, the flowering 
of the mercantile economy and a lively culture of consumption, the emergence 
of multiple forms of “‘proto-capitalism’” and “Asian (or North African) ‘capi-
talism’”.87 But the very success of the Islamic empires created the conditions for 
the “‘general crisis’” which was to descend on them in the eighteenth century.88 
The main beneficiaries of the empires were in fact, in the long run, the newborn, 
modernizing agrarian and bourgeois provincial elites. As a further historical par-
adox, their centrifugal tendencies were also fuelled by the very prestige of the 
monarchical institution. The Islamic ideal of cosmic royalty spread in peripheries 
that had preserved or had begun to develop “a strong sense of their own identity, 
expressed in religious difference or regional solidarity”, and where imperial uni-
versalism underwent a radical metamorphosis which anticipated the rebuilding 
of political legitimacy in a national-statal key which would have characterized 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.89
From the mid-seventeenth century onwards, all the Islamic imperial polities 
faced an escalation of conflicts and internal contradictions ultimately attributa-
ble to the “consolidation of Asian capitalism”. This happened before a new series 
of eighteenth century “tribal break-outs”—which saw as their protagonists the 
egalitarian warlike societies surviving at their margins—decreed the end of the 
Pax Islamica.90 What replaced it, however, was not the condition of decadence, 
86 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 22, 23-24, 35-74. See also idem, “Pre-Colonial Indian Merchants 
and Rationality,” in India’s Colonial Encounter. Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes, edited by N. 
Gupta and M. Hasan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1993), 3-24.
87 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 18, 27-32, 73-74, 179, 254.
88 Ibid., 24, 61.
89 Ibid., 34.
90 Ibid., 18, 35-46, 74.
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stagnation and anarchy evoked by the historians engaged in the apology of the 
European conquest; rather, the crisis gave rise to a fundamental restructuration 
of the political spaces occupied by the agrarian regimes, in which Bayly invites 
the reader to recognize the features of a new round of Afro-Asian state-building, 
developing this time not on a macro-regional, but on a sub-imperial, provincial 
scale. The “regional magnates”, who posed as the would-be heirs of the universal 
sovereigns of the great empires, adopted mercantilist practices and endeavoured 
to redress the balance of power between the state and rural landowners for the 
benefit of their own treasury. Moreover, the new provincial rulers had to legiti-
mize realms which were much more compact, intrusive and exclusive than the 
old empires. In pursuing this aim, they were able to exploit and mobilize the 
growing sentiments of territorial patriotism and religious affiliation which were 
much more “tightly defined” than in the past. This gave them the opportunity 
to become a focal point of unprecedented kinds of collective identity which fore-
shadowed modern nationality.91 In this sense, Bayly argues, the late eighteenth 
century marked “an important stage in the creation of the preconditions for the 
emergence of modern ethnicities and nation states” in Asia as well as in Europe. 
Nor does he fail to emphasize how this implies that “the regional ethnicities 
which were later seen as ‘nationalism’ in Europe, Asia and North Africa had 
already begun to form before the full impact of the West was felt. They were not 
the simple product of ‘Westernisation’”—of a Westernization, that is, interpreted 
according to the diffusionist stereotype.92
More generally, the reasons that bring Bayly to regard the early modern 
transformations in Eastern societies as “a critical force in the creation of Euro-
pean world-wide dominance”, rather than the “immobile background” of the 
expansion of Europe, are threefold. Firstly, these changes generated both the 
“pressures and opportunities” that induced the Westerners to take or try to take 
the power in “key regions” such as Bengal, Java or Egypt before 1800. Secondly, 
91 Ibid., 18, 34, 51. See also C.A. Bayly and S. Bayly, “Eighteenth Century State Forms and 
the Economy,” in Arrested Development in India. The Historical Dimension, edited by C. Dewey 
(New York and Delhi: Manohar, 1988), 66-90, and, on the agrarian empires, Bayly, The Birth 
of the Modern World, 27-48, Bang and Bayly, “Comparing Pre-Modern Empires,” P.F. Bang and 
C.A. Bayly, “Tributary Empires—Towards a Global and Comparative History,” in Tributary 
Empires in Global History, 1-17.
92 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 50, 52. See also Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 1-132, and, in this 
volume, the essay by Laura Di Fiore.
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they made available to the conquerors the administrative, financial and military 
tools elaborated by the “new ‘Asian states’”.93 Thirdly, and perhaps less obviously, 
they also cast some of the foundations of the “colonial world” and the “‘para-co-
lonial’ states” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, preparing the ground, 
in particular, for the rise of native proprietary classes who would become “the 
keystone of the European colonial economy” and “the nineteenth-century export 
boom in primary agricultural produce”. Moreover, endogenous changes in Af-
ro-Eurasia acted as a “critical precondition” of phenomena which were destined 
to shape “the modern world order” not less decisively than the globalization of 
the catchwords of the French Revolution—“Liberty, Equality and Fraternity”—, 
and with effects recognizable to the present day, such as the emergence of new 
paradigms of political legitimacy more attuned to the modern state (as compared 
to monarchical universalism) and the beginnings of what were to become the 
“national consciousness”, “communalism” and religious fundamentalism.94
4. The World Historical Impact of “British Nationalism” in the Age of Revolution
The will to highlight the much-underestimated analogies between European 
and extra-European histories and the multipolar character of world-historical 
change makes Bayly well aware of the faultiness of any approach to globalization 
which assigns an overbearing role to the West. The most obvious example is pro-
vided by those normative ‘stages of development theories’ which simply equate 
modernization with Westernization. In his 1989 book, however, Bayly detects 
the same error in the opposite theory of the “European capitalist world system” 
advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein, then much in vogue, according to which the 
expansion of the European world-economy since the sixteenth century, far from 
promoting the progress of other areas of the ecumene, condemned them uni-
formly to a condition of underdevelopment and subaltern integration as periph-
eries or semi-peripheries in the Western-dominated global order. Such theories, 
both denying, in different ways, the interactive nature of the process of globaliza-
93 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 16, 17, 69.
94 Ibid., 27, 47, 51, 53, 72, 74, 174-175, 178-179, 180, 231, 235, 255. See also idem, “The 
Pre-History of ‘Communalism’? Religious Conflict in India, 1700-1860”, Modern Asian Stud-
ies, 19 (1985), no. 2: 177-203, revised in idem, Origins of Nationality, 210-237.
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tion, appear inadequate to provide historiography with those synthetic, unifying 
categories which its practitioners require in order to reverse “the fragmentation 
which has overcome the discipline”, and to escape the risk of remaining locked 
within their respective specialistic fields, without sacrificing the agency and indi-
viduality of the single world “cultures or communities”.95 
Imperial Meridian clearly prefigured the argumentation laid out in The Birth 
of the Modern World, however, in that Bayly refused to underplay the momentary 
superiority in power and the expansive drive accruing to the West from the rela-
tive exceptionality of its path to modernity.96 Bayly’s critique, in fact, did not tar-
get only or mainly the “‘Eurocentric’” theories of imperialism. His methodologi-
cal polemic was directed with equal vigour, and perhaps greater urgency, against 
the “‘excentric’” interpretations developed in reaction to them, which he charged 
with having exaggerated, in turn, the role played in the colonial expansion of 
Europe by such extra-European factors as “‘local crises’” in the peripheries, the 
availability of indigenous “‘collaborators’” and independent initiatives of Euro-
pean ‘men on the spot’ operating in territories remote from the metropolitan 
centre. In the 1980s, when Imperial Meridian was written, this historiographical 
trend had resulted, for example, in a complete “Africanisation” of the factors 
taken into account in the debate on the partition of the Dark Continent. Bayly 
therefore felt obliged to remind his readers of the apparently obvious truth that 
the “metropolitan impulses were, by definition, central to the process of expan-
sion and to the creation of the social order of European empires”. The mutually 
opposing limitations of the two explanatory strategies—the Eurocentric and the 
excentric—were surmountable, in his opinion, only if it was firmly borne in 
mind that the imperial experience “by definition was a dialogue between the 
metropolitan impulses and the history of the colonized societies”.97
Perhaps the single most noteworthy aspect of the extremely articulate histori-
ographical operation attempted by Bayly in his 1989 book was the virtual re-in-
clusion of the histoire à part entière of the colonizing power in the field of investi-
95 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, xiv, 14-15, 253.
96 See also Aux origines de la domination européenne, réflexions de C.A Bayly, Paris, UNESCO, 
12 juin 2006 (http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/carnet/2006-06-21-Colloque-Bayly-I). 
97 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 13, 75, 253. Bayly was implicitly referring to R.E. Robinson, 
“Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration,” 
in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, edited by R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (Harlow: Longman, 
1972), 117-142.
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gation of the imperial studies.98 He shows a vivid awareness of the impossibility 
of neglecting what happened in the depths of “British society” if one really wants 
to understand “those societies which were touched by imperial power”.99 This 
methodological attitude represents an important novelty with respect to Bayly’s 
previous work on India, as well as an essential prerequisite of his subsequent work 
on global and world history. 
In Imperial Meridian, then, Bayly made an original attempt to reincorporate 
the internal histories of Britain and Europe as a whole into a field of inquiry 
where the historiographical school that had influenced his beginnings as a co-
lonial historian—the Cambridge School—had rather privileged, albeit not in 
an exclusive manner, the overseas side of the Western expansion. In the preface, 
he confesses that the composition of the volume coincided with the resumption 
of his interest in national history which had remained dormant since he was an 
undergraduate. Bayly added that this new interest had been reawakened in par-
ticular by two historiographical trends. The first, well exemplified by David Can-
nadine’s work on the prolonged Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy between 
the 1780s and the 1980s, focused on the very long-term role played in the history 
of British society by the “landed establishment”. The other, and complementa-
ry, whose chief exponent was Linda Colley, addressed the formation of British 
national identity in the context of the European international state system, with 
particular reference to the Second Hundred Years’ War between England and 
France from the end of the seventeenth century to the fall of Napoleon in 1815.100 
In Bayly’s case, then, reinterpreting the British and European expansion by 
locating it in a world-historical frame of reference did not just mean crossing the 
boundaries of his original area of  specialization, colonial India, and widening the 
range of his studies so as to embrace all the regions of the ecumene in any way in-
teracting, or comparable at least, with England and its colonial system. Adopting a 
98 See also C.A. Bayly, “Returning the British to South Asian History: the Limits of Colonial 
Hegemony,” South Asia. Journal of South Asian Studies, 17 (1994), no. 2: 1-25 (revised in idem, 
Origins of Nationality, 276-306). 
99 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 218.
100 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, xv; idem The Middle East and Asia, 84; L. Colley, “The Apotheosis 
of George III: Loyalty, Royalty and the British Nation, 1760-1820,” Past and Present, no. 102 
(1984): 94-129; eadem, “Whose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain, 1750-
1830,” Past and Present, no. 113 (1986): 97-117; eadem, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992); D. Cannadine, “Preface to the 1992 Edi-
tion,” in idem, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (New York: Vintage, 1999), xxii. 
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global perspective in his approach to the British Empire also implied rediscovering 
and revisiting the past of the European Metropolis itself, whose very Anglo-Celtic 
core presented, after all, the specific character of a “‘British Empire in Europe’”.101 
And in making this effort of “returning the British” to imperial history, Bayly 
could avail himself of the guidance of colleagues who had specialized in other ar-
eas of historical research and who were intent, in their turn, to reintegrate into the 
purview of British national experience the international, the imperial and the “fis-
cal-military”102 dimensions, and the correlative culture of patriotism. All these as-
pects of the British past, it has to be remarked, had been neglected or moved to the 
background by major trends in the historiography of the second half of the twen-
tieth century such as Anglo-Marxism (especially in the “populist” version given of 
it by E.P. Thompson), which had tended to emphasize internal social conflicts, and 
especially the moments when ordinary people had contested the hegemony of the 
ruling classes, as the main theme of national history.103 
The central thesis argued by Bayly in Imperial Meridian is that “metropol-
itan impulses” played a preponderant role in giving impetus and form to em-
pire-building during the expansive phase that it underwent between the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries. The engine of the expansion, in this particular 
historical conjuncture, could not be industrial capitalism, which would begin to 
make its consequences felt on the Empire only from the 1830s-1840s onwards. 
The greatest thrust behind global imperialism did not even come from “‘gentle-
manly capitalism’”, a capitalism dominated, according to the proponents of this 
theory, Anthony Hopkins and Peter Cain, by a landed or gentrified elite prone 
to invest his wealth in commerce and finance rather than in industry.104 What 
propelled the extra-European expansion was, for Bayly, the energetic response 
given to a succession of terrible internal and external challenges by the broadly 
101 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 77. See also idem, “Ireland, India and the Empire: 1780-1914,” 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 10 (2000): 377-397.
102 Bayly, “The British Military-Fiscal State and Indigenous Resistance: India 1750-1820,” in 
An Imperial State at War: Britain from 1689 to 1815, edited by L. Stone (London: Routledge, 
1994), 322-354, revised in idem, Origins of Nationality, 238-275.
103 C.A. Bayly, “Patriotism and Political Ethics in Indian History,” in idem, Origins of Nation-
ality, 6; idem, “Rallying around the Subaltern,” The Journal of Peasant Studies, 16 (1988), n. 1: 
110-120, 113; Tagliaferri, La repubblica dell’umanità, 129-133. 
104 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 12, quoting P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capital-
ism and British Expansion Overseas. 1. The Old Colonial System, 1688-1850,” The Economic 
History Review, 2nd series, 39 (1986), no. 4: 501-525.
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majoritarian sectors of the British metropolitan society who were under the he-
gemony of the oligarchic and aristocratic agrarian establishment.
The initial challenge came from the “imperial crisis” concomitant with the 
secession of the Thirteen Colonies in 1776.105 American Independence, in fact, 
only marked the partial triumph of a more general tendency towards the transfer 
of imperial power from the metropolitan centre to the peripherical white elites, 
which had established itself in the colonies of settlement, including Ireland, after 
the Seven Years’ War. The British reaction, while failing to avert the outcome of 
the American Revolution, arrested and inverted the process of “‘creolization’”106. 
In the case of Ireland, for example, the Act of Union of 1801 deprived the King-
dom of legislative autonomy, abolishing the Irish Parliament. Irish Protestants 
maintained the right to parliamentary representation, but the members they 
elected had to sit in the London ‘imperial’ House of Commons, while the Irish 
Catholics remained excluded from it till the Emancipation Act of 1829. The Irish 
Act of Union was passed in the context of the subsequent, interrelated challenges 
which spurred Britain to imperial expansion between the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. These were the competition with revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France and the veritable “world crisis”—“the first true world crisis 
since the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century”—107 that the further glo-
balization of the inter-European international conflicts contributed to triggering 
from the “Atlantic Mediterranean”108 to South-East Asia. 
The British response to this succession of crises developed therefore at the 
international, ideological, political, institutional and military levels, more and 
before than at the economical level. Integrating the mainly ‘excentric’ approach 
followed in his previous works on the genesis of the colonial empire in India, 
in Imperial Meridian Bayly examined the “new imperialism” emanating from 
the British Isles as an organic part of the nascent “British nationalism”, which 
was fomented by the aristocratic and noble ruling class in order to mobilize the 
wealth and the consensus of the Metropolis for the purposes of the anti-French 
struggle.109 
105 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 95-99.
106 Ibid., 91.
107 Ibid., 164-192. 
108 J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of England. Two Courses of Lectures (London: Macmillan, 1883), 101.
109 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 11, 15, 100, 106-107, 108, 109, 115, 134, 213. See also idem, The 
Birth of the Modern World, 227-233.
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The war between England and France was at its core a clash of ideologies. 
The peculiar Toryism that the British opposed to the French Gospel of the Rev-
olution took the shape of a patriotic ideal which credited the British State with 
a providential mission and re-legitimized the Empire as an essential instrument 
for performing it. The anti-revolutionary patriotism inspired a reinvention of the 
British monarchy which made of the King (George III for most of the period) the 
symbolic personification of the British identity. This process had been studied by 
Linda Colley in a series of essays published during the 1980s.110 In Imperial Me-
ridian, Bayly complemented her investigations significantly by also tracing the 
manifestations of the new cult of the monarch in the public rituals which were 
celebrated in the imperial and colonial “scenarios of power” in Ireland and over-
seas111. On the other hand, Bayly differentiated himself from Colley’s paradigm, 
which had paid much more attention to popular patriotism, because he focused 
almost exclusively on elite nationalism.112
It is important to observe that the new British nationalism emphasized by 
Bayly did not draw its chief inspiration from the kind of conservativism and 
constitutionalism represented by Edmund Burke, whose celebrated and enor-
mously influential Reflections on the Revolution in France criticized the French 
revolutionary model and its British admirers and followers by arguing that that 
dangerous foreign experiment was completely alien and antithetical to the spirit 
of the English political tradition and institutions. Burke condemned the arro-
gant French ambition of remaking state and society in conformity with abstract 
reason and extolled the contrary ideal of change-in-continuity supposedly re-
alized in the history of England, whose Constitution had not been consciously 
and artificially ‘made’ by men according to a preconceived overall plan, but had 
110 See above, note 100.
111 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 109-115; R.S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power. Myth and Ceremony 
in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995-2000); T. Taglia-
ferri, “Democrazia, nazione e Impero nella modernizzazione della monarchia britannica,” in 
Sovrani a metà. Monarchia e legittimazione in Europa tra Otto e Novecento, edited by G. Guaz-
zaloca (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2009), 93-117.
112 For Bayly’s later approach to the popular culture of imperialism, which seems in broad 
agreement with the ‘Manchester School’ animated by John MacKenzie, see C.A. Baily, review 
of Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts, by J.M. MacKenzie (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1995), Journal of Historical Geography, 22 (1996), no. 3: 361-363; idem, “Foreword 
to the New Edition,” in P.S. Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964 
(Sage, 2002), xii-xxxvi.
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organically and naturally ‘grown’ in time from precedent to precedent without 
ever losing contact with its roots in the past. The culture and mentality of the an-
ti-French patriotism analysed by Bayly in his 1989 book shows the very different 
aspect of a “constructive”, dynamic, reformist and modernizing conservatism. 
Its projection in the colonial world gave rise to a series of autocratic, militaristic 
and paternalistic regimes far remote from the Burkean ideal. These “proconsular 
despotisms” and the policies they pursued were very similar to each other, so they 
“began to impose a uniform pattern of rule and uniform notions of ‘law’ and 
‘progress’” also on the heterogeneous mosaic of distant extra-European societies 
all around the world which were affected by its impact.113
What the increased British domination and influence globally spread, starting 
from the colonial fringes of the British Isles themselves, Ireland and Scotland, were 
first of all the after-effects of the enormous strengthening of the “sinews”114 of the 
state produced by the imitative antagonism with France. The period, like any oth-
er period of world war, saw a huge growth of the fleet, the army, the armaments 
industry, the police forces, the bureaucratic institutions and personnel, and a cor-
responding “revolution in government” (i.e. administrative) concealed behind the 
appearance of constitutional continuity.115 The repercussions of all these develop-
ments were felt well beyond the borders of the United Kingdom proper. 
At the same time, the “new British Empire” forged in the struggles of the 
revolutionary and Napoleonic epoch conveyed outside its original European 
laboratory a system of beliefs and attitudes supporting a pedagogical-religious 
“project” of regeneration of humanity which Bayly deems comparable, in view 
of its universalistic claims, to the much more well-known French revolutionary 
ideology.116 This palingenetic grand design can be regarded, in some respects, as a 
113 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 11, 14, 193. Bayly’s contributions to the Oxford Dictionary of Na-
tional Biography are devoted for the most part to prominent examples of “proconsular despots”. 
See idem, “Elphinstone, Mountstuart  (1779-1859),”  in ODNB (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), online edition, January 2008; idem, “Metcalfe, Charles Theophilus, Baron Met-
calfe (1785-1846),” ibid., online edition, January 2008; idem, “Wellesley, Richard, Marquess 
Wellesley (1760-1842),” ibid., online edition, January 2011; C.A. Bayly and K. Prior, “Corn-
wallis, Charles, First Marquess Cornwallis (1738-1805),” ibid., online edition, September 2011. 
114 J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783 (New York: 
Knopf, 1989); Bayly, The British Military-Fiscal State, 241-242.
115 Idem, Imperial Meridian, 116-121; G. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government. A Study of 
Administrative Changes in the Reign of Henry VIII (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).
116 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 11, 253.
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prefiguration of the civilizing mission that the nineteenth-century propagandists 
of colonial rule assigned to the British Empire, called to convert backward peo-
ples to “Commerce, Christianity and Civilization”, a celebrated mid-Victorian 
triad.117 Bayly does not identify the intellectual basis of this first modern culture 
of imperialism with the doctrines of utilitarianism and free trade prevailing in 
subsequent periods of European expansion. The main source of the new British 
nationalism and imperialism was a peculiar kind of civic republicanism—a form 
of political discourse, dating back to classical antiquity and Aristotelian politics, 
and spread in various shapes at pan-Eurasian level, which extolled as one of 
the highest forms of self-realization of the human being the performance of the 
duty and the fruition of the right to take an active interest in the res publica, to 
participate in its corporate life and to contribute to its common good even at 
the cost of personal sacrifice.118 It was therefore both fully compatible with the 
cult of the King and much similar, in fact, to the Napoleonic conception of the 
administrative monarchy.119 
The specific British variant of civic republicanism, which Bayly named 
“‘agrarian patriotism’”, was strongly indebted to the ideas of the eighteenth-cen-
tury Enlightenment, and in particular to the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
Physiocrats, in that it regarded agriculture as the real source of the wealth of 
nations and advocated the right to the full enjoyment of land property rights and 
free exchange of the products of agricultural work. Agrarian patriotism therefore 
idealized the figure of the “independent” big landowner or, in its more democrat-
ic Scottish version, the “independent” yeoman.120 
“Independency” embodied a whole cluster of economic, ethical and com-
munal values: enterprise, strength of character, public spirit. Bayly discerns their 
worship as reflected in many ways in both the rhetoric and the colonial institu-
tions of the refashioned British Empire, the “Second British Empire” resurrect-
ing, phoenix-like, from the ashes of the “First”. The presumed degree of “‘moral 
independency’” was placed at the foundation of a pyramid of racial, social and 
religious types more or less provided with this complex of human virtues. The 
scale of mankind culminated, of course, in the white Anglican gentleman. In the 
117 S.J. Brown, Providence and Empire. Religion, Politics and Society in the United Kingdom, 
1815-1914 (Harlow: Pearson, 2008), 139-213.
118 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 42-43, 71-80.
119 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 11-12.
120 Ibid., 80-81, 85, 89, 108, 121-126, 155-160, 193, 210.
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period covered in Bayly’s book, the anthropological ladder was still conceived in 
a historical-evolutionary rather than a biological way, so that the peoples arrested 
at its lower steps were deemed susceptible of improvement, and their elevation 
began to be considered the very purpose of imperial government. In the colonies, 
however, well before the rise of biological racism, the worldwide exportation of 
the cultural hierarchy inherent in agrarian patriotism propelled by global impe-
rialism resulted in a hardening of the boundaries between colonizers and natives 
(which previously had remained much more fluid and porous), practices of ex-
clusion, and multiple forms of juridification of otherness. Faith in the beliefs of 
agrarian individualism also inspired the legislative interventions of the imperial 
authorities in the sphere of land regimes, which in this case met the demands of 
the rising Asian “gentry”.121 
The decades that witnessed the rebirth and rebuilding of the Empire on a 
wider scale also saw a significant missionary expansion of the Established Church 
and British Christianity in general. It is true that the missionary initiative had 
as its recipients, in this period, the European colonizers themselves, or catego-
ries of non-Europeans who were already Christianized (for example, the Indi-
an Eurasians born from European males and Asian women). The missionaries, 
therefore, did not aim at direct conversion of the followers of other cults, at least 
in principle. But the mere intensification of the Anglican and Christian pres-
ence in the colonial world, together with the explicitly Protestant character of 
the Second Empire’s legitimizing myth, was enough to provoke not only hostile 
reactions, but also attempts at emulation by Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists. 
These religious implications of the new imperialism, as Bayly remarks, offer the 
most eloquent confirmation of the capacity of British metropolitan nationalism 
to exert its influence, through colonial expansion, even on “the deeper historical 
experience of non-European peoples”.122
121 Ibid., 26, 32, 73, 151, 219. Organic incorporation of metropolitan cultures, ideologies and 
ideas into the disciplinary field of interactive colonial history, pioneered by another of his men-
tors, Eric Stokes, was a fundamental premise of Bayly’s subsequent work in the areas of imperial 
knowledge and global intellectual history. See E. T. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), Tagliaferri, “Christopher Bayly e ‘the return of uni-
versal history’”, 58-59 (note 107), 64-65 (note 121), and, in this volume, the essays by Guido 
Abbattista and Maurizio Isabella.
122 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 147; idem, “Returning the British,” 278-282.
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The analysis of the elements of affinity discernible in the “proconsular des-
potisms” predominating throughout the Empire during the first three or four 
decades of the nineteenth century fulfils a strategic function in Bayly’s attempt 
at reincorporating imperial history into world history. The homogenizing effects 
of the British expansion favoured “the emergence in varied colonies remote from 
each other of similar policies and similar types of colonial discourse”, thus testi-
fying to the globalizing effectiveness of forces of change which had their sources, 
in this case, in the very heart of the European civilization: “Out of the collision 
and accommodation between widely differing societies and these impulses to 
uniformity was generated much of the structure of the modern world”.123 
On the other hand, the fact that the new powerful expansive efforts accom-
plished by Europe were intertwined with previous dynamics which were endog-
enous to the non-European societies, and never ceased altogether to depend on 
these other paths to modernity (as an indispensable source of native ‘collabora-
tors’, for instance), helps to explain why the convergence between the regional 
histories that was being realized under the aegis of a contingent and temporary 
Western hegemony could not give rise, either now nor later, to mere cultural ho-
mologation or provoke resistances which were capable of preserving a mythical 
integrity of the threatened cultures.124 Imperial globalization, as described by 
Bayly, rather produced a numerous range of what the American scholar Emily 
Rosenberg has called “differentiated commonalities”—a type of hybridization in 
which the surviving local identities were transformed by creatively incorporating 
the global uniformities that provided them with both the stimuli and the means 
to express themselves in completely renewed forms.125 
5. A Global Past for a Common Future: Bayly’s “Ethics of World History”
The human condition that seems to be the point of arrival of the story of 
transregional encounters and clashes told in Imperial Meridian and The Birth of 
123 Bayly, Imperial Meridian, 14, 193-216.
124 Bayly, Rallying around the Subaltern. This important article was a polemical review essay 
comprehensively dealing with Subaltern Studies. Writings on South Asian History and Society, 4 
vols., edited by R. Guha (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982-1985). 
125 E. Rosenberg, “Transnational Currents in a Shrinking World: 1870-1945,” in A History of 
the World, vol. 5, 813-996.
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the Modern World, whose recently published sequel, Remaking the Modern World, 
carries the narrative literally to the present, offers a precious key to the ethical 
assumptions which were at the very heart of Bayly’s approach to world history 
and to the practical purposes he pursued through his scientific work in this field 
of inquiry. 
It is quite striking how similar the globalized society whose roots in the past 
Bayly aimed to explore appears to a brilliant characterization of contemporary 
India first given by E.P. Thompson in the late 1970s and disseminated afterwards 
by Amartya Sen: “All the convergent influences of the world run through this 
society: Hindu, Moslem, Christian, secular; Stalinist, liberal, Maoist, democratic 
socialist, Gandhian. There is not a thought that is being thought in the West or 
East that is not active in some Indian mind”.126 What Thompson and Sen ob-
served about Indian multiculturalism some decades ago, and Bayly’s “narrative 
of convergence” concurrently suggested about the historical present generally,127 
could be truly repeated, with the necessary adaptations, for each and every part 
of the world of today. It is not only that, in the very shrunken planet we inhabit, 
the once remote regional cultures interact much more closely than in the past, so 
that their bearers and representatives may be found living, working and studying 
at each other’s elbow in the same streets, factories, offices and schools, or inveigh 
against each other on the same TV talk shows and social media. Contemporary 
globalization means something more. It implies that the world’s cultures have 
been increasingly penetrating, permeating and modifying the core identity of 
each other up to the level of the individual minds and souls of the people belong-
ing to them (this already happened in the past, so there is no reason to believe 
that it couldn’t happen again), if only because their unprecedented mixing forces 
us to react in some way or another to their ubiquitous presence and influence.128 
126 E.P. Thompson, “Indira: The Light That Failed,” The Guardian, 16 November 1978, reprint-
ed in an expanded version as “The Nehru Tradition” in idem, Writing by Candlelight (London: 
Merlin Press, 1980), 135-149; A. Sen, “Tagore and his India,” The New York Review of Books, 
26 June 1997, reprinted in idem, The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture 
and Identity (London: Allen Lane, 2005), 116-117. On the affinities between Bayly and Sen see 
also, in this volume, the essays by Guido Abbattista and Marco Meriggi.
127 Clark and Bayly, Christopher Bayly, xvi.
128 On the fascinating process of interactive globalization of Indian religious traditions see C.A. 
Bayly, “India, the Bagavad Gita and the World,” in “The Bagavad Gita and Modern Thought,” 
edited by S. Kapila and F. Devji, Modern Intellectual History, 7 (2010), 2: 275-295; idem, “Mak-
ing Hinduism a ‘World Religion’: before and after Swami Vivekananda,” Inaugural Indian 
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It is only too obvious that our political future will greatly depend on the way in 
which we cope with this melting pot situation, or panmixìa. 
The term panmixìa—an ancient Greek word which signifies the mixing of 
everything with everything—was employed by Arnold Toynbee in the 1940s 
to describe the cultural condition created by globalization, which he still equat-
ed with Westernization. Referring in particular to the possible role of Islam in 
future world politics, Toynbee evoked the “discordant panmixìa set up by the 
Western conquest of the world” in order to warn that “a panmixìa may end in 
a synthesis, but it may equally well end in an explosion”. He believed that the 
investigator of the global past had both the power and the responsibility to help 
mankind to avert this last “disaster”.129
Toynbee’s precedent may serve to introduce the examination of a further 
relevant affinity between Bayly’s position and the orientations of the US New 
World History, which pertains to the values choices related to the adoption of 
the “global point of view”,130 and the results that the global historians should ex-
pect from it in the educational and public spheres. Among the North American 
scholars, there is a widespread belief that the production of an intelligible world 
history would be “the moral duty of the historical profession in our time”, be-
cause it would possess the virtue “to diminish the lethality of group encounters” 
and to favour “cross-cultural understanding and global peace”. A history written 
according to the methodological precepts followed by these scholars would re-
veal itself as the natural ally of movements committed “to advance the causes of 
global citizenship, cosmopolitan democracy, cross-cultural dialogue” and analo-
gous “globalist projects”, as well as the international struggle for a “more just and 
equitable organization” of the world economy.131 
These sanguine expectations are also reflected in Moore’s plan for the Black-
well History to which Bayly contributed both The Birth and Remaking the Modern 
World, so that we are allowed to suppose he partook of them to the full.132 The 
ideal readers to whom the series addresses itself are in fact the citizens of “a world 
Ministry of Culture Swami Vivekananda Visiting Professor Lecture, April 8, 2014, University 
of Chicago (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdY9W1qqqlU). 
129 A.J. Toynbee, “Islam, the West, and the Future,” in idem, Civilization on Trial (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1948), 209.
130 Bentley, “A New Forum for Global History,” iv.
131 McNeill, “Mythistory,” 7; Bentley, “Myths, Wagers,” 52, 78-79.
132 R.I. Moore, “Series Editor’s Acknowledgements”, in Bayly, Remaking the Modern World, xi.
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which faces a common future of headlong and potentially catastrophic transfor-
mation”. A mature awareness of its common history would help the peoples who 
are living and appear destined to live together in a unified world make it into “a 
rational and humane cosmopolis” based on mutual respect and understanding 
among the identity groups involved. It is the consciousness of a shared present 
and future, in other words, that gives value and relevance to knowledge of the 
global past.133 
It is pretty clear that Bayly personally endorsed a belief in the ethical respon-
sibility of the global historian professed by the editor of the Blackwell History, 
although he rarely expressed his own deepest convictions in public. This was 
witnessed by Richard Drayton in an obituary written for The Guardian. Drayton 
describes his colleague’s and friend’s entire scientific work as tacitly “animated by 
a moral, even utopian, purpose”. “Hidden” behind his impeccable professional-
ism, there was an “emotional” source of inspiration—Bayly’s “hope for a cosmo-
politan liberal future, in which human beings, beyond race and nation, would 
live compassionately in a family of democracies”.134 
Bayly’s propensity towards some form of pluralist cosmopolitanism seems 
confirmed by a certain sensitivity to what he himself has critically defined as “the 
fascination which the vast, multi-ethnic empires of the agrarian world exercise 
on scholars and laymen”. There is an obvious ideological dimension to the histor-
ical-cultural myth which portrays such universal empires—when compared to 
the homicidal and genocidal intolerance of diversity displayed by the nation state 
in the contemporary age—“as benign political organisms providing their sub-
ject populations with the benefits of peace, law and order”.135 It is worth noting 
that until the mid-twentieth century, the British Empire and Commonwealth 
of Nations claimed to be the newest and the last incarnation of the ideal of the 
cosmic monarchy. Official propaganda represented the British world state as a 
great family of peoples scattered in every corner of the earth, all contributing to 
the richness of the whole in terms of their prized talents and peculiarities, and 
therefore realizing the utopia of unity in diversity.136 There is every reason to be-
lieve, on the strength of Bayly’s own autobiographical testimony, that he actually 
133 Moore, “World History,” 933; idem, “Series Editor’s Preface,” xix.
134 R. Drayton, “Sir Christopher Bayly,” The Guardian, 23 April 2015.
135 Bang and Bayly, “Comparing Pre-Modern Empires,” 169, 170.
136 T. Tagliaferri, La cultura metropolitana e il mito di legittimazione dell’Impero britannico 
(1858-1947). Saggio d’ interpretazione (Naples: Giannini, 2015).
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entered into contact with this kind of popular liberal imperialism through the 
mediation of both his parents when he was a boy (being born in 1945).137 
But how exactly did Bayly imagine that his scholarly activity in the field of 
world history could help ensure “a 21st-century global future for his kind of lib-
eralism”?138 It is not an easy task to give an answer to this question, because Bayly 
never addressed it explicitly in his published writings and several recorded inter-
ventions. There may be no doubt, on the other hand, that he was confident in 
the practical usefulness of historical studies. He contributed to the World Bank 
Development Research Group a dense paper on the Indigenous and Colonial Or-
igins of Comparative Economic Development, analysing the cases of India and 
Africa and thus establishing a telling example of how imperial history could be 
concretely employed in the planning of policies aiming to face global poverty.139
It can be ruled out from the start, moreover, that Bayly attributed to the 
empirical knowledge of the common past of the globalized world any mystical 
virtue of automatically converting into a choice of value in favour of cosmopol-
itanism and multiculturalism. This way of thinking was widespread among the 
world historians of previous generations. Many of them, often influenced by 
religious providentialism, believed that history possessed an objective teleological 
meaning—an immanent purpose, logic and direction. They therefore regarded 
the historical process as the realization, depending on the right use of human free 
will, of a predetermined end. For influential scholars, including Toynbee, this 
télos consisted in the reunion of mankind into a single “family” or “oecumenical 
society” (corresponding to the Church that the Christian tradition had posited as 
the ultimate beneficiary of the unification of the globe whose antecedent stages 
137 Bayly, “Historiographical and Autobiographical Note”, 308-310.
138 Drayton, “Sir Christopher Bayly”.
139 C.A. Bayly, “Indigenous and Colonial Origins of Comparative Economic Development: 
The Case of Colonial India and Africa,” The World Bank, Development Research Group, Pov-
erty Team, Policy Research Working Paper 4474, January 1, 2008 (http://documents.banque-
mondiale.org/curated/fr/945001468034474628/pdf/wps4474.pdf), reprinted in History, Histo-
rians and Development Policy: a Necessary Dialogue, edited by C.A. Bayly, V. Rao, S. Szreter, and 
M. Woolcock (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 39-64. See also idem, review 
of Measuring the Condition of India’s Poor. The Physical Quality of Life Index, by M.D. Morris 
and M.B. McAlpin, Pacific Affairs, 58 (1985), 2: 348-349; idem, “Introduction to the Third 
Edition,” in idem, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars. North Indian Society in the Age of British Ex-
pansion, 1770-1870, third edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012; first edition 
1983), xxi.
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had seen as their protagonists secular actors like the Roman Empire).140 A man 
equipped with a truthful notion of world history could not help but take sides for 
some form of pluralist cosmopolitan way out from the predicament of globalized 
humanity, which was being torn apart by the intensification of the simultaneous 
“unifying and divisive movements” coexisting in the “Atomic Age”.141
Some conspicuous traces of this old mode of viewing and trying to exploit 
the potentialities of the global perspective can be recognized in the work of Wil-
liam McNeill, the historian of the “human community” and a former contribu-
tor to Toynbee’s Survey of International Affairs.142 In 1985, McNeill was elected 
President of the American Historical Association, a significant indication of the 
emerging recognition of world history as a legitimate field of scientific profes-
sionalization. On this occasion, he delivered a remarkable address entitled My-
thistory, or Truth, Myth, History, and Historians, whose main thesis was that, 
in order to perform the most urgent duty conferred on them by the society in 
which they lived and worked, professional historians had to take on the task of 
producing a world history which partook of both myth and historical truth.143 
As history, “mythistory” had to be impeccably written from a scholarly point of 
view. But the “ecumenical history, with plenty of room for human diversity in all 
its complexity” envisaged by McNeill had to possess at the same time the narra-
tive structure and meaningfulness proper to a “myth”. To this end, the would-be 
mythistorians were exhorted to reconstruct a synthetic overview of the entire hu-
man past around an organizational principle which sounds reminiscent, both in 
140 Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. 3 (1934), Part III, “The Growths of Civilizations, C., The 
Criterion of Growth, (d), The Transference of the Field of Action,” 212; ibid., vol. 12 (1961), 
“Reconsiderations, C, Reconsiderations of Particular Topics, VII, Explanations and Revision of 
Usages of Terms, 15, Civilization,” 279.
141 A.J. Toynbee, Democracy in the Atomic Age, The Dyason Lectures, 1956, Issued under the 
Auspices of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1957); idem, “Divisive and Unifying Movements in History,” in idem, Change and Habit. 
The Challenge of Our Time (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 87.
142 W.H. McNeill, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946: America, Britain and Russia, Their 
Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946, with a Foreword by A. J. Toynbee (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1953); idem, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (Oxford: Oxford Universiy Press, 1990); 
idem, The Pursuit of Truth. A Historian’s Memoir (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
2005), 39, 60-63, 68-70; idem, “Leaving West Civ Behind,” Liberal Education, 97 (2011), nos. 
3-4: 40-47, 43.
143 McNeill, “Mythistory,” 7. See J. Mali, Mythistory. The Making of a Modern Historiography 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 24-25.
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its hypothetical gnoselogical status and particular content, of Immanuel Kant’s 
Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim. Resorting to the mythis-
torical approach in fact implied surveying the global past as if it were the long, 
difficult march of mankind towards the “eventual establishment of a world-wide 
cosmopolitanism”. The resulting world historical narrative would have been able 
to generate in its readers “a sense of individual identification with the triumphs 
and tribulations of humanity as a whole”.144
Bayly distanced himself much more markedly than McNeill from the teleo-
logical attitude of the old global history, albeit the two scholars in a way shared 
a similar religious upbringing (McNeill was the son of a Presbyterian minister, 
while Bayly’s father, Roy, had converted from his family’s Presbyterianism to free 
thinking).145 Bayly’s epistemological pronouncements indeed reveal a strict ad-
herence to the precepts of the English empiricist tradition. He was radically scep-
tical about the possibility for the professional historian to base any judgement 
about how things ought to be on the knowledge of the past “wie es eigentlich 
gewesen”. More exactly, Bayly’s work is infused with a sophisticated, quasi-We-
berian understanding that history cannot by itself yield any ethical message, be-
cause the objects of historical research are shaped by the cognitive interest of the 
researcher and an indispensable role is therefore played in their shaping by values 
choices. The historian cannot draw his preferences from the realities he probes. 
What happens is rather the opposite: his evaluations give form and meaning to 
that portion of the past which he selects as the subject matter of his inquiry.146 
It must be added that Bayly, as a historian of imperialism, opposed any apolo-
getic whitewashing of its evil consequences and crimes, as well as the Manichae-
an posture of prejudicial and indistinct condemnation of this most ambivalent 
phenomenon which has for so long prevailed.147 He has shown himself only too 
144 McNeill, The Rise of the West, 806; idem, “Mythistory,” 7.
145 Bayly, “Historiographical and Autobiographical Note,” 309. See McNeill’s dedication of The 
Rise of the West to his colleagues of the University of Chicago—“I seek to understand, and if I 
can/To justify the ways of man to man”—, which was an obviuos paraphrase of Milton’s Paradise 
Lost, Book I, vv. 25-26.
146 Bayly, “Historiographical and Autobiographical Note,” 322.
147 See, for example, C.A. Bayly, “Two Colonial Revolts: The Java War, 1825-30, and the Indi-
an ‘Mutiny’ of 1857-59”, in Two Colonial Empires; idem, Creating a Colonial Peasantry; idem, 
“Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780-1916,” Compar-
ative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27 (2007), no 2: 332-344; idem, “Moral 
Judgment: Empire, Nation and History,” European Review, 14 (2006), no. 3: 385-391. Bay-
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aware, therefore, that the vivid consciousness of a common history is not in itself 
conducive to a better mutual comprehension between peoples. After all, what the 
past co-experienced by the descendants of colonizers and colonized has left to 
the globalized present is first and foremost a heavy, almost unmanageable legacy 
of violent clashes and “inexcusable” wrong.148 
For all these reasons, Bayly seems to have set himself a practical purpose 
which appears much more circumscribed, but at the same time much more well 
defined and actually achievable, than the ambitious edificatory goal of McNeill’s 
“mythistory”. Far from attempting to convert anyone to his own brand of liberal 
cosmopolitanism, Bayly’s explorations of the global past aimed at counteracting 
the obnoxious ideological tendency of our times to reify as fixed and separate 
essences the fluid, overlapping, intricate group identities coexisting in the con-
temporary globalized society, so as to equip the aspirant builders of the future 
Cosmopolis with a realistic knowledge about the cultural materials which must 
be handled and the obstacles which must be overcome in order to advance to-
wards its always imperfect realization.149
But even within these rigorous limits, there remains an uplifting lesson in 
rational hope to be apprehended from reading and attentively studying Chris-
topher Bayly’s books and essays. The critical investigation of the actual ways in 
ly’s critical attitude towards imperialism most clearly emerges from his vast contribution to 
the historiography of the ‘end of Empire’: idem, “Rangoon (Yangon) 1939-49: the Death of a 
Colonial Metropolis” (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Centre of South Asian Studies, 
Occasional paper no. 3, 2003); C.A. Bayly and T. Harper, Forgotten Armies. Britain’s Asian 
Empire and the War with Japan (London: Allen Lane, 2004), and Forgotten Wars. The End of 
the Britain’s Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007), whose subtitle in the American edition 
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at War, 1939-1947”, Raleigh Lecture on History, 26 November 2003, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 125 (2005): 265-296; idem, “Ideologies of the End of the Raj: Burma, India and the 
World, 1940-1950,” in Decentering Empire: Britain, India and the Transcolonial World, edited 
by D. Ghosh and D. Kennedy (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2006), 351-373; idem, “Fighting 
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Interdisciplinary History, 39 (2009), no. 3: 361-385. 
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justice of Slavery”, Atlanta Black Star, 28 March 2017.
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which modern globalization has come to shape the identity profiles of groups 
and individuals interacting in today’s world disproves the pseudo-historical ste-
reotypes that tend to credit the prejudice according to which between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ (between ‘us’ Europeans or Italians, for example, and non-European Un-
ion migrants of various origins and provenances) there would exist irreducible 
differences, to be classified in simple dichotomic schemes. Rather, the history of 
the last quarter of millennium has generated a conspicuous set of “differentiat-
ed commonalities”—resemblances between regional societies and civilizations 
which result from their sharing the same or analogous experiences, but which 
are everywhere inflected according to the most varied local codes. As they have 
made possible the present degree of convergence and interpenetration among 
the cultures of the world, the global interactions of the past have bequeathed to 
us, together with a tragic legacy of conflict, vast and manifold opportunities for 
mutual accommodation between group identities which are anything but rigid, 
homogeneous, mutually exclusive and uncommunicating monads.
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Maurizio Isabella
Liberalism and Globalization
The book of Bayly on the Indian liberalism in a global context, Recovering 
Liberties, contains in the subtitle (The Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and 
Empire) an explicit reference to a classic of the historiography of extra-Europe-
an political culture published in 1962 by the Oxford University Press, Arabic 
Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939 by Albert Hourani. To the old master Bayly 
makes a warm homage also in the preface, where he is defined as “one of the 
finest historians of the later twentieth century”.1
In the volume of Hourani, the relationship between Ottoman intellectuals 
and Europe played a central role, not only because the opportunity or not to im-
itate the European model was at the centre of their reflections, but also because 
the author of every type of reformist opening of the Arabic thought, although 
formulated in the terms of indigenous culture, depended on ideas and stimuli 
which came in any case from the European continent.
Elie Kedourie, the great scholar of nationalism, of Iraqi origins, in a famous 
review wrote that the title of the book was deceiving because there was no form 
of liberalism in the Ottoman empire.2 To understand the reactions produced 
by Hourani’s book we must return to the terms of the post-war debate on the 
nature and origins of liberalism. As Duncan Bell recently argued, a strongly 
normative conception of liberalism has its roots in the critique of totalitarian-
ism inaugurated in the 1930s and consolidated during the Cold War. Basically, 
starting from the fortunate stories of Guido De Ruggiero and Harold Laski, 
liberalism has been associated with Western modernity and progress, and has 
1 C.A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties. Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), vii.
2 E. Kedourie, “Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939,” Political Quarterly, 24 (1963), 
no. 2: 217-219.
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therefore been defined as an ideology created to protect individual rights and 
property in the framework of a constitutional government. To give coherence 
and unity to this ideology contributed an entirely European intellectual ge-
nealogy whose founding father was John Locke, and whose conceptual bricks 
were analyzed through a gallery of thinkers, from Thomas Hobbes to Charles 
de Montesquieu, from Benjamin Constant to John Stuart Mill. Within this 
tradition were recognized at the most the distinctions between a British and a 
continental variant of liberalism.3
Bayly’s work calls into question this reconstruction together with its his-
toriographical and methodological premises. How is it possible to study lib-
eralism at a global level in a period when it became the dominant ideology of 
those countries that politically and materially conquered the rest of the world 
without adopting the diffusionist model implicit in the post-war literature on 
liberalism? The great merit of Bayly, already starting from a brief section of The 
Birth of the Modern World,4 is to radically revise the terms of the relationship 
between European and extra-European liberalism in the era of colonial expan-
sions, abandoning, on the one hand, the thesis of the derivation of the second 
from the first, on the other, a homogeneous and univocal idea of  liberalism that 
has become unsustainable in the light of the studies of the last twenty years on 
nineteenth-century political culture.5
Moyn and Sartori have proposed three definitions of global intellectual histo-
ry: a history that considers the global as a meta-analytic category that the histo-
rian uses; the study of a historically given process (for example the globalization 
of ideas); a category historically used by the intellectuals. Bayly has contributed 
to this discipline at all levels, although its greatest contribution has been above 
all to the globalization of ideas as a result of co-production, interactions and ex-
changes.6 A fundamental premise of his approach is the reduction of the distance 
or the difference between European and extra-European political culture even 
before the nineteenth century.
3 D. Bell, “What is Liberalism?”, Political Theory, 42 (2014), no. 6: 682-715.
4 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of Modern World 1780-1914 (London: Blackwell, 2004).
5 Cf. too C.A. Bayly, “European Political Thought and the Wider World during the XIX Cen-
tury”, in The Cambridge History of the XIX Century Political Thought, edited by G.S. Jones and 
G. Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 835-863.
6 Cf. Global Intellectual History, edited by S. Moyn and A. Sartori (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 5.
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According to Bayly there is a substantial affinity between the idea of  freedom 
of the Western republican civic tradition and those of the Arab, African, Asian 
and Creole-Latin American cultures, all based on the notion of “virtuous city” 
and anxious to defend themselves from the threat posed by corruption and by 
tyranny thanks to the principles of justice and wisdom. The new themes of nine-
teenth-century liberalism are grafted onto these concerns, and therefore there is 
convergence and also continuity, not just rupture, between the “liberty before 
liberalism”—according to the fortunate definition of Quentin Skinner—and 
liberalism.7 If in the nineteenth century the reception of European texts in the 
rest of the world was successful, this also happened thanks to the fact that West-
ern ideas were recognized as familiar by their non-European readers. It becomes 
difficult—Bayly seems to suggest in this way—to defend the exclusivity or the 
peculiarity of Western political thought.
At the same time Bayly’s approach does not deny the fundamental impor-
tance of the interaction between local traditions and European ideas for the 
creation of liberal currents in the world. What counts is not so much the rate 
of reception of European culture and fidelity to its original texts, as the way 
in which the language of liberalism in non-European continents used Western 
ideas by handling them, cannibalizing them, rebuilding them and reinterpreting 
them in a drastic way to reinvent alternative modernities and criticize the coloni-
al authority in an original way. Consequently the relationship between liberalism 
and empire, whose importance is already underlined in the subtitle of Recovering 
liberties, takes on new connotations. The classic studies of Uday Mehta and the 
more recent ones by Jennifer Pitts have suggested a close link between the im-
perial project, whose ascent in the nineteenth century is associated, according 
to Pitts, with a “turn to empire”. For Metha, the logic internal to liberalism is 
imperialist, since it is linked to a universally applicable idea of  progress and civ-
ilization, which in the face of extra-European diversity reacts with the colonial 
paternalism of the gradual education to freedom.8 The study of extra-European 
liberalism by Bayly, however, demonstrates the existence of a liberal criticism of 
the empire, but dismantles the rigid opposition between anti-colonial anti-im-
perialism and Western imperialism. The first Indian liberals did not want to dis-
7 Cf. Q. Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
8 Cf. U. Metha, Liberalism and Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1999); J. Pitts (A 
Turn to Empire (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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mantle the British Empire but to reform it by granting forms of local autonomy, 
without invoking its dissolution.
The prominence given to the connections through space and time does not 
therefore reduce the differences and the existing intellectual facets, it does not 
annul the characteristics of nineteenth-century liberalism in a minimum com-
mon denominator. One of Bayly’s fundamental methodological observations 
seems to me that the global dimension, whose definition requires a greater level 
of simplification or generalization, must always be combined with the regional 
and local level, because none of these plans alone is sufficient to understand the 
characteristics of the liberal thought in its interactive dimensions. Bayly uses the 
term “ecological niche”9 to indicate the local intellectual and institutional tra-
ditions that sometimes remain isolated or which, in certain historical contexts, 
take on new meaning by connecting and mingling with international trends.
The period for which Bayly more accurately and convincingly demonstrates 
the link and dependence between the different plans is that of the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, which he very happily defines as a “liberal moment” 
of a transnational nature.10 Central figure of this global constitutional phase 
is Ram Mohan Roy, a reformer whose intellectual horizons are marked by the 
geopolitical spaces of the British and Portuguese empires, of the Mediterrane-
an, of Southeast Asia.11 This constitutional moment is defined by the reformist 
aspirations that emerge simultaneously in the Ibero-American world, in Europe 
and in Asia, but Bayly emphasizes how the meaning of constitution and the 
expectations linked to the request for its adoption vary from context to context, 
from region to region. Roy supported the cause of the Spanish and Portuguese 
Carbonari and Liberals, but what he wanted for India was a constitution that 
guaranteed to the Indians first of all access to the jury, rather than their national 
representation. Although the constitutional moment marked the emergence of 
new political aspirations also in Southeast Asia, the liberals in India, Singapore, 
Ceylon and Malaysia claimed a role in the imperial justice system, referring to 
the tradition of panchayat or councils, as examples of representation of local is-
sues, and therefore to their “ecological niche”.
9 Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 12.
10 Ibid., 95.
11 C.A. Bayly, “Rammohan Roy and the Advent of Constitutional Liberalism in India,” Mod-
ern Intellectual History, 4 (2007), no. 1: 25-41.
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Until now we have wanted to underline the strategies adopted by Bayly to 
overtake a derivative and Eurocentric approach to the history of liberalism. An-
other important issue raised by his work is the rate of ‘normativity’ of the liber-
alism historically given in its extra-European dimension, when compared to the 
ideal-typical model proposed by post-war studies. In truth, Bayly does not seem 
to completely abandon the use of a normative model in the study of the historical 
roots of liberalism. He often assumes the comparison of the essential characteris-
tics of the thought of the Indian reformers with the writings of John Stuart Mill, 
labeling them as classic liberalism. At the same time, it should not be forgotten 
how Bayly, while giving an unusual weight among scholars of intellectual history 
to the social, political and economic context of the debates studied, remains a 
‘contextualist’ according to the methodological canons of the Cambridge school. 
It is not for nothing that his book is the hundredth of the Ideas in Context series 
founded by Quentin Skinner, one of the main inspirers of that kind of approach 
to the history of political thought.
Referring to the positions of the philosopher and historian Raymond Geuss,12 
Bayly nevertheless considers the liberalism historically given as the product of 
“an amalgamation of historically contingent fragments” of different ideologies.13 
Consequently, the study of this amalgam transforms in a surprising, at least at 
the first sight, way the most usual image of nineteenth-century liberalism. In the 
first place because what is presented to us is a liberalism which in its various fac-
ets and planetary declinations remains largely and profoundly religious. In India 
the Buddhist, Islamic and Hindu cultures merged with Evangelical Christian 
influences in the texts of local reformers. Among the Indian liberals, toleration 
was conceived not as a protection of an individual right, but as a privilege or 
defense of community rights. The liberalism that emerges from the pages of 
Bayly often subordinates the defense of individual rights to the defense of the 
community, whether it is a national community or a traditional social body. In 
nineteenth-century India one can be a reformer and at the same time defend 
the caste system in an anti-British function. But obviously, as Bayly does not 
fail to point out, the subordination of individual rights to the community must 
be traced back to global trends, not just local, which bring together European 
and Asian thinkers. The worldwide success of the Mazzinian thought, together 
12 Cf. R. Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
13 Bayly, Recovering Liberties, 2
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with the Indian reception of Comte, demonstrates the ambiguous relationship 
that exists historically between nationalism and individual liberties.14 Finally, as 
we have mentioned, the liberalism revealed by Bayly absorbs and also contains 
“liberty before liberalism”. The civic virtues and participation were important for 
the nineteenth-century Indian liberals: in Bombay and Calcutta the middle class 
identified with their city, exalting philanthropy and responsibility towards the 
urban community.
In this perspective the rigid distinctions and dichotomies used by historians 
of political thought lose meaning: the oppositions between republicanism and 
liberalism, historical constitutionalism and contractualism, nation and empire, 
organicism and individualism—if understood as alternative or incompatible lan-
guages—appear fundamentally ahistorical because not perceived as such by the 
actors of the time. Finally, the manipulation of European culture in the rest of 
the world subjected the nineteenth-century liberal thought canon to a very severe 
test. Figures considered marginal or non-liberal acquired value for their global 
echoes: so Mazzini or Comte are more important, from this point of view, than 
Benjamin Constant or Adam Smith.
As the titles of the numerous conferences organized in honour of the work of 
Bayly as an historian of the ideas suggest—Global Liberalisms, Liberal Multiplic-
ities, Liberalisms at the Margins—the need to pluralize our notion of liberalism 
seems urgent. If liberalism in the nineteenth century becomes a global and uni-
versal language, its spread on a planetary scale is accompanied by a proliferation 
of political languages, categories and topics, by a notable enrichment of semantic 
nuances, and not by their homogenization, and less than less by their uniform 
assimilation to a single project tending to Western liberal democracy.15 Thanks 
to Bayly’s work nineteenth-century liberalisms appear today as the answer to a 
series of questions and problems shared by those who in the world tried, even 
with different intellectual instruments, to reconcile in a new way authority and 
freedom, and to invoke reforms against or within old or new states or despotic 
empires, to simultaneously defend the rights of individuals and communities as 
well as, as suggested by the title of his book, “to recover ancient liberties”.
14 Cf. Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalization of Democratic Nationalism, 1830-1920, edited by 
C.A. Bayly and E. Biagini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
15 G. Sluga and T. Rowse, “Introduction” to “Forum: Global Liberalisms”, Modern Intellectual 
History, 12 (2015), no. 3: 523-528.
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Marco Meriggi
The Local and the Global:  
Bayly’s The Birth of the Modern World
The period 1780-1914 is conventionally considered by historiography as the 
long nineteenth century. This is also the temporal scenario which Bayly’s book 
spans: the long nineteenth century of the Industrial Revolution and of the great 
expansion of the market; that of the growth of the role of science in society and 
simultaneously of its capacity to dominate nature; that of secularization; finally, 
that of the diffusion and consolidation by the Napoleonic-Weberian bureaucratic 
state of such values  as citizenship on the one hand, and popular sovereignty (var-
iously shaped in a liberal or democratic sense) on the other.1 
Of course, this list could continue. The topics we have recalled are yet suf-
ficient to begin a critical path through the book—among the many written by 
Christopher Bayly—which has known the greatest resonance.2 Already his works 
on India had consecrated him as a historian tending to cross the specific bound-
aries of his own discipline and to practise with intelligence the technique of 
analogy—if not precisely a comparison—between the historical trajectories of 
the subcontinent and the West. These works have been, yet, read and debated 
almost exclusively within the field of  the so called area studies, although the 
1 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World. Global Connections and Comparisons, 1780-1914 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
2 For a detailed critical illustration of the content of the work we are considering, see J. Oster-
hammel, “Baylys Moderne,” Neue Politische Literatur, 50 (2005), no. 1: 7-17. Among the numer-
ous reviews of the work that appeared in Italy, see M. Meriggi, “Come nacque la modernità,” 
Il Mestiere di Storico, 1 (2009), no. 1: 52-54. In this regard, see also idem, “Storie mondiali 
dell’Ottocento,” Contemporanea, 13 (2010), no. 3: 591-597, which discusses both the book by 
Bayly and that by J. Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des XIX Jahrhun-
derts (Munich: Beck, 2009).
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critical dialogue which Bayly entertained during the 1980s and the 1990s with 
the authors of the Subaltern Studies group undoubtedly made him known also 
by a wider audience, namely a public not necessarily interested in the themes of 
Indian history, but rather in the methods and problems characteristic of post-co-
lonial studies.3 
Thanks to The Birth of the Modern World, many basic ideas which Bayly had 
formulated in his previous researches enjoyed a full-fledged treatment, in so far as 
the author tried to test their heuristic effectiveness on a global scale; a scale, howev-
er, that the book we discuss here has greatly contributed in recent years to make fa-
miliar to the historiographic community, and especially to its younger generation.4
Bayly’s ‘modern world’ is, actually, incomparably larger than the one pro-
posed by previous general histories of the long nineteenth century. It is a polycen-
tric world, whose profile doesn’t correspond only to the economic, political, sci-
entific agency of its traditional supposed emerging social subject, the Western 
bourgeoisie.5 
This polycentrism, which often surprises the ‘conventional’ reader, corre-
sponds to a lively and spiky dialectical tension between the global and the local 
moment. It is precisely the focus of this specific intertwining—one, and cer-
tainly not the only one, of the visual angles from which it is possible to follow 
the architecture of this book—that represents the thread of the considerations 
developed here.
What is the ‘global’ in Bayly’s reconstruction? Essentially, the dissemination 
on a planetary scale (but, in truth, Eurasian above all) of some factors that im-
posed on the human coexistence unifying trends to which the author attributes 
a modernizing value. Globalization therefore means at the same time growth and 
3 A reconstruction of the assumptions and results of the line of research taken by Bayly as a 
scholar of Indian history, can be read in D. Chakrabarty, “Reading (the) Late Chris Bayly: A 
Personal Tribute,” South Asian History and Culture, 7 (2016), no. 1: 1-6. Here, Chakrabarty 
sensibly mitigates the tones of the controversy that he had engaged in with Bayly between the 
1980s and the 1990s, as the Indian historian was on the front line of post-colonial critique, 
while the British was strongly identified with the ‘Cambridge approach’. Later, the distance 
between the two authors was considerably reduced.
4 On the theme now, in the context of a huge literature, see the clear synthesis written by S. 
Conrad, Storia globale. Una introduzione (Rome: Carocci, 2015; original German edition 2013).
5 See the famous Hobsbawm trilogy: E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution 1789-1848 (London: 
Abacus, 1962); idem, The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (London: Weidenfeld, 1975); idem, The Age 
of Empires: 1875-1914 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987).
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modernization, a universalization of techniques and binding internal normative 
definitions of the fields of knowledge and belief, a push towards the future and a 
distancing from the past.
These are all processes that can be easily analysed thinking of the simulta-
neous growth of the market and the state, but that—in order to be fully under-
stood—need also to be connected with another basic trend: the long nineteenth 
century also means, perhaps above all, the almost entire world’s domination by 
the West. This West was essentially Europe; a Europe that was, in its turn, above 
all the British Empire, according to a logical sequence that explains well, I be-
lieve, Bayly’s ‘conversion’ from the refined specialism of Indian history to the 
universalizing perspective of global history.
Now, if the global—which the author defines as an extension of the ambitions 
of the “European State [and of] its colonial offshoots”6 thanks to the “growing 
economic dominance of Western Europe and North America”7—performs in 
Bayly’s reconstruction the function of an expansive and modernizing vector, the 
local, instead, tends to play the role of an element under pressure and under ma-
nipulation, if not altogether in full retreat.
The local dimension, in Bayly’s book, means, for instance, corporeity, once 
free and now disciplined by the general adoption of Western clothing;8 or pov-
erty, highlighted by the “huge differentials of wealth, productivity, and life ex-
pectancy which had opened up between the West and the rest by 1900”;9 or, 
again, indigenism/nativism,10 naturalism and wildness.11 These were all features 
of living first attacked and then eventually put on display by colonial rule. They 
6 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 7.
7 Ibid., 2.
8 “In 1780, the most powerful men in the world were dressed in a large variety of different types 
of garments which ranged from Chinese mandarin robes, through French embroidered frock 
coats, to ritualized undress in the Pacific and parts of Africa”, whereas, “by 1914, a growing 
number of the most important men operating in public arenas wore western style clothes wher-
ever they lived. Chinese nationalists and the leaders of the new Japan dressed in the top hat and 
black morning coat” (ibid., 13). See also page 380, where the redingote jacket, alternating with 
the Prussian military uniform, is also worn by the Young Turks.
9 Ibid., 59.
10 “If the native peoples were so irremediably primitive, corrupt, or trapped at the level of the 
ancients, then the British, French, Americans, or Germans would have to bring them the bene-
fits of state, commerce, and freedom of trade” (ibid., 111).
11 “The sciences of living beings, natural history, and anthropology intervened to class native 
peoples and rare animals as specimens, and this afforded them a degree of protection [...]. As 
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were the remains of a defeated adversary, put on show in the global museums set 
up in the colonial metropolises, from London to Paris.12 At the same time, they 
were forms of manifestation of the ‘good’ ancient communitarianism, scrambled 
and transformed by the intrusive devices of modern statehood.
This modern statehood, however, was not the exclusive prerogative of the 
Western world and its dominant groups. True, the state was first “the European 
state alone”,13 but its global expansion gave rise to numerous phenomena of mi-
mesis and of fully-fledged metamorphosis. Like the European ones, in fact, cer-
tain non-European states, “notably the Ottoman Empire, the Chinese Empire, 
and Tokugawa Japan were forced to widen their scale of ambition”. On the other 
hand, “the leaders of these states had to adapt and modify the new ideologies. 
They had to trench into areas of society that had formerly been autonomous”.14
The advance of the global (and modernity) had, therefore, a Western engine, 
but its performers on a local scale show a more varied physiognomy which does 
not automatically correspond to that of the Europeans in action in the colonial 
scenario, the bearers of the supposed Kiplingian burden. Sometimes, in fact, 
the autochthonous territorial elite was actually the social subject, who put into 
practice the authoritarian mechanisms on which the unprecedented globalizing 
supremacy exerted by the West rested.
To the expansion of the Western macro-empire, which subjugates to its direct 
dominion much of the globe, corresponded, therefore, the attempt at survival of 
at least some of the great non-European empires of the past.
These were immense territorial complexes, each of which characterized by its 
own peculiar form of organization of society, whose features now tended to melt 
and give way to a Westernized style of government. Once the world was not only 
polycentric, but also polymorphic, despite the “family resemblances” between 
the many “old regimes” that flourished in Eurasia and in Western and Northern 
Africa before the late eighteenth century European expansion.15 This latter still 
gave some chance to polycentrism, but tended to homologize its features. Yet, 
having been embodied and developed by extra-European contexts, the Western 
‘living fossils’, such peoples surely needed conservation as much as the physical objects and 
natural history specimens preserved in museums” (ibid., 447).
12 Ibid., 315, 370, 447.
13 Ibid., 267.
14 Ibid., 7.
15 Ibid., 30.
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model knew a variety of transformations. The moment it met the local worlds, 
the global produced in fact a genealogy of globalized places that were distinct 
from each other.
Therefore, globalization did not—and still does not—simply and necessarily 
mean the fulfilment of a generalized imitation process. The bourgeois with the 
turban—the subject of a book written by Margrit Pernau a few years after Bayly’s 
Birth of the Modern World, and certainly at least partially inspired to the perspec-
tive developed by Bayly himself16—is, for instance, an emblematic representation 
of this entanglement between Western modelling and a variety of local contexts. 
Through their mutual encounter, the local changes the global.
Is yet the local, in its double figuration of resistance and metamorphosis, all 
located in areas of the planet other than the West? In Bayly’s reconstruction, it 
is certainly largely prevalent there and this represents, in my opinion, one of the 
problematic aspects of the world reconstructed by the British historian.
There are, in fact, sporadic references in the book—for instance, those to 
“Christ stopped at Eboli”, or to the romantic rediscovery of Heimat in post-Na-
poleonic Germany— which allow us to realize that the ‘South’ of the world was, 
indeed, multiple. This becomes evident also through some other themes analysed 
in Bayly’s narrative; for example, handicraft, or the mythical pre-industrial and 
local past, nostalgically considered as a good old time to place in opposition to 
the humiliating present, marked by the generalization of factory work.17 Further, 
these Souths were sometimes located near the places where the command engine 
of the process of globalization and modernization was at work.
On the other hand, the turning point that gave birth to the long nineteenth 
century was primarily due precisely to the long lasting process of transformation 
of the polycentric fabric of the old European regime by the modernizing and 
levelling tendencies deployed by capitalism and statehood.
16 M. Pernau, Bürger mit Turban. Muslime in Delhi im 19. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck und Ruprecht, 2008).
17 “Where socialists and even conservative historians once saw the industrial worker as in the 
vanguard of political change, modern historians have argued that the rebellions of 1848 and 
the Paris Commune were really caused by dispossessed old-style artisans” (ibid., 171). Further, 
“Thinkers and activists on the left of British politics before the 1890s tended to look back to an 
idealized era of guild-like work and labor, in which the artisan and the field-worker owned his 
tools and his plot of land” (ibid., 310).
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In truth, we have to consider a contrasted and longstanding open-ended pro-
cess, as Arno Mayer suggested some decades ago in an important study. Bayly 
actually evokes it incidentally, but this doesn’t seem to represent a truly signif-
icant reference in his reconstruction, where resistances—both traditional and 
modern—to globalization arising in the metropolitan territories play a decidedly 
accessory role.
Thus, we find ourselves faced with a problem of organization of the hierarchi-
cal structure of the narrative of global history that, as Tagliaferri has observed, 
seems to emerge even in more recent works. An example is given by the fifth 
volume of the History of the World, recently translated into Italian, where “the 
metropolitan imperial project [...] continues to be painted as something intrin-
sically monolithic and unproblematic [whereas it is] almost continuously shaped 
and reformed also by negotiations and conflicts among a multitude of subjects 
operating in the centres of the imperial systems, and able to leave their ‘imprint’ 
no less than the colonial subjects”.18 
Likewise, in Bayly’s study, reactivity—in the form of both rebellion and adap-
tation—to the hegemonic tendencies deployed by nineteenth century globalism 
is depicted, in essence, as an almost exclusive problem of non-European local 
worlds. It seems to me that, in order to give depth to his polycentric narrative, 
Bayly mostly tends to highlight these latter at the expense of the metropolitan 
societies.
Clearly, the world of the Westernizing territorial elites fascinates Bayly more 
than the world of subalterns.19 Such a predilection leads him to formulate anoth-
er of the great ideas of his book: that concerning the simultaneous existence, in 
many late eighteenth century societies moving towards globalization, of ‘moral 
communities’ animated by “ideas not dissimilar to European traditions of civic 
republicanism”. On this ground, during the long nineteenth century, these mor-
18 T. Tagliaferri, contribution to “Connessioni globali e storia transnazionale,” edited by M. De 
Giuseppe and A. Roccucci, Il mestiere di storico, 7 (2016), no. 2: 57-60, 60.
19 Here again, on a different territorial scale, one can find some important traces of the studies 
about Indian nationalism developed in the past by the author, which gave rise to a heated con-
troversy between him and Partha Chatterjee. See C.A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South 
Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1998); P. Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histo-
ries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). We will analytically discuss the essential 
issues of this controversy shortly.
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al communities tended to mix “elements from modern Western radicalism and 
theories of human rights with claims to defend ancient traditions of community 
and the honour of the land from the rising tide of global commercialization”.20
This idea of the existence of an eighteenth-nineteenth century public opinion, 
on the one hand global but on the other locally variegated, and inspired by a sort 
of universal crypto-republicanism, nurtured by the most heterogeneous cultural 
traditions, is a great one, indeed, but not entirely persuasive. Yet it is perhaps the 
idea that best illustrates Bayly’s effort to insert radically non-Eurocentric points 
of view in his narrative. For this reason, it is advisable to review analytically the 
examples to which he resorts, and the reasoning structure he derives from them.
These are examples that lead us, undoubtedly, into places and sites very dis-
tant from those in which we usually locate the process of genesis of eighteenth 
century public opinion, the latter essentially seen as an outcome and renewal of 
the tradition of civic republicanism characteristic (as suggested by Pocock in The 
Machiavellian Moment) of the history of the West. Here is what Bayly observes:
Indeed, ideas not dissimilar to European traditions of civic republicanism existed in 
many world societies. Anthropologists, for example, have shown how pre-colonial 
Africans used ideologies of good kingship to justify the overthrow of wicked and inef-
fectual rulers. John Peel has demonstrated this particularly effectively in the case of the 
West African Yoruba, a people who recorded their struggles to maintain a harmonious 
society and wise kingship through bardic myths which stressed the role of the hono-
rable householder. Wise counsel, care for the toiler, and the desire to be ruled by vir-
tuous patriarchs were, quite understandably, the social goods sought by intellectuals in 
all agrarian and early commercial societies before industrialization. In contrast, what 
was perceived as corruption, although it was understood differently in the various tra-
ditions, seems to have been a cause for dissent and even revolt almost universally.21 
From the West Africa of the Yoruba we then move on to Japan, where we get 
to know Ogyū Sorai, “probably the most influential thinker of eighteenth-cen-
tury Japan”, who considered the exercise of criticism “as a way of safeguarding 
the regime”, and therefore spent his life attacking “samurai corruption and mer-
chant violations of the moral economy”, as well as familiarizing some of his 
20 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 288.
21 Ibid.
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countrymen with an attitude of contestation of the constituted power that in 
the following century fed “dissidence against the Tokugawa dynasty”, acting as a 
prerequisite for the “Japanese ‘revolution’ and ‘renaissance’”.22
If, according to Bayly, a local tradition that insisted on the “ethnic myth of 
divine monarchy and good rulership” gave life in Japan to a deep renewal of 
the relations between political power and society, in Hindu and Muslim India, 
instead, “the elite and popular understandings of corruption took on a more 
immediate, bodily sense through the notions of purity and pollution”. These 
notions offered the basic framework for Indian patriotism in the colonial era.23
Yet, so far, as Bayly himself states, “the connection between Euro-Ameri-
can civic republicanism and patriotic communitarianism elsewhere” would be 
“merely implicit”. On the other hand, to the British historian, the case of the 
Muslim world seems different. There, in fact, the tradition of criticism of power 
“harked back to the medieval Arab and Persian moralists’ attempts to reconcile 
Aristotle’s civic morality with the Prophet’s norms of the godly life”. Here, one 
could consequently catch a glimpse of “a direct, if distant, connection between 
the archaic European traditions of civic republicanism and the political ethics 
of an extra-European society”, since “Aristotle was common to both civiliza-
tions”.24 On the other hand, “some Islamic liberals in nineteenth-century Egypt 
appealed to the early days of the Prophet’s reign in Medina, which they pictured 
as a sort of representative government”.25
Now, it seems to me that this method of argumentation tends to equalize 
spatially and temporally the peculiar local modalities of expression of the eight-
eenth century moral communities; that is, their being what Eurocentric histori-
ography, thinking mostly of Europe and America, usually calls public opinion, 
yet recognizing, at the same time, in this latter something strictly and exclusively 
connected to the (Western) enlightenment and its characteristic values  in terms 
of promotion of rights.
In articulating his position on this topic, Bayly declares that he is drawing on 
those scholars who, in the history of ideas, since the 1960s have “partly changed 
their views”, distancing themselves from a previous largely shared opinion, tend-
22 Ibid., 288-289.
23 Ibid., 289.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 290.
Marco Meriggi, The Local and the Global: Bayly’s The Birth of the Modern World
129
ing to highlight instead the radical difference of the eighteenth century ways of 
critical interaction with public power from those preceding them. In this new 
perspective, “much of the critical thought of the revolutionary age” could be 
considered, according to Bayly, as “the last flowering of a much earlier political 
tradition”.26 It is on the basis of this assumption that it becomes feasible for Bayly 
to suggest the existence of a close proximity between the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries’ developments of the public spheres in various parts of the globe, 
each starting from pre-existing local traditions.
This proximity goes so far as to induce the author to affirm that “the fabled 
‘republic of letters’ of eighteenth-century Europe”—the classic public sphere de-
picted by Jürgen Habermas—was in reality “analogous elsewhere”,27 and espe-
cially to the one of East Asia, whose reforming intellectuals were also between 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries “grappling with their own forms of 
modernity no less rigorously than the freemasons and philosophes of Western 
Eurasia”.28 According to Bayly, “behind Confucian ‘revivals’ of knowledge or 
Islamic ‘doctrinal controversies’” of that era, one could so “discern rulers and 
intellectuals attempting to grapple with the problems of organizing society and 
human experience” through the exercise of a radical critical attitude, which is 
therefore not ultimately to be regarded as a Western exclusive.29 
Let us try to gather together this argumentative sequence. On the one hand, 
the author postulates the existence, under every sky and in every time, of moral 
communities wishing to pursue the goal of good government and inclined to of-
fer (each according to their own cultural peculiarity) their advisory contribution 
to the holders of the public power for the purpose of its realization, since these 
latter, also everywhere at all times, were liable to be contaminated by corruption 
and to abandon the main road of virtue. On the other hand, he suggests the 
sharing of a minimum common denominator (Aristotle)  by at least some of these 
moral communities (namely, the Western and the Islamic). Finally, he assumes a 
strong continuity between the timeless tradition of the critical moral community 
as such and the republics of letters of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
26 Ibid., 286.
27 Ibid., 78.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 79.
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The impression, however, is that here, in the worthy effort to overcome the 
conceptual barriers of Eurocentrism, Bayly has lost sight of an important thread. 
True, of course, the aspiration to good governance and to the ‘good advice’ that 
various moral communities can provide to the rulers can be found in every time 
and in every place. Yet such a finding appears to be barely significant in many 
ways, because it is not circumstantial enough. In other words, the author runs 
the risk of becoming undefined, since, evoking that aspiration, reference is made 
to contents and methods of pursuing them that are often so different as to be, 
in fact, irreconcilable. Although it is plausible to maintain that, until the end of 
the eighteenth century, many societies of the world were governed by ancient 
constitutions which, despite the diversity of their forms, were characterised by 
significant features of mutual familiarity,30 the Atlantic revolutions in the West 
played the role, in fact, of a moment of strong separation from both that world 
and that tradition; a world and a tradition which suddenly became past.
In the decades during which the American Revolution, the French Revo-
lution, and later those of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies of Central and 
South America took place, in various other places on the globe many other major 
political upheavals broke out; and certainly this happened thanks to an active 
contribution by the respective moral communities.31 Even in Mughal India, in 
Safavid Persia, in the Ottoman and in the Chinese Empires, contemporaries 
described those agitations, some of which preceded the ‘Atlantic revolutions’, 
with the term ‘revolution’. Asian revolutions, however, unlike the Western, did 
not give rise to an attempt to build up a political community without a king or, 
in any case, grounded on popular sovereignty: their goal was rather to replace a 
sovereign who was considered bad with a better one.
The fact is that, in spite of a—so to say—perennial ‘crypto-republicanism’, 
which—according to Bayly—was universally widespread from the African Yoru-
ba, to Japan, to India, to China, to the Islamic empires (namely, the places he 
evokes to exemplify his theory about the role of moral communities or ethical 
communities in the exercise of ‘public criticism’), the idea of replacing the mon-
30 This was, for example, even then, the opinion of Edmund Burke. See R. Travers, Ideology and 
Empire in Eighteenth-Century India. The British in Bengal (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), but also M. Meriggi, “Costituzioni antiche e narrazioni orientaliste. Dal Sette 
all’Ottocento,” Storica, 15 (2009), nos. 43-45: 209-255.
31 See the geographical map that illustrates them in Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 84-
85.
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archy with an institution like the republic had no luck outside a specific place: 
the ‘Atlantic’ world, in which a new, modern West, no longer limited to Europe 
alone, began to take shape. Many of the great rebellions that characterised Asia 
during the decades we are considering aimed not, in fact, at the introduction of 
a new system of law, but rather at the restoration of old customary rights which 
the sovereigns of the time were trying once again to disregard, as they had almost 
always done in the past. As the Ottoman poet Sheyh Galib—who lived between 
1757 and 1799, very turbulent five decades even for the empire in which he spent 
his existence—wrote: 
The sagas of kings are but a painted rose
nothing more
on a fragile Chinese cup,
made for the ruler’s hand
not my own.32
The late eighteenth century was a specific time during which Western cit-
izenship began a process of radical differentiation from the rest of the world, 
grasping with determination that cup that elsewhere remained in the hands of 
the sovereigns. On the other hand, it was the time when the ‘birth of the mod-
ern world’ took place. In addition to the processes mentioned at the beginning 
of the text, this ‘birth’ manifested itself in phenomena and values  such as the 
emergence of liberal individualism, of popular sovereignty and of the rights of 
citizenship connected to both.
These were all factors that entailed a drastic break with the modes of ex-
pression of the public sphere that were characteristic of the ubiquitous world of 
ancient constitutions. Qualifying itself as the queen of the world, modern public 
opinion exceeded the usual limits of the traditional ancient regime moral com-
munities, since it claimed a role that was no longer that of providing good advice 
to a higher authority, but rather of being the holder of the government of things 
as such.
32 Quoted in D. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam, “Introduction,” in The Age of Revolution 
in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, edited by D. Armitage and S. Subrahmanyam (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), xxviii.
From the History of the Empire to World History
132
However, in order to find the roots in Bayly’s thought of the interpretative 
key on which we have just now focused—that is, the strong emphasis on the role 
universally played by local moral communities —it is necessary at this point to 
take a step backwards. Let’s now combine, for this purpose, the reading of The 
Birth of the Modern World with that of one of the works written during the Indi-
an phase of Bayly’s scientific path.
It is there, in relation to a specific country and cultural area, that we meet for 
the first time the theme of non-European traditions of good governance, which 
will later assume such a crucial role in some chapters (particularly the second, the 
third and the eighth) of the 2004 book, whose treatment of the entanglements 
between global and local we are trying to highlight.
This work is dedicated to the origins of Indian nationalism in the nineteenth 
century,33 and, as mentioned earlier, is nourished by a strong critical stance 
against theories about its derivative nature (that is, directed externally by the 
West) suggested by some authors belonging to the Subaltern Studies group, in 
particular Ashis Nandy and Partha Chatterjee. Here Bayly states that, despite the 
undeniable Western influences, “the particularities of Indian nationalism have to 
be understood in the context of Indian forms of social organization and ideolo-
gies of good governance that pre-date the full western impact”.34 Moreover, he 
goes on to declare that “Historians of modern India are apparently unable to see 
any political forms between those of decentralized, traditional society and mass, 
‘modern’ nationalism, other than the experience of the colonial rule”.35
Now, that form “between” the decentralized local communities, hermetically 
closed to the outside world, and the universalistic and supra-local systems of ag-
gregation typical of modern nationalism, would be, according to Bayly, precisely 
the moral community, or ethical community,36 aimed at pursuing an ideal of 
good governance,37 whose global agency we already met by reading The Birth of 
the Modern World.
According to the author, this moral community gave expression to a tradi-
tional patriotism in which one can identify the origins of the Indian national 
33 Bayly, Origins of Nationality.
34 Ibid., vii.
35 Ibid., 2.
36 In this study, Bayly sometimes defines it as a “community of sensibility” (ibid., 40).
37 Or even the exercise of a “right counsel” by the society for the purpose of implementing a 
“good administration” (ibid., 71).
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nineteenth and twentieth century ideology. This ideology would therefore not 
be—as the scholars gathered around Subaltern Studies maintain—a mere imita-
tive derivation of the Western model, introduced in the subcontinent following 
the British colonial occupation.
If one agrees with the Subaltern Studies theory—Bayly concludes—one ends 
up paradoxically legitimizing the imperialist and Eurocentric interpretations ac-
cording to which, on the one hand, the pre-colonial social order of the subconti-
nent was completely antipathetic to the spirit of the Western modern state (and 
politics), and, on the other hand, found its core in decentralized local commu-
nities, rather than “in active political sentiments or in theories of government”. 
This would lead to the denial of any “agency [of the Indians] in their own histo-
ry”, and to the acceptance of an interpretation according to which “Europe was 
the only moving force in the world history, sweeping away Asian and African 
despotisms and their primitive societies”.38
We will not follow the further argumentations—in my opinion, even in this 
case, not always convincing and fully supported by evidence—developed by the 
author in this text to give substance to his thesis. However, we note that the 
underlying argument that is placed at the centre of this thesis has been criticised 
and variously rejected by an array of authors both before and after the publica-
tion of the volume in question, and that it is one of the most burning and sensi-
tive issues of the whole debate today fuelled by post-colonial studies.
Long before the authors belonging to the Subaltern Studies group, already 
Rabindranath Tagore theorized a radical ‘otherness’ to the typical Western po-
litical forms (not only the state, but also, implicitly, the crypto-republicanism 
mentioned above) of what he defined as India’s “nature”. At the same time, he 
claimed for the local community and its values the emblematic function of en-
suring social cohesion and primary political aggregation in the subcontinent.39 
The same interpretation was proposed in the 1960s by Louis Dumont, who pro-
vided a much rawer (but substantially similar) portrait of the holistic myth of the 
Indian local community, which was yet later harshly disputed.40 
38 Ibid., 2-3.
39 R. Tagore, “Società e Stato,” in Rabindranath Tagore, La civiltà occidentale e l’India (Turin: 
Bollati Boringhieri, 1991), 23-40. Tagore’s essay was written in 1904.
40 L. Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus. Il sistema delle caste e le sue implicazioni (Milan: Adelphi, 
1991). A sharp critique of Dumont’s theses is that by R. Inden, Imagining India (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999).
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Clearly culturally and ideologically far from Dumont, the Subaltern Studies 
group, in turn, has been claiming the centrality of the spiritual (here synony-
mous with autochthonous) dimension in the public life in India, supporting the 
thesis of the derivative (and contaminated) nature of the materialistic national-
ism displayed by the elite during the colonial era. This led the group to argue in 
favour of a ‘provincialization’ of Europe,41 and at the same time of the radical 
irreducibility of the Indian corporate structure to Western political models. The 
result of this interpretation was the rejection of any universalizing (and therefore 
globalizing) theory. 
By proposing this point of view, the Subaltern Studies group has revived the 
theme of the extreme autonomy of the local, which contraddicts not only the 
idea of  the supposed all-pervasive connectivity of the global, but also the idea of 
the similarity of cultures suggested by Bayly through the image of moral com-
munities simultaneously practicing their counselling function in various parts of 
the world.
However, it must be said that Bayly, in turn, although strongly criticized by 
those accusing him of privileging the world of the colonized and Westernized 
elites and of completely neglecting the spiritualizing Indian popular values rep-
resented by home and the community,42 was certainly in good company in his 
effort to refuse both the theory of the incommensurability between different cul-
tures and the basic idea of localist essentialism. Like Bayly even such authors as 
Amartya Sen43 and Sanjay Subrahmanyam,44 maintaining a distance from the 
universalistic prejudices of the Eurocentric matrix, have shaped in fact through a 
similar effort good conceptual tools for enhancing the peculiarities of the Indian 
civilization and of its interpretation of history and politics.
41 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializzare l’Europa (Rome: Meltemi, 2004).
42 On this aspect, see primarily Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments, 128-159.
43 A. Sen, The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity (New 
York: Picador, 2005). In Italian, A. Sen, La democrazia degli altri. Perché la libertà non è un’ in-
venzione dell’Occidente (Milan: Mondadori, 2004).
44 S. Subrahmanyam, Mondi connessi. La storia oltre l’Eurocentrismo (Secoli XVI-XVIII) (Rome: 
Carocci, 2014), a collection of essays written in previous years and published in various editorial 
locations; also idem, Alle origini della storia globale (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2016.) On 
Subrahmanyam, in addition to the introductions by Giuseppe Marcocci and Adriano Prosperi 
to the two volumes mentioned, see S. Pellò and M. Meriggi, “A Proposito di Mondi connessi di 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam,” Quaderni Storici, 50 (2015), no. 2: 567-584.
Marco Meriggi, The Local and the Global: Bayly’s The Birth of the Modern World
135
Let us recap. We have Western expansion on a global scale on the one hand 
and, on the other, various assimilations, reactions and adaptations by the cultures 
and by the forms of social and political organization disseminated in other parts 
of the world. Sometimes all this happened through dialogue (a dialogue mostly 
imposed and therefore mandatory), with the pressures to modernize urged by 
European colonialism and its related regulations and classification logic; some-
times, instead, it happened through the valorisation of a heritage of habits and 
endogenous ideals capable of renewing themselves and of supporting trajectories 
of modernization. While the dialectic between global and local, according to 
Bayly, took mostly place between these two polarities, although under the pre-
dominance of Western agency,45 there is a specific field in which things seem to 
have taken a different turn. This is that of religion: in the age of globalization, 
the Western religion, Christianity, faced and still faces difficulties in advancing.
In fact, every religion of the world in this period experienced a process of 
standardization and internal hierarchization, not unlike what happened in secu-
lar institutions and in the market, the two scenarios from which we started. How-
ever, in the course of this process of formalization of “homogeneous religions” 
characterized by a previously unknown degree of “uniformity of doctrine”,46 as 
well as by the presence of more solid centres of authority, Christianity was not 
the only colonizing religion.47 In spite of the concomitant Western colonization, 
and therefore of the reduction to the rank of local of most of the territories in 
which it was practised, the new nineteenth-century Islam, now standardized, 
and in its own way canonized through the marginalization of its spiritual pe-
ripheries, was the protagonist of a new expansion. It gained space and territories, 
imposing itself—obviously completely outside any Western agency—among the 
main vectors of globalization.
Similar processes of normative tightening and the reduction of the local spe-
cificities of cults took place for other forms of religiosity, such as Hinduism, 
45 Further on this subject, and in a long-term perspective, see the monumental study by W. 
Reinhard, Die Unterwerfung der Welt: Globalgeschichte der europäischen Expansion 1415-2015 
(Munich: Beck, 2016), an extensive and updated review of the four volumes published about 
thirty years ago by the author on the topic of European expansion. In Italian, see also Storia 
del mondo, vol. 3, Imperi e Oceani 1350-1750, edited by W. Reinhard (Turin: Einaudi, 2016), 
which, however, stops at a time earlier than that analysed by Bayly.
46 Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 343.
47 Ibid., 333.
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although, in this case—unlike Christianity and Islam—in the absence of an 
expansion outside the territorial areas in which it was already practised.48 
In this specific field, therefore, the process of expansion of the global and its 
simultaneous conquest of the local were decidedly more varied and polycentric 
than in the context of power politics and modes of government, since the West-
ern religion was not - and still isn’t - the only one capable of exercising successful 
levelling pressures and of gaining new souls for its spiritual army. 
48 On the topic, an interesting work is that of M. Margotti, Religioni e secolarizzazioni. Ebrai-
smo, cristianesimo e islam nel mondo globale (Turin: Rosenberg & Sellier, 2012).
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Laura Di Fiore
The Origins of Indian Nationalism
In his world history of the long nineteenth century, Christopher Bayly fo-
cused in particular on the theme of nation and nationalism, which he analysed 
from a global perspective. In the dense pages of The Birth of the Modern World, 
he explicitly defines the nationalism that developed in the second half of the 
nineteenth century as “a global phenomenon” that “emerged contemporaneously 
in large parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas” as well as in Europe.1 At vari-
ance with diffusionist interpretations, Bayly did not therefore see nationalism as 
an exclusively European invention, developing on the Old Continent and later 
exported via colonial domination to the rest of the world. The second half of the 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of nationalist movements in Egypt, India 
and Japan that were no less lively and developed than those affecting Germany 
and Italy at the same time. In reality, the crisis of the old order, identified as the 
origin of the global rise in nationalism, did not concern Europe alone, which 
makes it possible to reconstruct a meaningful chronology at the global level. Two 
groups of world crises (1780-1815 and 1848-1865) acted as a driving force and 
accelerator in the development of “incipient national identities”2 outside Europe 
that drew on specific local cultural and religious systems, as well as feelings of 
belonging and concepts of land and people proper to the various scenarios in 
question. Thus, in the construction of new national identities, pre-existing cul-
tural materials and identities were recovered and reworked within the framework 
of the global rise of nationalism. 
1 C.A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914. Global Connections and Comparisons 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 199.
2 Ibid., 205.
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The origin of this interpretation, made known mainly thanks to the reso-
nance of The Birth of the Modern World, needs to be sought in Bayly’s works on 
India, an area in which he specialized from his student days at Oxford at a time 
when—as he himself was keen to recall—modern history meant that of the 
French and German elites.3 The desire to move beyond these narrow horizons 
was certainly decisive for his encounter with Indian, and later global, history. As 
far as the theme of nationalism and nation building in particular is concerned, 
a reading of some of Bayly’s works on the Indian scenario highlights, on the one 
hand, the empirical foundations underlying his interpretation of these questions 
and, on the other, their importance in contemporary historiographic debate and 
today’s global history. 
A particularly important volume from this point of view is a collection of 
essays, Origins of Nationality in South Asia, that came out in 1998, including 
Bayly’s unpublished Radhakrishnan Lectures, held at Oxford in 1996, aiming 
to shed new light on Indian nationalism in the late pre-colonial period and dur-
ing English domination.4 From the opening chapters of the book, Bayly dis-
tanced himself from modernist interpretations of Indian nationalism, which, 
in the wake of the claims of scholars such as Ranajit Guha, Ashis Nandy, and 
Partha Chatterjee,5 was deemed “illegitimate” because of its “derivative” na-
ture.6 According to this reading, despite its origins in rebellion against colo-
nial domination, the Indian nation state, slavishly borrowed from the Western 
model, was the product of a movement firmly tied to a wholly Western discourse 
and an imperialist framework. Bayly strongly criticized such hypotheses for the 
fundamental reason that they tend to deny the Indian people an original “agen-
cy” “in their own history”, relegating them to the rank of a set of “second-class 
nationalists” .7 Without denying that both the organization and the nationalist 
ideology of modern India were in many ways shaped, to some extent consciously, 
3 C.A. Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South Asia. Patriotism and Ethical Government in the 
Making of Modern India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 310.
4 This contribution focuses on these four unpublished essays that constitute, in Bayly’s own 
words, “the heart of the book” (ibid., v).
5 A. Nandy, The Intimate Enemy. Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (New Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press, 1983); R. Guha, A Disciplinary Aspect of Indian Nationalism (Santa Cruz, 
CA: University of California, 1991); P. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: 
A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
6 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, vi. 
7 Ibid., 3.
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by the Western model, Bayly underlines the specificity of Indian nationalism, 
characterized by two essential features: its doctrinal system and its models of 
social relations and communication, dating back to an era prior to the impact of 
the West.8 
Before analysing these two elements as reconstructed by Bayly, it is necessary 
to clarify that his thesis in no way embraces a teleological perspective inclined to 
propose some sort of epic of original Indian nationalism where the construction 
of the nation state would represent its inevitable triumph. Nor does reference to 
characteristics at times dating back to, and indigenous to, native nationalism 
aims to convey a primordialist position laying claim to an authentic (and ahistor-
ical) essence of ‘Indianness’, since, as will be seen, the pre-existing doctrinal and 
institutional matter, merged and re-worked within the nationalist movement, 
was in turn modified within the framework of colonial domination. 
The first of the two specific features of Indian nationalism identified by Bayly 
concerns the ideological plane and, in particular, the so-called “Old Patriotisms” 
that indicate “the sense of loyalty to place and institutions which bound some In-
dians, even in the immediate pre-colonial period, to their regional homelands”.9 
This is a form of patriotism not unknown to European history: rather than ex-
pressing the meaning more closely associated with the modern nation state and 
the principle of sovereignty of the people, it actually denoted a form of ancient 
loyalty to communities and political and religious institutions.10 Through this 
combination, Bayly convincingly demonstrates the reconcilability of a compar-
ative strategy with a global historical perspective.11 In reality, it is a question of 
comparing the reaction of two human macro-groups to changes that historians 
recognize as similar and at the same time connected. If it is true that, start-
ing from the seventeenth century, European theorists and statesmen developed 
a universalizing system of doctrines of good governance, marking the passage 
8 Ibid., vii.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 4-8.
11 S. Curtis Comstock, “Incorporating Comparison in the Rift: Making Use of Cross-Place 
Events and Histories in Moments of World Historical Change,” in Beyond Methodological 
Nationalism: Social Science Research Methodologies in Transition, edited by A. Amelina, D.D. 
Nergiz, T. Faist, and N. Glick Schiller (London: Routledge, 2012), 176-197; P. Parthasarathi, 
“Comparison in Global History,” in Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the 21st 
Century, edited by M. Berg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69-82.
From the History of the Empire to World History
140
from “traditional” to “rational” patriotism, a similar scheme can be identified 
in the pre-colonial Indian context.12 Specifically, a peculiar feature of the first 
type of patriotism consisted in the identitary value attributed to the concepts of 
‘land’ and ‘people’, as emerges from the Indian lexicon and literature. Rational 
patriotism, on the other hand, distinguished itself—as it did in Europe in the 
early modern age—by the combination of elements proper to the sciences and 
natural philosophy with doctrines of good governance in treatises on political 
ethics. A just government first of all had to balance the different types of peo-
ple and organizations in a given territory, conceived as a set of complementary 
elements of bio-moral substance. Although this ethical literature dated back to 
Abul Fazl, Minister of the Emperor Akbar, it was further developed within the 
post-Mughal states, and some of its features continued to characterize Indian 
political discourse in the nineteenth century. These principles, elaborated at the 
theoretical level, also permeated popular discourse. Moreover, despite the theo-
retical differences, ideas of good governance characterized both the Hindu and 
Muslim ethical systems and proved to be largely congruent in practical terms.
Significantly, Bayly compared this conception of the balance of the different 
moods of the political body, as well as the different castes and communities, to 
the ancient constitutions of Western Europe, based mainly on forms of negotia-
tion between rulers and holders of different corporate, class-driven and territorial 
interests. The definition of Oriental despotism as “myth”,13 given the Indian rul-
ers’ practice of striking a balance and bargaining with the interests represented in 
the panchayats, or traditional local councils, opens up an original perspective for 
comparison between European and Asian macro-regions regarding institution-
al forms. This approach is particularly significant in view of the contemporary 
historiographical rethinking of ‘the state’ in European history. In the wake of 
interpretations that limit the existence of the ‘modern’ state to the time frame 
between the late eighteenth century and the third quarter of the twentieth, some 
recent studies have highlighted a number of similarities between Europe and 
Asia, rejecting the notion of “oriental despotism” and reconstructing “the image 
of a modern age in Eurasia that, despite the undoubted differentiations between 
its components, remained substantially impermeable to the ‘despotic’ primacy 
of administration that the late-eighteenth century revolutionary turning point 
12 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 11-19.
13 Ibid., 18.
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would make tangible first in Europe, then in the rest of the world that had fallen 
under the rule of one of its powers”.14 Prior to this change, therefore, balance 
and negotiation practices between different social and territorial interests would 
appear to have brought Europe and Asia much closer than interpretations based 
on the ambiguous concept of ‘despotism’ had suggested.
Similarly, a sense of territoriality contributed to the definition of ‘rational’ 
Indian patriotism and, contrary to frequent claims, was far from absent in the 
Indian scenario and very strong among both nobles and commoners. Certainly, 
rather than being seen as an economic resource marked out by rigid political 
boundaries, the land was considered a heritage to be protected, as it included 
spirits and substances incorporated by individuals. In any case, the concept of 
political boundary was well understood by the rulers and the Indian people, 
although it was evoked only in moments of need, while a sense of territorial 
belonging was far from extraneous to the development of local patriotic feeling. 
These reflections prove particularly interesting in the light of recent questioning 
of the concepts of ‘territory’ and ‘border’ as specifically Western ideas transferred 
beyond Europe through colonial domination. Not only were various ideas of 
territoriality and border present in non-European cultures,15 but in Europe itself 
the existence of a linear political boundary as an exclusive expression of territorial 
limits can be ascribed only to the nineteenth century within the framework of a 
complex territoriality less rigid than is traditionally presented.16 
Nor did a land-related feeling of belonging exist only on the local scale. At 
variance with the historian J.R. Seeley, who denied that Indians had any sense of 
14 M. Meriggi, “Le istituzioni asiatiche in età moderna,” in Storia delle istituzioni politiche. 
Dall’antico regime all’era globale, edited by M. Meriggi and L. Tedoldi (Rome: Carocci, 2014), 
57; idem, “Costituzioni antiche e narrazioni orientalistiche. Dal Sette all’Ottocento,” in Storica, 
15 (2009), nos. 43-45: 209-255.
15 Cf. I. Surun, “Une souveraineté à l’encre sympathique? Souveraineté autochtone et appro-
priations territoriales dans les traités franco-africains au XIXe siècle”, Annales. Histoire, Sciences 
Sociales, 69 (2014), no. 2, Special Issue, Souveraineté et territoire (XIXe-XXe siècle): 313-348; on 
the issue of borders, see P. Valsecchi, “La frontiera come storia. Politiche dell’appartenenza sul 
confine Ghana-Costa d’Avorio,” Il Politico, 75 (2010): 101-117; G. Casentini, “Il confine come 
agente di costruzione della rappresentanza politica: il caso di Ghana e Togo settentrionali,” Il 
Politico, 75 (2010), no. 3: 118-135.
16 L. Di Fiore, “The Production of Borders in Nineteenth-Century Europe. Between Insti-
tutional Boundaries and Transnational Practices of Space,” European Review of History/Revue 
Européenne d’Histoire, 4 (2017), no. 1: 36-57. 
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identity beyond the regional, Bayly highlights the existence of a broader sense of 
identity on the subcontinent17 dating back to the imperial patriotism promoted 
by Emperor Akbar and characterized by a specific Indian identity within the 
broader Islamic umma. The symbolic value of this Hindustan, understood as a 
cultural kingdom shared by Hindus and Muslims, seems to have survived de-
spite the emergence of smaller regional homelands related to the decentralization 
and decline of the Mughal empire. And again, in the eighteenth century, the 
sense of identity of an ‘all India’, seen as a projection of the country onto a larger 
scale, continued to coexist alongside other horizons of identification and other 
loyalties, not least those of religious origin. 
In this regard, Bayly argues that by that time the differences between Hindus 
and Muslims had already become significant on the subcontinent, even if they 
were not of the same nature as in colonial times. If, in reality, the distinction be-
tween the two religions in comparison with other dividing lines connected with 
different rituals and forms of worship was not prevailing until the seventeenth 
century and part of the eighteenth century, it took on new meaning during the 
eighteenth century. In this way, Bayly questions the idea of communalism as a 
mere product of colonialism. While recognizing that communalism, in terms 
of the “transformation of religious ties into active and mutually hostile pseu-
do-ethnicity”, was developed under colonial domination, he argues that it in fact 
consisted of antagonisms, polemics and pre-existing aspirations.18
More generally speaking, the idea of the coexistence of different forms of be-
longing in the subcontinent opens up interesting scenarios in the light of twentieth 
century debates on the possibility of recognizing the status of British India as a do-
minion. This guaranteed the colonies with a white population a different degree of 
autonomy from their homeland, undergoing a decisive evolution between 1917 and 
1931, albeit within the broader institutional framework of the British Empire.19 In 
17 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 36-62.
18 Ibid., 46.
19 J. Darwin, A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics, in The Oxford 
History of the British Empire, 5 vols., Editor-in-chief W.R. Louis (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998-1999), vol. 4, The Twentieth Century, edited by J.M. Brown and W.R. Louis, 64-87; 
T. Tagliaferri, La repubblica dell’umanità. Fonti culturali e religiose dell’universalismo imperiale 
britannico (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2012); L. Lloyd, “Loosening the Apron Strings. The 
Dominions and Britain in the Interwar Years,” The Round Table. The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, 92 (2003), no. 369: 279-303; W.D. McIntyre, “Clio and Britannia’s Lost 
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any case, as has been ably pointed out,20 the tendency to reconcile forms of political 
identity with belonging to a broader horizon of identification was a characteristic of 
British nationality itself, the expression of a political-institutional entity produced 
by the union of four nations. The longstanding coexistence on the subcontinent 
of different levels of belonging that emerges from Bayly’s analysis would also last, 
with numerous developments, until the twentieth century, when a ‘softer’ model of 
an Indian nation, conceived as a federal union of regional homelands, was actually 
competing with a more rigid form of unitary state, which would remain an impor-
tant alternative well into the twentieth century.21 This elaboration of federal insti-
tutional models, with indigenous roots at the intellectual level, may thus represent 
an innovative, and not solely English, standpoint from which to analyse the phase 
between the first and second post-war periods when a number of theorists of the 
British Empire proposed to involve a non-European colony for the first time in that 
experiment in some new kind of federalism which was the British Commonwealth. 
The second of the indigenous elements identified by Bayly as preconditions 
for the development of Indian nationalism—namely, the existence of an “in-
creasingly sophisticated regional and even interregional system of communi-
cation”22—strengthened the profile of a supra-local and supra-regional Indian 
‘imagined community’. This complex communication system at the origin of 
what Bayly calls the Indian “ecumene” was the subject of another of his books.23 
The most interesting aspect of the core theme of this essay is Bayly’s emphasis on 
the ‘literacy awareness’ of the largely illiterate Indian society. On the one hand, 
this can be seen in the extensive use of various types of written media, such as 
private letters and newsletters; and, on the other, in a dense informal network 
comprising numerous actors—from astrologers to singers, midwives and media-
tors—who, as they moved around the territory, contributed to the development 
of indigenous systems of knowledge and the collection of information, flows of 
Dream: Historians and the British Commonwealth of Nations in the First Half of the 20th 
Century,” The Round Table, 93 (2004), no. 376: 517-532.
20 T. Tagliaferri, “Greater Britain, Stati Uniti, India nella visione imperiale di John R. Seeley,” 
Archivio di storia della cultura, 21 (2008): 7-94; L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707-
1873 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
21 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 119-121.
22 Ibid., 20.
23 C.A. Bayly, Empire and Information. Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in 
India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For an analysis of this text, 
see the contribution in this volume by G. Abbattista.
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ideas and news. The density and flexibility of these indigenous communications 
systems are considered fundamental in explaining phenomena that would other-
wise be difficult to interpret. To begin with, the existence of this communicative 
fabric made it possible to take advantage of periodicals supporting nationalist 
movements in Northern India after their wide-scale distribution in the 1830s 
and 1840s; secondly, it explains how it was possible to create a widespread and 
popular nationalist movement in a country that was essentially poor and largely 
illiterate.24
While appreciating this dimension of social communication prior to “print 
capitalism”,25 Bayly also distances himself from interpretations such as Ander-
son’s—and Gellner’s26—that tended to consider nationalism as the product of 
profound schisms linked to decisive processes of change, such as industrializa-
tion, print capitalism and the advent of public education. Rather than a sharp 
contrast between tradition and modernity, Bayly prefers the prospect of a gradual 
and modulated change, where pre-existing elements were not supplanted by new 
horizons but formed their very basis. Thus, the author’s emphasis is on the craft 
industry or the expansion of literacy, considered vectors of change that would 
then continue to inform subsequent models. In this sense, the North Indian 
ecumene, characterized by various analogies with the public sphere as theorized 
by Habermas, represented a form of political and cultural debate in a period 
preceding the widespread use of newspapers, later destined to cohabit with the 
new forms of communication and the journalism of the age of nationalism. It 
testified at any rate to the emergence of a public sphere which, according to an 
interpretation that Bayly developed in The Birth of the Modern World, cannot be 
considered exclusive to eighteenth century Europe.27
These old forms of patriotism and the Indian ecumene are the two elements 
in pre-colonial India upon which nationalism was later developed and grafted at 
the time of its encounter with colonialism. This meeting, both at the time of the 
East India Company and in the subsequent phase of British domination, set in 
motion crucial dynamics and mechanisms for the development of Indian nation-
24 Bayly, “Introduction” to idem, Empire and Information.
25 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983).
26 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).
27 For a critical analysis of this theme, see the contribution by M. Meriggi in this volume.
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alism.28 First and foremost, in the period between 1760 and 1860, the presence 
of the British intensified traditional forms of patriotism. For Bayly, the chain of 
revolts between 1760 and 1850 and the 1857 rebellion must both be interpreted 
as patriotic revolts, supported by significant strata of the population. Secondly, 
contact with the British sparked extremely vigorous public debate that belonged 
to and enlivened the traditional arena of political exchange constituted by the 
Indian ecumene, to the point that Sir John Malcolm was able to define “our In-
dian Empire” as “an Empire of opinion”.29
Moreover, the very nature of this debate was extremely diverse. On the one 
hand, it was heavily influenced by criticism in Great Britain of the way the East 
India Company worked, as well as by information concerning the struggles of 
other peoples against colonial expansion. On the other hand, the Indian public 
debate was fed by old traditions of political ethics and regional patriotism. More-
over, some of the key arguments in defence of Hinduism and Indian integrity 
re-emerged in 1885 at the first general Indian National Congress in Bombay. By 
now, however, they had been reshaped by a century of confrontation, debate and 
conflict with the British rulers. Bayly’s reconstruction does not in fact aim to sug-
gest a sort of uninterrupted continuity in the development of Indian nationalism; 
rather, it shows how “old patriotisms and, more recently, nationalisms, have long 
been making and remaking each other within the context of the British Em-
pire”.30 For example, Bayly recorded the coexistence, after 1857, of three different 
kinds of discourse in the field of developments in nationalism, where belonging to 
different religious communities and the persistence of old patriotic themes existed 
alongside a nationalism derived from Western ideologies, emphasizing modern in-
dustry and the importance of the international role of India.31 This also indicates 
that Bayly does not presuppose an essentially Indian path to nationalism. 
Naturally, Bayly aims to counter the theory of derived nationalism using the 
specificities of the Indian context and the long-term elements that can be seen on 
the conceptual, emotional and communicative levels, which not only favoured 
28 In Origins of Nationality Bayly analysed this encounter in the essays on “Patriotism and 
Ethical Government, c. 1780-1860” (ibid., 63-97) and “Patriotism and Nationalism” (ibid., 98-
132), but also in some important pages of the chapter devoted to “The Consolidation of Indian 
Patrias and the Colonial Encounter” (ibid., 49-59).
29 Ibid., 64.
30 Ibid., 99.
31 Ibid., 93-94.
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the entrenchment of nationalistic ideologies, but continued to characterize them 
for a long time to come, as emerges from an analysis of political activity in the 
major cities on the Indian subcontinent between 1880 and 1930.32 
The most interesting feature of his interpretation, however, is that, while sup-
porting the thesis that Indian nationalism was rooted in the indigenous social, po-
litical and cultural fabric and was not merely a heterodirect product of European 
political discourse, he points out that the “indigenous inheritance” was transformed 
and reworked in the context of contacts, exchanges and transfers typical of the im-
perial models.33 And these exchanges were not unilateral. It should not be forgotten 
that in the early days of the empire—while, as we have seen, Indian patriotisms had 
to reckon with the political culture and ambitions of the newcomers—British na-
tionality found itself being defined as much in the home country as in the colonies. 
A number of aspects of the British and Indian political identities were therefore 
taking shape at the same time, and not without confrontation and conflict. 
Once again, therefore, Bayly distances himself from Chatterjee who, in his 
second work, The Nation and its Fragments34, revises his previous position, now 
distinguishing between a more external, material sphere, borrowed from the 
Western model, and a more internal, spiritual, specifically Indian one. Bayly, 
on the other hand, is unable to consider Indian spirituality as immune to both 
modernization and colonization, since, in the imperial framework of exchange 
and circulation of ideas and political models, “all were to some degree hybrid”.35
Thus, Bayly seems to avoid the risk identified by Conrad of distinguishing 
between form, understood in universal and transferable terms, and content, seen 
as culturally more specific, in the study of the nation from the global perspec-
tive.36 The scope of this volume should not then be underestimated: twenty 
years on, it still offers extremely important elements for the study of a subject—
the nation—which, far from being outdated, remains a central topic in global 
history, one of whose most recent challenges is precisely the analysis of concepts 
and institutional models as products of global processes. 
32 Ibid., 110-111.
33 Ibid., 127
34 P. Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993). 
35 Bayly, Origins of Nationality, 103.
36 S. Conrad, Storia globale. Un’ introduzione (Rome: Carocci, 2015; original German edition 
2013), 146-150, esp. 149.
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Some studies on the processes of development of nationalisms outside Eu-
rope have examined, for example, the impact of Western paradigms of nation 
and nationalism on the Muslim world37 and Africa.38 What such studies have 
shown is how nationalism in non-Western contexts has been expressed in origi-
nal forms, through confrontation and resistance, but also as a hybridization with 
a local cultural substratum that, far from being erased by European models, 
is subsumed within them, to borrow a term used by Bayly himself.39 Similar-
ly, more recent studies have insisted on the importance of global processes and 
transregional connections for nation building in India,40 China,41 Japan42 and 
the West itself, such as in Germany43 or the United States.44
In the essays collected in Origin of Nationality in South Asia discussed here, In-
dian nationalism emerges mainly as the result of the circulation of ideologies and 
exchanges of ideas and models which, despite taking place in a non-egalitarian 
context marked by the colonial power relationship, also developed on a level that 
was in many ways horizontal and in no way unilateral. It was thus in his specialist 
studies on India that Bayly began to outline his interpretation of the development 
of nationalism outside Europe that would be given greater coverage in The Birth of 
the Modern World. Compared with the 2004 work, however, where Europe always 
made the first move while non-European peoples were seen as having agency in a 
response that, albeit formulated in terms of resistance or creative reworking, was 
still a response, in Bayly’s 1998 book the key note seems to be the syncretic, hybrid 
nature of ideologies and political models resulting from the dynamics of interac-
tion and exchange which are currently of core interest to global history.
37 A.K. Bennison, “Muslim Universalism and Western Globalization,” in Globalization in 
World History, edited by A.G. Hopkins (London: Vintage Digital 2011), 74-97.
38 J. Lonsdale, “Globalization, Ethnicity and Democracy: A View from ‘The Hopeless Conti-
nent’”, ibid., 194-219.
39 C.A. Bayly, “‘Archaic’ and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 
1750-1850,” ibid., 47-63.
40 M. Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2004).
41 R. Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century (Dur-
ham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002)., 
42 C. Hill, National History and the World of Nations: Capital State and the Rhetoric of History in 
Japan, France and the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008).
43 S. Conrad, Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2006).
44 T. Bender, A Nation among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2006).
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